Posts Tagged ‘Uralvagonzavod’

Tank News Roundup For October 18, 2023

Wednesday, October 18th, 2023

A fair amount of tank news has built up in the hopper over the last month or so (some, but not all, related to the Russo-Ukraine War), so let’s do a roundup.

The U.S. Army has announced that it’s not doing an M1A2SEPv4, and instead will produced the M1E3.

The U.S. Army is scrapping its current upgrade plans for the Abrams main battle tank and pursuing a more significant modernization effort to increase its mobility and survivability on the battlefield, the service announced in a statement Wednesday.

The Army will end its M1A2 System Enhancement Package version 4 program, and instead develop the M1E3 Abrams focused on challenges the tank is likely to face on the battlefield of 2040 and beyond, the service said. The service was supposed to receive the M1A2 SEPv4 version this past spring.

The SEPv4 will not go into production as planned, Army Under Secretary Gabe Camarillo told Defense News in a Sept. 6 interview at the Defense News Conference in Arlington, Virginia. “We’re essentially going to invest those resources into the [research and] development on this new upgraded Abrams,” he said. “[I]t’s really threat-based, it’s everything that we’re seeing right now, even recently in Ukraine in terms of a native active protection system, lighter weight, more survivability, and of course reduced logistical burdens as well for the Army.”

The Abrams tank “can no longer grow its capabilities without adding weight, and we need to reduce its logistical footprint,” Maj. Gen. Glenn Dean, the Army’s program executive officer for ground combat systems, said in the statement. “The war in Ukraine has highlighted a critical need for integrated protections for soldiers, built from within instead of adding on.”

Ukraine’s military will have the chance to put the M1 Abrams to the test when it receives the tanks later this month. The country is fighting off a Russian invasion that began nearly two years ago.

The M1E3 Abrams will “include the best features” of the M1A2 SEPv4 and will be compliant with modular open-systems architecture standards, according to the statement, which will allow for faster and more efficient technology upgrades. “This will enable the Army and its commercial partners to design a more survivable, lighter tank that will be more effective on the battlefield at initial fielding and more easy to upgrade in the future.”

“We appreciate that future battlefields pose new challenges to the tank as we study recent and ongoing conflicts,” said Brig. Gen. Geoffrey Norman, director of the Next-Generation Combat Vehicle Cross-Functional Team. “We must optimize the Abrams’ mobility and survivability to allow the tank to continue to close with and destroy the enemy as the apex predator on future battlefields.”

Norman, who took over the team last fall, spent seven months prior to his current job in Poland with the 1st Infantry Division. He told Defense News last year that the division worked with Poles, Lithuanians and other European partners on the eastern flank to observe happenings in Ukraine.

Weight is a major inhibitor of mobility, Norman said last fall. “We are consistently looking at ways to drive down the main battle tank’s weight to increase our operational mobility and ensure we can present multiple dilemmas to the adversary by being unpredictable in where we can go and how we can get there.”

General Dynamic Land Systems, which manufactures the Abrams tank, brought what it called AbramsX to the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual conference in October 2022. AbramsX is a technology demonstrator with reduced weight and the same range as the current tank with 50% less fuel consumption, the American firm told Defense News ahead of the show.

The AbramsX has a hybrid power pack that enables a silent watch capability and “some silent mobility,” which means it can run certain systems on the vehicle without running loud engines.

The tank also has an embedded artificial intelligence capability that enables “lethality, survivability, mobility and manned/unmanned teaming,” GDLS said.

The Army did not detail what the new version might include, but GDLS is using AbramsX to define what is possible in terms of weight reduction, improved survivability and a more efficient logistics tail.

The Army awarded GDLS a contract in August 2017 to develop the SEPv4 version of the tank with a plan then to make a production decision in fiscal 2023, followed by fielding to the first brigade in fiscal 2025.

The keystone technology of the SEPv4 version consisted of a third-generation forward-looking infrared camera and a full-sight upgrade including improved target discrimination.

“I think the investment in subsystem technologies in the v4 will actually carry over into the upgraded ECP [Engineering Change Proposal] program for Abrams,” Camarillo said. “However, the plan is to have robust competition at the subsystem level for a lot of what the new ECP will call for, so we’re going to look for best-of-breed tech in a lot of different areas,” such as active protection systems and lighter weight materials.

For instance, the Army has kitted out the tank with Trophy active protection systems as an interim solution to increase survivability. The Israeli company Rafael Advanced Defense Systems develops the Trophy. But since the system is not integrated into the design of the vehicle, it adds significant weight, sacrificing mobility.

The Army plans to produce the M1A2 SEPv3 at a reduced rate until it can transition the M1E3 into production.

Which looks to be 2030.

Nicholas Moran looks at what this might or might not mean in practical terms, with an emphasis on what it doesn’t say:

