Let’s look at what the most logical outcome to Hamas’ largest large scale attack on Israel might be.
You’re not going to like it.
First, some context in this Haviv Rettig Gur Times of Israel piece linked by David Bernstein at Instapundit:
It was a horror, interminable, impossible. Hour after hour, families sat huddled in their homes awaiting rescue from the Hamas fighters streaming through their towns and villages.
Families were butchered in cold blood. In one home, a terrorist shot the parents dead, took a child’s cellphone and started broadcasting it all in a livestream on their Facebook account. Grandmothers were pulled in wheelchairs to waiting vehicles ready to carry them as hostages into Gaza. Then came the mothers carrying babies. Footage circulated on social media, put there by Hamas, of an Israeli child asking his mother if the gunmen that surrounded them were going to kill them. “They said they won’t,” the mother replied as they were taken outside to some unknown fate.
The stream of videos didn’t stop. An IDF soldier’s body was paraded in Gaza. A young woman, bleeding, was pulled by the hair from a car after being kidnapped and taken into the Strip. And all of it was broadcast by Hamas to the world in joyful pride, sparking celebrations in Tehran, Ramallah and no small part of the online pro-Palestinian activist world.
And all the while came the stream of messages on Twitter and Whatsapp from Israelis still surrounded by the roving gunmen, friends and relatives begging for a rescue that never came.
Hour after agonizing hour.
Snip.
Until Saturday, Israelis believed they were strong and safe. On Saturday, they started to believe that they were neither.
In that simple shift, the Hamas attack was massively successful.
As Palestinian Islamic Jihad spokesman Abu Hamza put it while the attack was still underway: “This powerful enemy is an illusion made of dust and capable of being defeated and broken. Our heroes made the enemy small and humiliated, feeling death everywhere.”
Theories abound about Hamas’s reasons for the assault. Many suggested it was an Iranian-ordered disruption of Israeli-Saudi normalization. Others focused on internal Palestinian politics and suggested Hamas was positioning itself, even at the cost of an inevitable and crushing Israeli retaliation, as the unquestioned leader of the Palestinian struggle after Mahmoud Abbas’s death. Still others said the reasons were simpler: The two Hamas leaders in Gaza who prepared and launched the operation were military chief Muhammad Deif and political head Yihye Sinwar. The first lost his family to an Israeli airstrike aimed at him, the second sat 22 years in an Israeli prison. Neither needed an overwrought geopolitical rationale to piece together such an operation.
There is probably some truth in all these theories. All make sense. But none are how Hamas itself explained the operation in real-time.
Here lies a part of Palestinian thinking and discourse that many of Palestine’s Western defenders ignore, both because it’s a hard sell to Western audiences and because they don’t really understand it themselves. Palestinian “resistance,” as conceived by Hamas, is about much more than settlements, occupation or the Green Line. A larger theory of Islamic renewal is at work.
As he announced the start of Saturday’s attack, Hamas military commander Deif said it was meant to disrupt a planned Israeli demolition of the Al-Aqsa Mosque. And when Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh called on Saturday for “every Muslim everywhere and all the free people of the world to stand in this just battle in defense of Al-Aqsa and the Prophet’s mission,” he meant just that, that the fight was over holy things, over Islam’s redemptive promise.
This reclamation of Islamic dignity through the ultimate defeat of the Jews occupies a great deal of Hamas’s political thought, permeates its rhetoric and profoundly shapes its thinking about Israeli Jews and its strategy in facing Israel. Israel is more than a mere occupier or oppressor in this narrative, it is a rebellion against God and the divinely-ordained trajectory of history. And by showing Israelis in their weakness, the thinking goes, Israelis are somehow actually made weak. Redemption requires only the faith of its believers to be fulfilled, and seeing is believing.
