Israel Gets Medieval On Hezbollah’s Ass

Israel is among the most technologically sophisticated nations in the world, with a highly developed military technology sector, so it was a surprise to read that they’re using a medieval siege engine to fight Hezbollah.

A short six-second video showing soldiers using what appeared to be a type of medieval trebuchet in northern Israel went viral online today, prompting questions about what the centuries-old contraption was meant to be doing while Israel is embroiled in large-scale combat operations in Gaza and trading strikes with Hezbollah at the Lebanese border.

Here’s a Livemap snap of the Israeli-Lebanese border:

That’s all Israeli activity, so there doesn’t seem to be a lot of “trading” going on today…

In the video at least six soldiers can be seen standing around what appears to be a trebuchet, a type of catapult…

No, a trebuchet is a completely different types of medieval siege engine than a catapult, using a counterweight system rather cranked tension.

…as it launches a flaming ball over a concrete wall. The trebuchet appears to be about 12 feet tall and is on a small wheeled trailer. In the video Hebrew is heard from one of the soldiers, who seems to be in command. After one flaming ball is launched over the concrete barrier, he tells the soldiers to run and add another. One soldier holds a fire extinguisher, apparently in case of a misfire.

As odd as it looks, Israeli media confirmed that the video was real, reporting that the IDF had said that it was a local initiative of a unit and not a tool that has come into widespread use, according to Israel’s Kan public broadcaster. It was purportedly the work of reservists stationed near the border with Lebanon, and the Jerusalem Post reported it was filmed weeks ago. The IDF did not respond to Breaking Defense’s request for comment about the video.

A trebuchet is a relatively simple type of catapult that uses a long arm with a heavy weight on one end attached to an axle closer to the heavy weight. It was a popular siege weapon during the 12th to 16th centuries. The arm is pulled down and a projectile is put in a sling, such that when the arm is released the heavy weight rapidly pulls it up and it slings the projectile far into the distance. The one in the video appears to have been constructed from commercially available wood. It’s not clear what was used as a counterweight or how the flaming ball of fire was constructed.

As for its objective, Israeli media reported the IDF unit is most likely attempting to set fire to underbrush in southern Lebanon, which the IDF says Hezbollah uses as cover to get into position to launch attacks on northern Israel.

And here’s the video, which also shows IDF forces using flaming arrows from a bow to set fire to the undergrowth as well:

The old cyberpunk adage “the street finds its own use for things” comes to mind.

Lebanon could, of course, keep Israel from hurling flaming trebuchet balls into its country by preventing Hezbollah from launching terrorist attacks against Israel from insider its borders. This it seems both unwilling and unable to do, not least of which because Hezbollah is actually a member of the ruling minority “March 8 Alliance” caretaker government. The government of Lebanon is so dysfunctional that the office of president (traditionally a Maronite Christian) has been vacant since Michel Aoun stepped down in 2022, as parliament has been unable to agree on a successor.

As I’ve noted before, for all the talk of Hezbollah opening up a “second front” while Israel whales on Hamas like Boom Boom Mancini TKOing Bobby Chacon, but they seem to have done very little but the usual pinprick terror attacks. Hezbollah’s paymasters in Damascus and Tehran seem too busy with their own troubles to offer their Lebanese catspaw much help right now.

(Previous “fun with trebuchets” coverage can be found here.)

Tags: , , , , , , , , , , ,

9 Responses to “Israel Gets Medieval On Hezbollah’s Ass”

  1. Big D says:

    Technically, the author is correct. “Catapult” refers to any projectile-throwing pre-gunpowder artillery piece; what we think of when we hear the word is technically an onager, which historically was very rare and only really used for a few hundred years before being essentially replaced by the mangonel, which is basically a trebuchet that uses ropes pulled by men attached to the short arm instead of a falling weight.

    I’m not certain how the onager became synonymous with catapults in the modern day; my best guess is that Wile E. Coyote had considerable influence on the matter, but the trend may already have been in place by that point.

  2. Malthus says:

    “[T]he IDF had said that it was a LOCAL INITIATIVE of a unit and not a tool that has come into widespread use,..”

    It is deliciously ironic that Israel has adopted the Prussian model of pushing decision making down to the lower ranks.

    The Prussian doctrine of “Auftragstaktik” was developed as a response by the Prussians to their losses at the hands of Napoleon. Needing a way to systematically counter their brilliant adversary, they concluded that the use of strict military hierarchy and central strategic control was ineffective in realizing the general mission-based, strategic goals that prevailed on the line of contact. This necessitated pushing down decision making to well-trained non-commissioned officers who were overseeing troops at the front and who required flexibility and independence to make tactical decisions without consulting their far removed commanders.