  • “We have about 10 years that the SEPv3 is the latest and greatest.”
  • “They are actually going to backfill some of the v4 modernizations to the v3.”
  • “‘The Abrams tank can no longer grow its capabilities without adding weight and we need to reduce its logistical footprint.’…There’s two parts to that one sentence that have a lot of digging into.”
  • “The Abrams started at 55 tons…now the v3 is 72 1/2 tons. If you add the Trophy APS, that’s an additional two and a half tons on its own. Then you put the reactive armor tiles on the side. Oh! Let’s put a mine plow on the front. Now your M1 is breaking 83 tons.”
  • One way to shed weight is with a smaller turret, like the Abrams X.
  • “What it doesn’t say in here, and what they’re not saying, is just how much weight are they trying to shed. Because if you’re trying to shed five to ten tons, that’s one thing. If you’re trying to shed 20 to 30 tons, then that’s something else entirely.”
  • The Abrams is essentially an analog tank which has had digital systems bolted onto it. “the upgrades that we have paid for our tanks have not been integrated upgrades from basically the ground up.” We’ve bolted on integrations modules, each of which adds weight.
  • “You can probably shave a few tons without touching the form factor of the M1A2 one bit.”
  • “Rip out the guts. Rip out all the electrics, all the electronics, and replace it from something that is designed and programmed from the ground up to be completely integrated.”
  • Replace the M256 cannon with the XM360, “which, as far as I know, does work. You install that you’ve shaved a ton off already.”
  • Replace the turret hydraulics with electrics.
  • Swap out copper wiring for fiber optics.
  • “So getting it from this current 73 tons down to, oh, let’s say 65 tons, probably isn’t all that hard.”
  • “If you want to take off more weight, you’re gonna have to look at a more radical redesign.” Like an unmanned turret.
  • Reduced logistics could go a lot of ways, some outside the tank. 80 ton tanks require beefy bridges, like the Joint Assault Bridge. (I include this because of my readers’ passionate opinions on proper battlefield bridging techniques.)
  • If you mean fuel efficiency, you can pull out the current gas turbine engine and replace it, either a more efficient turbine or something else.
  • “The Army has spent a lot of money paying Cummins to develop the Advanced Combat Engine. This is an opposed module, opposed piston modular engine, and it can be configured for 750 horsepower. I believe it’s just a six cylinder version to the 12 cylinder or piston version, which is a 1500 horsepower, the same as a turbine the same as modern MTU. It would make some sense that the Army is going to look very hard at this.” The AEC is a bit funky, with two pistons per cylinder working together to compress the gas. They claim it offers about 25% fuel economy and a similar reduction in waste heat.
  • They might also look at a hybrid power train.
  • You can also save logistical weight in spare parts. “If you were to rip the guts out of the tank and start from scratch, you can probably come up with a maintenance and logistics system for maintenance which is much more refined and efficient.”
  • “‘The war in Ukraine has highlighted a critical need for integrated protection from soldiers built from within instead of adding on.'”
  • “This has apparently been in the works for the better part of three years now. In 2020, the director of operational test and evaluation put out his annual report, and when it gets to the M1A2v3 section, it basically says ‘Guys, this is getting a little bit out of hand. The tank is a tad heavy.'”
  • “The Army understands that they’re pretty much at the limit.”
  • All this is being done now because Ukraine finally made them pay attention to things that had already been identified as problems but not addressed. “Something like the Ukraine conflict is a little bit of a kick in the pants, and it’s probably going to attract somebody’s attention and say ‘OK, yeah, this is what we need to do it.”
  • Trophy adds so much weight because you need to balance the turret. Redesigning the turret from the ground up solves that issue.
  • Modular open systems architecture standards: “The backbone, the central nervous system of these things, is a new version that’s compatible across vehicles.”
  • Chris Copson of The Tank Museum offers up an assessment of the use of tanks in Ukraine’s summer offensive (posted September 29).

  • “One commentator has been dubbing it ‘Schrodinger’s summer offensive.’ Is it or isn’t it, and it appears to be currently tentative at best.”
  • “We’re also seeing the tank struggling to assert influence in what has increasingly become a slog dominated by artillery.”
  • “Putin’s special military operation saw the Russian army fought to a standstill, and they’d suffered huge losses in men and material. But they’re still in possession a swathe of Ukrainian territory running through the Eastern Donbas right the way down to the coast of the Black Sea.”
  • “Russian forces have fallen back into a defensive posture behind layered defenses minefields, anti-tank obstacles and barbed wire.”
  • “Ukrainian response has been probing attacks in greater or lesser strength, and they’re starting to use some of their Western supplied military equipment to attempt to break through before the Autumn rains, and the rasputitsa, the roadless time, puts an end to the campaigning season.”
  • “Zelensky fought for supplies of modern Western military material, and, after quite a bit of hesitancy, it’s begun to arrive.”
  • “So far there’s been enough, we think, to equip up to 15 Ukrainian brigades, and each of those is going to be around about 3,000 personnel and about 200 vehicles of all types.”
  • He covers the trickle of Challenger 2s, Leopard 2s, Abrams, etc., and the capabilities of each, which we’ve already covered here.
  • “In the early stages of the invasion, February and March 2022, Russian tank losses have been estimated at anything from between 460 and 680 from a total inventory around about 2,700 in BTs. Both of those figures are estimates from Western or Ukrainian sources and they’re now putting the figure well over a thousand.”
  • “An awful lot of these losses seem to be in tanks and AFVs either stuck bellied out through poor driving, or run out of fuel. That’s just poor logistics.”
  • Russian tank units lack enough infantry support to protect their armored columns from Ukrainian anti-tank units.
  • “We’re starting to see images of Ukrainian Leopard 2s and Bradleys knocked out by mines or artillery in attempts to breach Russian layered defenses.”
  • Ukraine’s western tanks have much higher repairability than T-72s. “Western MBTs [are] designed so that an ammunition or propellant explosion actually vents to the outside, and this tends to maintain damaged vehicle’s integrity and make it repairable, as well as increasing the likelihood of crew survival.”
  • Damaged Leopard 2s are already being repaired.
  • “Because Russian industry is under the cosh, a shortage of chips and high-tech components, and that is because of the western embargo. The solution their general staff has come up with is to pull tanks out of storage, and this includes some very elderly models indeed. Some of the estimated 2,800 T-55s which comes into service.” Cold War designs.
  • “Commissioning tanks after decades in store is a huge undertaking. It’s not just a question of charge in the batteries, it’s more like a total rebuild.”
  • “They’re not likely to be in peak condition,” but might be OK in static defensive roles.
  • “There is evidence that at least one has been used as a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device.”
  • “Against tanks like Challenger, Leopard or Abrams in an open country tank engagement, it’s fairly obvious they wouldn’t make the grade.”
  • Keeping all the different western tanks supplied and running is going to be a huge challenge to Ukraine. “A range of different and very unfamiliar, in some cases artillery pieces, trucks, logistic vehicles. Now the range is huge. Finding trained mechanics and procuring a huge range of spares. It’s going to be a colossal headache.”
  • “Artillery is really of central importance to the Russian, and before that the Soviet, way of war. And it’s the primary lethality in deep and close battles. Now perhaps 70% percent of Ukrainian casualties so far are being caused by Russian artillery.”
  • “At present a [Russian] brigade grouping is assigned a brigade artillery group, BRAG, and that’s two battalions of self-propelled howitzers and a battalion of multi-barreled rocket launchers. Use is made of forward observers, unmanned aerial vehicles and artillery location radars to identify targets.”
  • “At its most effective this uses the Strelets reconnaissance fire system to pair tactical intelligence and reconnaissance assets with precision strike artillery, and that gives you real-time targeting [Reckify?] uses the 2K25 Krasnapol 152mm laser guided round, which is able to inflict accurate strikes.” But it doesn’t work so well with cloud cover.
  • “We’ve also heard quite a lot about the Lancet range of loitering munitions for precision targeting. The Lancet-3 drone has a 40 minute flight time and it counts a 3kg warhead.” Oryx credits over 100 kills to Lancets. “These mostly have been self-propelled artillery, but also tanks.”
  • “With the constant presence of surveillance drones and satellite intel, it is getting just about impossible to hide anything on the modern battlefield.”
  • “The main take-home from the current conflict, and this might be stating the blindingly obvious, is that the battlefield is a very open place these days, and tank tactics have to evolve to take this into account.”
  • One thing we haven’t seen much of recently: Russian air power.
  • “There seems to be some progress around Robotyne, and the Challenger 2, Maurder and Stryker IFVs of the 82nd Air Landing brigade have been deployed to bolster 47th Brigade. And there seems to be some penetration of the Russian air defenses. Ukrainian offensive has broken through the first of three defensive lines, but the progress is really slow, because you’ve got minefields, dragon’s teeth and anti-tank ditches, and the Russian forces are very well dug in.”
  • Finally, we have a report that Russia is resuming the long-halted production of T-80s.