The footage from Saturday, the snuff videos shared gleefully by Hamas supporters, including in some Western far-left circles, weren’t an aberration. Hamas gunmen didn’t get “carried away,” as some explained. They were the essence of the whole enterprise. They were Hamas’s basic message to Israelis: That they weren’t being killed and kidnapped just for tactical advantage in the struggle for Palestinian independence, but rather were being humiliated and dehumanized as traitors against God.
Snip.
The Israel that emerged from Hamas’s “Al-Aqsa Deluge” operation was different from the one that went into it. A tectonic shift had occurred in the country’s psyche. The horrors inflicted by Hamas sparked rage and an intense feeling of vulnerability. Where Hamas had always seemed an implacable but ultimately containable enemy, it had now proven it could bring the danger into Israeli homes, could slaughter children and kidnap grandmothers while all the vaunted power of the Israel Defense Forces was helpless to stop it.
Hamas had made itself an intolerable threat.
The change is so profound and palpable that many Israeli analysts, apparently assuming that Hamas understands the consequences that this psychological fallout will have for Gaza, argued on Saturday that the terror group was surprised by its own success.
“In my estimation,” tweeted analyst Avi Issacharoff, “the military and political leadership of Hamas did not expect these successes. They meant to kidnap two or three as part of a massive killing spree. But this many? Their problem is that this success may turn into a Pyrrhic victory. It seems to me there’s now a consensus in the Israeli elite and among the public that what was won’t be anymore.”
Snip.
There are many different kinds of power. There is the power of the confident, safe and strong. But there’s also the very different sort of power of the wounded, weak and desperate. These are psychological states, not objective realities. And pivoting from one to the other changes everything.
“A wounded tiger,” Arthur Golden wrote in Memoirs of a Geisha, “is a dangerous beast.”
It’s an image with a long pedigree in Israeli strategic thinking. Moshe Dayan was said to have urged Israel to act like a “wounded tiger,” unpredictable and desperate, to deter its enemies from attack.
Palestinians sometimes use the image to mock Israel or shrug off the impact of an Israeli reprisal attack.
Hamas is now putting that old adage to the test. Israelis can handle humiliation; they are less moved by the politics of honor than are their enemies. But these heirs of a collective memory forged in the fires of the 20th century cannot handle the experience of defenselessness Hamas has imposed on them. Hamas seemed to do everything possible to shift Israeli psychology from a comfortable faith in their own strength to a sense of dire vulnerability.
And it will soon learn the scale of that miscalculation. A strong Israel may tolerate a belligerent Hamas on its border; a weaker one cannot. A safe Israel can spend much time and resources worrying about the humanitarian fallout from a Gaza ground war; a more vulnerable Israel cannot.
A wounded, weakened Israel is a fiercer Israel.
Hamas was once a tolerable threat. It just made itself an intolerable one, all while convincing Israelis they are too vulnerable and weak to respond with the old restraint.
I largely agree with this analysis. Also, for the first time since the Yom Kippur War, Israel has formally declared war on Hamas, which means that what will now ensue will be a very different type of war than Operation Cast Lead.
Let’s review how Israel had tried to deal with Hamas:
- Israel tried occupying Gaza. That didn’t work.
- Israel tried building walls and letting Hamas run Gaza. That didn’t work.
This leads inexorably to the only viable solution for Israel to prevent Hamas attacking and murdering Israeli citizens from Gaza.
- Palestinians will no longer be allowed to occupy Gaza.
No Palestinians in Gaza = No terror attacks from Gaza.
Occupation didn’t work. Coexistence didn’t work. But ethnic cleansing will.
Keep in mind, it doesn’t have to be the ethnic cleansing Nazi Germany inflicted on Europe during World War II. It could be the ethnic cleansing the Allies implemented in Europe after World War II. If you were an ethnic German east of the Oder-Neisse line, you were no longer be allowed to live where you were. If you were lucky, maybe you got to pack a few suitcases before being trucked west. That’s what happens when your nation starts an illegal war of aggression and loses.
The parallels with Hamas and Gaza are obvious.