    The Israelis are vastly better trained and equipped that their primitive screw headed adversaries. In any one-on-one contact, the IDF will prevail. Joebama’s man love for Hamas will avail them nothing. Hizballah will learn a similar lesson soon.

  3. Kirk says:

    Malthus said:

    “The Prussian doctrine of “Auftragstaktik” was developed as a response by the Prussians to their losses at the hands of Napoleon. Needing a way to systematically counter their brilliant adversary, they concluded that the use of strict military hierarchy and central strategic control was ineffective in realizing the general mission-based, strategic goals that prevailed on the line of contact. This necessitated pushing down decision making to well-trained non-commissioned officers who were overseeing troops at the front and who required flexibility and independence to make tactical decisions without consulting their far removed commanders.”

    Solid encapsulation of the concept, and a powerful refutation of the ideas commonly held about “Prussian rigidity” in education and military operations. If anything, the Germans were too open to people doing their own thing, like Rommel’s various strategic blunders like trying to take Egypt in the face of logistics issues.

    The Israeli military culture has a lot of things going for it, one of which is that they believe in selecting their leaders from within the ranks. You’ll never hear about the equivalent of a lateral placement from civilian life into a combat leadership role; those are strictly reserved to technical skills only. Everyone else comes up the ranks from below, and has to prove their fitness at every level. You don’t become an NCO without being successful at being a private; you don’t become an officer without being a successful junior NCO.

    They also don’t suffer from the idea that you need a college-level education to be a company grade officer: In the Israeli system, your typical officer won’t even go to college until about the point where they’re becoming a staff officer at major or higher. Up to that point, all you need is a high school diploma equivalent.

    The Israelis do a lot of things right in their military, some things wrong. I’d particularly point out the way they operate with regards to what they term “Purity of Arms”, which is an all-encompassing code of conduct for the soldier. The US equivalent basically only address how to behave if captured, and you never, ever talk about the stress of killing or making mistakes in combat… Which is a huge part of why we have higher levels of PTSD in veterans, in my opinion.

  4. tim maguire says:

    I imagine they used it because they had it. Wouldn’t you?

  5. Seawriter says:

    “Up to that point, all you need is a high school diploma equivalent.”

    Well, the mid-20th century high school diploma equivalent, at least in the US. I’m not sure the 21st century US HSD, especially one granted by a public school is much more than a participation trophy.

  6. ed in texas says:

    Makes you wonder how they budget for these things. I mean, applying for funds to build a fire throwing trebuchet can’t be on a standard form. At least, I wouldn’t think so.

  7. I mean, applying for funds to build a fire throwing trebuchet can’t be on a standard form. At least, I wouldn’t think so.

    Actually, the Israeli Army has standard forms for siege engines that work with each of the four classical elements.

    Not that the wind-throwing ballistae get much use…

  8. Malthus says:

    “The Israeli military culture has a lot of things going for it, one of which is that they believe in selecting their leaders from within the ranks.”

    In addition, they do not isolate and protect their best assets by making them REMFs. In the first month following the Hamas attack of October 7, fully half of the IDF’s casualties (27/54) were suffered by Sergeants, Lieutenants and Captains. I was simultaneously appalled and curiously impressed.

    In Second Samuel 21:17b we read that…[King] David’s men swore to him, saying, “Never again will you go out with us to battle, so that the lamp of Israel will not be extinguished.”

    Prior to this prohibition, David had led his troops to victory in 44 battles(!?). The ancient Israelites fought side-by-side with their Kings. This ethos seems to have seeped into the IDF because even their Generals can be seen with their boots on the ground and a rifle on their back as they trod among the smoldering ruins of Hamas strongholds.

  9. Kirk says:

    Military culture is a fascinating subject. You can tell a lot about a country by the customs and traditions of the forces it produces, and you can equally predict a lot about those forces if you know the characteristics of the culture said military is recruited from.

    You go looking, and you’ll find that a lot of stereotypes are actual factual features in real life. The correlation between stereotype and reality is often disturbingly high.

    What’s fascinating, too, is just how long-lived these things can be. The US has been utter shiite when it comes to building up other nation’s forces; do a quick compare/contrast between the US with the Philippines before WWII and the British experience with the Gurkhas during the 19th Century. Or, between the Arab Legion and any of the various armed forces raised by American allies in the Middle East. US success at training/managing forces in Africa are another example; compare anything we’ve done in Niger or Nigeria with the King’s African Rifles or the Germans with their Askari troops under von Lettow-Vorbeck.

    Contemplate the lengthy list of failures like South Vietnam and Afghanistan, and wonder how/why we lost the bubble between the hallowed Indian Scouts and today’s multitudinous failures with foreign cultures…

Leave a Reply