    The Uralvagonzavod factory in Omsk, in Siberia, hasn’t manufactured a new T-80 hull since 1991. And work on the T-80’s GTD-1250 turbine, at the Kaluga plant, likewise has idled in the decades since the Soviet Union’s collapse.

    No, for nearly 30 years the Russian army has replenished its T-80 fleet with old, refurbished hulls and engines. Those hulls and engines obviously are beginning to run out as Russian tank losses in Ukraine exceed 2,000. For context, there were only around 3,000 active tanks in the entire Russian armed forces when Russia widened its war on Ukraine in February 2022.

    Uralvagonzavod produces just a few dozen new T-72B3s and T-90Ms every month: far too few to make good monthly tank losses averaging a hundred or more. That’s why, in the summer of 2022, the Kremlin began pulling out of storage hundreds of 1960s-vintage T-62s and ‘50s-vintage T-54s and T-55s.

    But the T-62s and T-54/55s, as well as only slightly less ancient war-reserve T-72 Urals and T-80Bs, are a stopgap. Some get fresh optics and add-on armor; many don’t. To sustain the war effort into year three, year four or year five, the Russian armed forces need new tanks. Lots of them.

    Thus it was unsurprising when, two weeks ago, Alexander Potapov, CEO of Uralvagonzavod, announced his firm would resume producing 46-ton, three-person T-80s “from scratch.”

    It’s a huge undertaking. While the Omsk factory still has the main T-80 tooling lying around somewhere, it must also reactive hundreds of suppliers in order to produce the tens of thousands of components it takes to assemble a T-80. That includes the gas-turbine engine.

    During the T-80’s initial production run between 1975 and 2001, Kaluga built thousands of 1,000-horsepower GTD-1000 and 1,250-horsepower GTD-1250s for the type. A thousand or more horses is a lot of power for a 46-ton tank: a Ukrainian-made T-64BV weighs 42 tons but has a comparatively anemic 850-horsepower diesel engine.

    The T-80’s excess power explains its high speed—44 miles per hour—and commensurately high fuel consumption, which limits its range to no more than 300 miles. Why then would Kaluga bother with a new 1,500-horsepower turbine?

    As long as certain Russian forces—airborne and marine regiments, for example—value speed over fuel-efficiency, it makes sense they’d want even more power for their new-build T-80s. A 1,500-horsepower engine also would give a next-generation T-80 lots of growth potential. Uralvagonzavod could pile on tons of additional armor without weighing down the tank.

    A few quick thoughts:

  • This hardly expresses confidence in the future of the T-14 Armata, does it now? (Speaking of which, they withdraw it from service in Ukraine, evidently without engaging any enemy tanks in anything but an indirect fire role (assuming they weren’t lying about that as well.))
  • If they’re struggling to produce just a few new T-72B3s and T-90Ms, why would producing T80s be any easier?
  • Russia announces a whole lot of things that never come to pass. In many ways its their default mode when announcing MilTech Wunderaffen.
  • Restarting a production line that’s been idle 30 years isn’t just difficult, it’s damn near impossible. At lot of the people who had the knowledge of how to actually build the things have probably died, and Soviet-era schematics are not an adequate substitute.
  • I’m pretty sure they have the capabilities to build the heavy equipment parts. The modern electronics? Not so much.
  • Like a lot of Russian announcements since the beginning of Vlad’s Big Adventure, this is probably a bluff to overall the gullible. I’m sure the Russians intend to restart production of T-80s, but I wouldn’t count on doing it very soon, or producing terribly many.
  • Is Russia’s Economy Collapsing?

    Tuesday, August 2nd, 2022

    Given the cutoff from SWIFT, the widespread economic sanctions, and the huge pullout of Western firms from Russia in the wake of their invasion of Ukraine, I would have expected more signs of the widely predicted economic decline on the part of Russia than we’ve been seeing.

    However, this report from the Yale Chief Executive Leadership Institute (CELI) says that the sanctions are indeed crippling Russia’s economy.

    Some skepticism is probably in order, as CELI’s head, Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, for all his talk of advising both Trump and Biden, is a Biden donor, and we all know the great lengths our political elites to lie in order to cover up the Biden Administration’s many manifest failures. But reading through the report there seems to be a substantial amount of evidence to support the thesis.

    The summary:

    As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters into its fifth month, a common narrative has emerged that the unity of the world in standing up to Russia has somehow devolved into a “war of economic attrition which is taking its toll on the west”, given the supposed “resilience” and even “prosperity” of the Russian economy. This is simply untrue – and a reflection of widely held but factually incorrect misunderstandings over how the Russian economy is actually holding up amidst the exodus of over 1,000 global companies and international sanctions.

    That these misunderstandings persist is not surprising. Since the invasion, the Kremlin’s economic releases have become increasingly cherry-picked, selectively tossing out unfavorable metrics while releasing only those that are more favorable. These Putin-selected statistics are then carelessly trumpeted across media and used by reams of well-meaning but careless experts in building out forecasts which are excessively, unrealistically favorable to the Kremlin…

    Our team of experts, using Russian language and unconventional data sources including high frequency consumer data, cross-channel checks, releases from Russia’s international trade partners, and data mining of complex shipping data, have released one of the first comprehensive economic analyses measuring Russian current economic activity five months into the invasion, and assessing Russia’s economic outlook.