Palestinians could be deported from the Gaza strip and replaced with Israeli settlers. Hell, Israel is rich enough that it could even financially compensate existing land owners. With Israelis running and owning everything, and no more money spent on murder tunnels and rocket attacks, Gaza would quickly transition from a clapped-out Arab city to a modern western one. In ten years, all that valuable seaside property is going to look more like the French Riviera than a Damascus slum.
And where will Israel forcibly relocate Palestinians to? Obviously the West Bank. Moreover, beyond war crime trials for the leaders, Israel doesn’t even need to slaughter Hamas footsoliders off the battlefield. They merely need to hand them over to the tender mercies of hated rival Fatah, who will no doubt be delighted to do it for them. And Palestinian-on-Palestinian bloodletting rarely makes the nightly news. In their heart of hearts, Fatah probably hates Jews almost as much as Hamas, but they no longer make such a public spectacle of their hatred. Why divert all that international guilt-geld into missiles and murder tunnels when it can be more profitably diverted to high living and Swiss bank accounts? Fatah’s current corrupt state is largely a regression to the Arab governing mean.
Would Egypt object? Formally, I’m sure. But remember that the current Egyptian government is in power because they literally deposed their own homegrown jihadist lunatics. An Israeli Gaza would probably offer Egypt a lot of economic growth possibilities, from more direct rail and road ties to be having low-labor-cost Egyptian maquiladoras for Israeli factories in Gaza.
How would the rest of the Arab World react to genteel ethnic cleansing of Gaza? The first answer is “Who cares?” The second answer is feigned indignation masking real indifference. It’s an open secret that other Arabs hate the Palestinians and treat them like dirt. No Arab state in 2023 is going to war over Gaza. The worst you’ll see is some more toothless UN resolutions, and maybe temporary suspensions of trade agreements, followed by quiet reinstatement 6 months to a year later. Hamas is backed by Saudi Arabia’s bitter rival Iran, so don’t expect many tears to be shed over their demise in Riyadh.
Expect impotent rage among European lefty types at their favorite victims/psychopathic killers getting snuffed out. But when has Europe needed an excuse to hate Jews? Europe will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitz. Expect a few mostly toothless trade sanctions and cancellation of a few meaningless cultural exchange programs. They probably won’t even suspend Israel from the Eurovision Song Contest. Plus the Russo-Ukrainian War is still going to be the top foreign policy concern in the EU for some time to come.
And the Biden Administration? Certainly the ideological core of the Democratic Party is hostile to Israel, but Biden himself has made all the proper noises condemning Hamas. U.S.-Israeli defense and intelligence cooperation goes so deep into the deep state that it’s hard to see anything short of Israel tossing nukes around to sever it. And even that might not be enough. And Biden is unlikely to want to risk alienating Jewish voters (and donors) ahead of the 2024 Presidential election.
Israel has declared war on Hamas, and countries that lose wars (as opposed to police actions) typically lose territory. Spain lost numerous overseas territories following the loss of the Spanish-American War. Today no party in Madrid demands the reconquest of Guam.
After disposing of as many Hamas fighters as it deems necessary, Fatah might be too hard pressed to deal with the sudden influx of population to launch a futile intifada to recapture Gaza. Hell, Israel might even give some West Bank settlements back in order to transfer Jewish settlers to Gaza.
Keep in mind, I’m not advocating this as a course of action (not my circus, not my monkeys). I’m saying that if Israel has finally found the existence of a jihadist death cult that periodically kidnaps, tortures and murders Israeli civilians for the crime of being Jews on its doorstep intolerable, as now appears to be the case, then this is the one course of action that logic dictates is necessary to ensure, with absolute, 100% certainty, that it never happens again.
And if Fatah does decide to follow Hamas’ path of total war against Jews? Israel can build it’s defensive wall higher and deeper. If the situation becomes intolerable in 2053, or 2073, then the same solution may come into play again.
From the river to the sea, Israel would be free…of Palestinians.