    From our analysis, it becomes clear: business retreats and sanctions are crippling the Russian economy, in the short-term, and the long-term. We tackle a wide range of common misperceptions – and shed light on what is actually going on inside Russia.

    Here are their main points (generic paper reference verbiage elided):

  • Russia’s strategic positioning as a commodities exporter has irrevocably deteriorated, as it now deals from a position of weakness with the loss of its erstwhile main markets, and faces steep challenges executing a “pivot to Asia” with non-fungible exports such as piped gas…
  • Despite some lingering supply chain leakiness, Russian imports have largely collapsed, and the country faces stark challenges securing crucial inputs, parts, and technology from hesitant trade partners, leading to widespread supply shortages within its domestic economy…
  • Despite Putin’s delusions of self-sufficiency and import substitution, Russian domestic production has come to a complete standstill with no capacity to replace lost businesses, products and talent; the hollowing out of Russia’s domestic innovation and production base has led to soaring prices and consumer angst…
  • As a result of the business retreat, Russia has lost companies representing ~40% of its GDP, reversing nearly all of three decades’ worth of foreign investment and buttressing unprecedented simultaneous capital and population flight in a mass exodus of Russia’s economic base…
  • Putin is resorting to patently unsustainable, dramatic fiscal and monetary intervention to smooth over these structural economic weaknesses, which has already sent his government budget into deficit for the first time in years and drained his foreign reserves even with high energy prices – and Kremlin finances are in much, much more dire straits than conventionally understood…
  • Russian domestic financial markets, as an indicator of both present conditions and future outlook, are the worst performing markets in the entire world this year despite strict capital controls, and have priced in sustained, persistent weakness within the economy with liquidity and credit contracting – in addition to Russia being substantively cut off from international financial markets, limiting its ability to tap into pools of capital needed for the revitalization of its crippled economy…
  • Looking ahead, there is no path out of economic oblivion for Russia as long as the allied countries remain unified in maintaining and increasing sanctions pressure against Russia…
  • I believe the first part of the first point is too speculative (“Rising Prices Mask Irreversible Deterioration in Long-Term Strategic Positioning”) and forward-looking to be worth examining. Russia isn’t worried about long-term positioning if it can use its gas pipeline leverage to crack the sanctions regime against it this year. The second “pivot to Asia difficulties” part is something I’ve covered here.

    First they cover why you can’t trust Russian statistics (duh):

    The Kremlin’s economic releases are becoming increasingly cherry-picked; partial, and incomplete, selectively tossing out unfavorable statistics while keeping favorable statistics. The Russian government is no longer disclosing certain economic indicators which prior to the war were updated on a monthly basis, including all foreign trade data, including those relating to exports and imports, particularly with Europe; oil and gas monthly output data; commodity export quantities; capital inflows and outflows; financial statements of major companies, which used to be released on a mandatory basis by companies themselves; central bank monetary base data; foreign direct investment data; and lending and loan origination data, and other data related to the availability of credit.

    The fact the data is so bad they’re not even trying to alter or spin it suggests things are pretty bad.

    Even Rosaviatsiya, the federal air transport agency, abruptly ceased publishing data on airline and airport passenger volumes. As a measure of comparison, prior to the war, the only economic data which have historically been classified and quarantined by the Russian government are sensitive metrics related to the trade of military goods, aircraft, and nuclear materials.

    Although the Kremlin explains away its newfound desperate obfuscation of its revenue and spending data and other macroeconomic indicators of overall economic health under the guise of “minimizing the risk of the imposition of additional sanctions”, what little data has trickled out from the Kremlin suggests the real reason may lie in the fact these statistics are unlikely to be positive for the Kremlin, and getting worse by the day. For example, total oil and gas revenues dropped by more than half in May from the month before, by the Kremlin’s own numbers. As one economist wrote, “it’s likely that the Kremlin is afraid of publishing data that reveal the full scale of the economy’s collapse”.

    Second, even those favorable statistics which are released are questionable if not downright dubious when measured against cross-channel checks, verification against alternative benchmarks and given the political pressure the Kremlin has exerted to corrupt statistical integrity. Indeed, the Kremlin has a long history of fudging official economic statistics, even prior to the invasion. Putin has on several occasions shunted aside heads of Rosstat who produced economic statistics which were not to his liking, and he personally transferred control of the agency to political appointees at the Economic Ministry, depriving the agency of its prior status as an independent branch of government free from political influence. Outside observers ranging from international organizations to foreign investors regularly sound alarm bells over “concerns about the reliability and consistency” of the Kremlin’s economic releases, especially given the propensity of Kremlin economists for “switching to new methodologies” with alarming frequency – many instances of which are not even disclosed. Concerns over meddlesome political interference must be given even more weight now that Putin appointed Sergei Galkin, the former Deputy Economic Minister and the most blatantly political pick in recent history as head of Rosstat in May.

    Third, and as mentioned briefly previously, almost all rosy projections and forecasts are irrationally extrapolating economic releases from the early days of the post-invasion period, when sanctions and the business retreat had not taken full effect, rather than the most recent, up-to-date numbers from recent weeks and months – partially due to the fact the Kremlin stopped releasing updated numbers, constraining the availability of datasets for economic researchers to draw upon. For example, many alarming forecasts projecting strong revenue from energy exports were based on the last available official export data from March, even though many business withdrawals and sanctions on energy had not yet taken effect, with orders placed prior to the invasion still being delivered.

    Take, as one instance of many, one widely cited study by Bloomberg decrying Russia’s surge in revenue from energy exports. The authors wrote: “even with some countries halting or phasing out energy purchases, Russia’s oil-and-gas revenue will be about $285 billion this year, according to estimates from Bloomberg Economics based on Economy Ministry projections. That would exceed the 2021 figure by more than one-fifth”. No doubt, Russia has continued to draw significant revenue from energy exports – a complex topic which we analyze in-depth in the sections below.

    But this specific Bloomberg analysis projected Russia’s 2022 energy export revenues based on its revenue through March of 2022 as disclosed by the Kremlin, even though the Kremlin has belatedly acknowledged that energy export revenues in May and June have diminished significantly. In fact, only after a long and unexplained delay did the Kremlin finally disclose that total oil and gas revenues dropped by more than half in May from prior months, by the Kremlin’s own numbers – along with the declaration that the Kremlin would cease releasing any new oil and gas revenues from that point on. Nevertheless, the misleading Bloomberg forecast carelessly extrapolating out initial energy export volumes into the rest of the year was then repeated by leading voices including Fareed Zakaria and others in proving the supposed “resilience” and even “prosperity” of the Russian economy.

    On the collapse of Russian imports:

    Imports consist of ~20% of Russian GDP, and the domestic economy is largely reliant on imports across industries and across the value chain with few exceptions, despite Putin’s bellicose delusions of total self-sufficiency.

    Snip.

    By far and large, the flow of imports into Russia has drastically slowed in the months since the invasion. A review of trade data from Russia’s top trade partners – since, again, the Kremlin is no longer releasing its own import data – suggests that Russian imports fell by upwards of ~50% in the initial months following the invasion.

    And China isn’t replacing western countries as a source of imports.

    In the initial days of the Russian Business Retreat, when hundreds of western businesses rushed to exit Russia, the authors – who were deluged with media inquiries given the prominence of the Yale CELI List of Companies curtailing operations in Russia – were frequently asked whether Chinese companies would rush to fill the spots vacated by western businesses. Many naïve observers cynically remarked that the Business Retreat would be futile, as Chinese companies would relish the opportunity to do more business in Russia, and the Russian economy would barely miss a beat. This is not at all what has played out – and quite to the contrary.

    In fact, according to recent monthly releases from the Customs General Administration of China, which maintains detailed Chinese trade data with detailed breakdowns of exports to individual trade partners, Chinese exports to Russia plummeted by 50% from the start of the year to April, falling from over $8 billion monthly at the end of 2021 to under $4 billion in April. This aligns with our anecdotal observations of several Chinese banks withdrawing all credit and financing from Russia following the start of the invasion, including ICBC, the New Development Bank, and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, in addition to energy giants such as Sinochem suspending all Russian investments and joint ventures.

    The explanation for China’s reticence, once again, lies in the asymmetric nature of Russia’s relationships with its trading partners. Even on imports, it is clear that Russia needs its trade partners far more than its trade partners need Russia – and the power dynamic is not even close to being balanced.

    This imbalance is put into stark relief when the proportion of imports Russia draws from China is compared to the proportion of exports China sends to Russia. Russia is not even in the top ten destinations for Chinese exports; in 2021 alone, China exported over $500 billion in goods and services to its largest trade partner, the United States, representing ten times the amount of goods it sent to Russia ($72 billion). On the other hand, China represents Russia’s largest source of imports by far; in fact, the $72 billion in imports Russia draws from China is nearly three times the amount of imports Russia draws from its second largest partner, Germany ($27 billion), and five times the amount of imports Russia draws from its third largest partner, the United States.

    Given the extremely minor proportion of Chinese exports going to Russia vis-à-vis China’s trading relationship with the United States and Europe, clearly most Chinese companies are much more wary of losing access to US and European markets by running afoul of US sanctions and crossing US companies than they are of losing whatever erstwhile market share they had in Russia. The dangers of losing access to US technology are already readily apparent from China’s point of view. When the US imposed export restrictions on Chinese telecom companies Huawei and ZTE in 2020, they were unable to source advanced microchips and saw a massive reduction in their chip-dependent smartphone businesses – a fate which no Chinese company wants to suffer by running afoul of US sanctions related to Russia.

    China is the most prominent example, but other trade partners have been just as reticent to export to Russia. In fact, it appears that exports to Russia from sanctioning and non-sanctioning countries have collapsed at a roughly comparable rate in the months following the invasion. One analysis found that non-sanctioning countries saw exports to Russia fall by an average of 40%, while sanctioning countries saw exports fall an average of 60%, reflecting the disadvantaged economic position Russia finds itself vis-à-vis practically all its trade partners regardless of political rhetoric

    Snip.

    One survey done by the Central Bank of Russia found that well over two-thirds of surveyed companies experienced import problems, and manufacturers, in particular, reported a shortage of raw materials, parts, and components. Unsurprisingly, the focus has shifted towards import substitution – a topic analyzed in closer detail in Section IV. But in short, this has not been fruitful. Despite Russian companies’ desperate efforts to find alternative production and re-orient supply chains towards domestic substitutes, according to a survey by Russia’s Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, a whopping 81% of manufacturers said they could not find any Russian versions of imported products they need, and more than half were “highly dissatisfied” with the quality of homegrown production even when domestic substitutes could be sourced.

    On to the failure to find adequate domestic substitutes. I’m going to skip over a lot of the stuff I don’t really give a rat’s ass about (radical declines in new car sales) as it’s not particularly important except as evidence of aggregate demand destruction. Others are much more surprising: Fruits and vegetables and fish production are down as well, despite Russia supposedly being the country that can supply all its own fertilizer needs. (And pesticides and fertilizers are also down.)

    When domestic industrial production is measured by volume rather than value added, cross- filtered against a more granular breakdown by sub-industry, the picture becomes even bleaker suggesting large-scale shutdowns of the Russian industrial base, which is evidently operating at a fraction of its usual capacity. Industrial production volume in crucial industries such as appliances, railways, steel, textiles, batteries, apparel, and rubber fell by well over 20%, while other sub-industries such as electronics, sports, furniture, jewelry, fertilizers, and fishing fell in excess of 10%.

    And despite Putin’s rallying cries of self-sufficiency, all of these industries share a crucial similarity: they simply cannot replace imported parts and components that Russia lacks the technological prowess to make, and illicit, shadowy parallel imports can only go so far. For example, the Russian tank producer Uralvagonzavod has furloughed workers based on input shortages.

    So much for the Russian trolls that claim Uralvagonzavod’s is still cranking out tanks unimpeded!

    Russian production of tanks, missiles and other equipment relies on imported microchips and precision components that simply cannot be sourced right now. Likewise, Russia’s Caspian pipeline has had challenges finding spare parts related to the US and EU’s ban on exports related to gas liquefaction. Each of these supply disruptions – which cannot be replaced by import substitution or parallel imports – leads to production shutdowns which then ripple across the entire supply chain, bringing various ancillary products and services into a simultaneous standstill.

    The breadth of this industrial production slowdown across the Russian economy is further worsened by a rapidly deteriorating outlook for new purchases and orders. A reading of the Russian Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) – which captures how purchasing managers are viewing the economy – shows that new orders have plunged across the board, both in terms of domestic Russian orders as well as Russian orders for foreign products and foreign orders of Russian products. Clearly, purchasing managers want nothing to do with placing new orders until the geopolitical environment stabilizes. Likewise, PMIs highlight that inventories have dropped and delivery times have increased in the context of widespread supply-chain problems, so even if new orders were to be placed, the fulfillment of those orders would continue to pose steep challenges to Russian domestic production.

    Also hurting Russia is the fact that over 1,000 global companies have curtailed operations there. (Though some still remain; why the hell is Cloudflare, Carl’s Jr. and Sbarro still doing business there?)

    When the list was first published the week of February 28, only several dozen companies had announced their departure from Russia. In the two months since, this list of companies staying/leaving Russia has already garnered significant attention for its role in helping catalyze the mass corporate exodus from Russia, with widespread media coverage and circulation across company boardrooms, policymaker circles, and other communities of concerned citizens across the world.

    Based on the authors’ proprietary database tracking the retreats of over 1,000 companies, our researchers found that across all these 1,000 companies aggregated together, the value of the Russian revenue represented by these companies and the value of these companies’ investments in Russia together exceed $600 billion – a startling figure representing approximately 40% of Russia’s GDP. We further found that these companies, in total, employ Russian local staff of well over 1 million individuals. The value of these companies’ investment in Russia represents the lion’s share of all accumulated, active foreign investment in Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union – meaning the retreat of well over 1,000 companies in the span of three months has almost single-handedly reversed three decades’ worth of Russian economic integration with the rest of the world, while undoing years of progress made by Russian business and political leaders in attracting greater foreign investment into Russia.

    To be sure, this is not to say that the GDP of Russia will contract 40% overnight. Many of the 1,000+ businesses who have curtailed operations in Russia are still in the process of winding down their operation, meaning it will take months if not even years to feel the full impact of their withdrawal. Other companies from this list of 1,000+ have already divested or sold their Russian businesses to local Russian operators, which means that even though these businesses will lack western technical and financial support and know-how and deteriorate in the long-run, in the short-term, they will still continue to operate to some extent and thus cannot be written off from Russian GDP immediately. There are also some companies which continue some operations in Russia while pulling out of other operations, so any hit to Russian GDP from these companies would be partial rather than total. It is impossible to capture the full economic impact of the Russian business retreat as many of the most devastating consequences will be felt years from now -with long-term structural losses to the Russian economy beyond any single dollar figure of lost revenue or lost investment. Nevertheless, the fact that the 1,000+ companies that have curtailed operations represent such a high proportion of Russia’s GDP – 40% – signifies the importance of these economies to the Russian economy prior to the war, and how the Russian economy must now undergo dramatic, forced transformations with these companies pulling out, as amplified throughout this paper.

    Some might argue that the companies that curtailed operations in Russia were forced to incur a short-term loss in Russian revenue and investment – despite the fact the impact on Russia is more painful in both the short-term and the long-term – but it is not even true to say that the companies leaving Russia incurred any losses. In fact, rather than penalizing companies for leaving Russia, in a separate study, we found that foreign investors by far and large rewarded companies for removing the risk overhang associated with exposure to Russia – that the value of aggregate stock market gained since the start of the invasion for companies that have left Russia far outweigh the value of Russian asset divestitures and lost Russian revenue, which for most multinational corporations, represented a small fraction of total revenue to start with – no more than 1-2% in most cases. Thus, clearly the loss of 1,000+ companies has been borne solely by Russia – in both the short-term and the long-term – while leaving Russia actually benefited companies.

    Not to mention the brain drain and capital flight:

    Unsurprisingly, the Russian business retreat has coincided with rapid “brain-drain” as talented, educated Russians flee the country in droves. It is impossible to assess the exact number of Russians who have left Russia permanently since the outset of the invasion, but most estimates peg the number as no less than five hundred thousand – with the vast majority being highly-educated and highly-skilled workers in competitive industries such as technology. The mass exodus of skilled Russian natives is further amplified by the forcible expulsion of a not-insignificant population of western expatriates working in Russia. These workers – who understand the structural challenges facing the Russian economy and technical hurdles obstructing Putin’s vows of self-sufficiency and import substitution – are joined by many of Russia’s few remaining high-net-worth and ultra-high-net-worth individuals, who understand that capital controls, taxes, the business and investment climate, and government restrictions are only likely to become worse in the years ahead, particularly for those holding financial capital. By one measure, 15,000 ultra-high-net-worth individuals have fled Russia since the invasion began, which would represent 20% of the population of Russia’s ultra-high-net-worth individuals at the outset of the war. These Russians, as the holders of significant capital, seek the safety, security, and stability of western financial markets, especially as Russia’s access to those markets shrinks.

    These high net worth individuals are bringing their wealth with them when they flee, contributing to soaring private capital outflows, even by the Central Bank of Russia’s own admission. The official level of capital outflows indicated by the Bank of Russia in Q1, nearly $70 billion USD, is likely to be a gross underestimate of the actual level of capital outflows, given strict capital controls implemented by the Kremlin restricting the amount of wealth Russian citizens can transfer out of the country, particularly foreign-currency denominated wealth. Any additional capital outflows which have skirted these capital controls are unlikely to have been captured by the Central Bank of Russia’s gauge, and indeed, by all anecdotal reports, wealthy Russians are flocking for safe havens in droves.

    Next up, just why we haven’t yet seen an actual collapse: unsustainable fiscal stimulus and capital controls.

    As global businesses swarmed for the exits and after the implementation of devastating sanctions by the US and EU in the early weeks following the invasion, many western economists and policymakers had unrealistic expectations that the Russian economy may collapse or that a financial crisis might take hold. Sanction regimes very rarely cause instantaneous financial crises or economic collapses; rather, they tend to be longer-duration tools designed to structurally weaken a nation’s economy while isolating it from global markets. Indeed, as this paper has shown, the impact of business retreats and sanctions on the Russian economy has been nothing short of catastrophic, eroding the Russian economy’s competitiveness while exacerbating internal structural weaknesses.

    But for those who expected a more rapid collapse in the Russian economy, and who were shocked this did not occur – much of the reason the Russian economy proved marginally more resilient than initially expected has to do with the unprecedented and unsustainable fiscal and monetary response initiated by the Kremlin. A little-understood but critically important component of Russia’s economic journey since the outset of the invasion, the Kremlin’s fiscal and monetary response has largely averted a credit/liquidity squeeze, which could have induced a financial panic, while propping up the economic livelihoods of many core constituencies of the Putin regime, ranging from state owned enterprises to pensioners and retirees – rescuing them from sudden economic catastrophe.

    One of the best case studies for how, through massive and unsustainable government intervention, the Kremlin has been able to temporarily prop up the Russian economy also happens to be one of Putin’s favorite propaganda talking points: the appreciation of the ruble, which is now the strongest-performing currency this year by some measures. Overnight, as soon as the invasion commenced, the exchange rate for the ruble relative to the dollar jumped from ~75 to ~110 – but the Kremlin immediately announced a rigorous set of capital controls on the ruble including a blanket ban on citizens sending money to bank accounts abroad and foreign money transfers; a suspension on cash withdrawals from dollar banking accounts beyond $10,000 per person; a mandate for all exporters to exchange 80% of foreign currency earnings for rubles; a suspension of direct dollar conversions for individuals with ruble-denominated banking accounts; a suspension of domestic lending in foreign currencies; a suspension of dollar sales across domestic banks; a mandate that companies pay foreign-denominated debt in rubles; and encouragement of individuals to redeem dollars for rubles out of patriotic duty. These restrictive capital controls – which rank amongst the most restrictive of any government in the world – immediately made it effectively impossible for domestic Russians to purchase dollars legally or even access a majority of their dollar deposits, while artificially inflating demand for rubles through forced purchases by major exporters. These capital controls, which have only weakened slightly in the four months since the outset of the invasion, continue to prop up the ruble’s official exchange rate with artificial strength across onshore and offshore markets.

    However, the official exchange rate given the presence of such draconian capital controls can be misleading – as the ruble is, unsurprisingly, trading at dramatically diminished volumes compared to pre-invasion on low liquidity. By many reports, much of this erstwhile trading has migrated to unofficial ruble black markets, where the spread between the official exchange rate and the actual exchange rate is equally dramatic – upwards of 20% to 100% higher than the official exchange rate, in some cases, given a shortage of obtainable, liquid dollars within Russia. Even the Bank of Russia has admitted that the exchange rate is a reflection more of government policies and a blunt expression of the country’s trade balance rather than freely tradeable liquid FX markets.

    The Kremlin’s implementation of capital controls pales in comparison to the unsustainable full-scale fiscal and monetary stimulus launched over the last few months, stretching to every corner of the Russian economy. That the Kremlin would flood the Russian economy with such a deluge of Kremlin-initiated spending was far from certain in the initial days of the war. Initial attempts by the Kremlin to intervene in the economy when the invasion started were marked by relative restraint, defined by measures such as shutting down trading on the Moscow Stock Exchange and suspending measures intended to be largely transitory in nature. But when it became apparent that western sanctions were not being lifted and that the Russian economy would not go back to “normal” anytime soon, Putin announced escalating waves of fiscal and monetary stimulus targeted at easing the economic pain faced by individuals and companies. These measures included subsidized loans and loan payment assistance to companies; transfer payments to affected industries; subsidized mortgages and mortgage payment assistance; increases in direct payments to individuals including families, pregnant women, government employees, pensioners, military, low-income; recapitalization of companies by the National Wealth Fund, the sovereign wealth fund of Russia; nationalization and recapitalization of certain companies and assets; subsidized credit forgiveness approaching a debt jubilee; subsidized protection from bankruptcy and foreclosure; drawdowns from the National Wealth Fund for state expenditures; and subsidized infrastructure development – to name only a few.

    The ultimate scale of these relief expenditures is still unclear as they are currently ongoing, but initial signs point towards a massive, unprecedented magnitude of spending. By the Central Bank of Russia’s own data releases, the Russian money supply – M2, which includes cash, checking deposits, and cash-convertible proxies of store-holders of value – ballooned by nearly two times from the start of the year through June.

    A good thing that doubling your money supply almost overnight can’t possibly have any negative repercussions!

    Putin’s remaining FX reserves are decreasing at an alarming pace, as Russian FX reserves have declined by $75 billion since the start of the war – a rate which, if annualized, suggests these reserves may be spent down within a few years’ time. Critics point out that official FX reserves of the central bank technically can only decrease, not increase, due to international sanctions placed on the central bank, and suggest that non-sanctioned financial institutions such as Gazprombank can still accumulate FX reserves in place of the central bank. While this may be true technically, there is simultaneously no evidence to suggest that Gazprombank is actually accumulating any sizable reserves, considering the distress facing its own loan book, pressure to fund increasing amounts of infrastructure loans and the fact that Gazprombank has been accused of being the conduit through which the Kremlin indirectly transfers the regular military pay and combat bonuses of Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine. These signs point toward Gazprombank simply channeling massive government expenditures outward with the government spending down immediately rather than stashing away government revenues for later.

    Snip.

    The challenges facing Russia’s sovereign financing are exacerbated by Russia’s newfound lack of access to international capital markets. With Russia’s first default since 1917 on its sovereign debt, Russia is now frozen out of international debt issuances for years to come and unable to tap into traditional sovereign financing across international capital pools. Russia can continue to issue its version of domestic bonds, known as OFZs, but the total capital pool available within Russia domestically is a fraction of the financing needed to sustain these levels of spending by the Russian government over an entire economic cycle. And indeed, the Finance Minister has confirmed that Russia is not raising debt to pay for its fiscal program and has no plans to do so in the near-term.

    “Financial Markets Pricing In Sustained Weakness In Real Economy with Liquidity and Credit Contracting.” Yeah, I’m just going to skip over all that. Just note that not even Russians want to buy Russian real estate or stock.

    Let’s jump to the conclusion. After reiterating the main points:

    Looking ahead, there is no path out of economic oblivion for Russia as long as the allied countries remain unified in maintaining and increasing sanctions pressure against Russia.

    Is Russia’s economy collapsing? Not quite yet. Actual economic collapse is what we’re seeing in Sri Lanka: You can’t buy food, you can’t buy fuel, and you can’t keep the lights on. Russia isn’t there yet. However, the authors do present compelling evidence that Russia’s economy is contracting quite dramatically, and will continue to get worse as long as the war and sanctions continue.

    Russian Tanks in Ukraine News Roundup

    Wednesday, March 23rd, 2022

    There’s just enough tank-specific news coming out of the Russo-Ukrainian War to justify a roundup. Despite supposedly having the largest tank army in the world, Russia’s tank corps is clearly taking it on the chin in Ukraine.

  • You know that “largest tank army in the world” bit? Not so much:

    Can Russia pull reserve tanks out of its inventory and put them in active duty? Probably, but: A.) The truck tire issued showed that even active equipment hasn’t been well-maintained. How much worse shape are mothballed vehicles in? B.) How quickly can new tank crews be trained to work effectively? Speaking of maintenance problems:

  • Russia’s main tank factory has reportedly stopped production and repairs due to a lack of parts:

    Russia’s largest tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod, has halted production because of supply shortages, according to Ukraine’s state media and Ukrainian armed forces.

    The Kyiv Independent writes that Uralvagonzavod has stopped operations in its Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant in west-central Russia because of the lack of component parts supplied from foreign countries.

    The claim was initially made by a report of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and confirmed by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense on March 21, according to The Kyiv Independent.

    Uralvagonzavod had his assets frozen in the U.K. on February 24 and was hit by European Union sanctions on March 15.

    Two reasons to take this with a few grains of salt: A.) It’s a Ukrainian source, and B.) Uralvagonzavod is the company manufacturing the T-14 Armata tank as well as the T-90M, and they were only supposed to produce 100 T-14s total, of which none have been spotted in-theater.

  • One thing that seems notably absent from combat reports is accounts of Russian active protection systems defeating incoming rounds or missiles. Arena-M seems to be the current Russian APS (a replacement for the Afghanit system rumored to be slated for the T-14?), but previous APS systems (Drozd 2) were supposedly available for earlier Russian tanks. (Shtora is a passive protection system used on Russian armor.) But Arena was first tested in 1995, which would make it pretty long in the tooth on the software side. Would you trust your life to Windows 95?
  • The lack of effective active countermeasures is one reason so many Russian armored vehicles in Ukraine seem to sport improvised metal cages up top, which appear to be doing Jack and Squat.

    A LOT OF Russian tanks involved in the invasion of Ukraine have strange cages welded over the roofs of their turrets. Strange and apparently useless—for many pictures have emerged of destroyed vehicles surmounted by them. Sometimes the cage itself has been visibly damaged by an attack that went on to hit the tank beneath.

    Stijn Mitzer, an independent analyst based in Amsterdam, has looked at hundreds of verified photographs of destroyed Russian vehicles. He thinks that, far from acting as protection, the cages have done nothing save add weight, make tanks easier to spot, and perhaps give a false and dangerous sense of security to the crew inside. They have thus been mockingly dubbed by some Western analysts as “emotional-support armour” or “cope cages”.

    Snip.

    The new cages, the fitting of which seems to have begun late in 2021, appear to be a variant of so-called slat or bar armour. Such armour can provide effective lightweight protection if used correctly (as it is, for example, on American Stryker armoured personnel carriers). But in this case that seems not to have happened. They might thus be seen as symbols of Russia’s inadequate preparation for the campaign, as pertinent in their way as its failures to neutralise Ukraine’s air defences and to shoot down that country’s drones.

    One of the main threats to armoured vehicles are HEAT (High Explosive Anti-Tank) weapons, such as the Russian-made but widely employed RPG-7. The warheads of these rocket-propelled grenades are shaped charges—hollow cones of explosive lined with metal. When the explosive detonates it blasts the metal lining into a narrow, high-speed jet that is able to punch through thick steel. According to Dr Appleby-Thomas an RPG-7 can penetrate 30cm of steel plate.

    And RPG-7s are the babies of the bunch. Other, far more powerful shaped-charge anti-tank weapons used by Ukrainian forces include Javelins supplied by America, NLAWs (Next-generation Light Anti-tank Weapons) supplied by Britain, and drone-borne MAM-L missiles, supplied by Turkey.

    HEAT warheads may be countered by what is known as explosive reactive armour, or ERA. When this is hit, a sheet of explosive sandwiched inside it blows up and disrupts an incoming warhead before it can detonate. Many Russian tanks are indeed fitted with ERA. However ERA may, in turn, be defeated by a so-called tandem warhead, in which a small precursor charge triggers the armour’s explosive before the main warhead detonates.

    Slat and bar add-on armours are a lighter and cheaper way to counter RPGs, though even if used correctly they are, literally, hit or miss protection. The spacing of the bars or slats is crucial. If a rocket hits a bar it makes little difference, for its warhead will detonate anyway. But if it gets trapped between bars it will probably be damaged in a way which means that the signal from the nose-mounted fuse cannot reach the detonator.

    This approach is known as statistical armour, because the protection it offers is all or nothing. It is typically quoted as having a 50% chance of disrupting an incoming RPG. But Dr Appleby-Thomas notes that it works only against munitions with a nose fuse, which Javelins, NLAWs and MAM-Ls do not have.

    Russia has been fitting slat armour to vehicles since 2016, but the design of the new cages, seemingly improvised from locally available materials, is baffling. They appear to be oriented in a way that protects only against attacks from above. In principle, that might help against Javelins, which have a “top attack” mode in which they first veer upwards and then dive to punch through a tank’s thin top armour. But, as Nick Reynolds, a land-warfare research analyst at RUSI, a British defence think-tank, notes, even if the cage sets off a Javelin’s precursor warhead, the main charge is still more than powerful enough to punch through the top armour and destroy the tank—as the Ukrainian army itself proved in December, when it tested one against a vehicle protected by add-on armour replicating the Russian design. As expected, the Javelin destroyed the target easily.

    Enjoy this Sad Trombone gif, unearthed from the archives of the ancient, terrible conflict known only as The Pony Wars

  • Speaking of the Javelin, it and other western-supplied anti-tank weapons are tearing up Russian armor.

    Despite amassing an invasion force of nearly 200,000 troops and thousands of armored vehicles supported by combat aircraft and warships, the Russian military has failed to reach its primary objectives in the three weeks since its offensive into Ukraine began.

    Russian military planners expected a blitzkrieg campaign that would last 48 to 72 hours and lead to a quick Ukrainian capitulation, but Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has led a fierce resistance, and major urban centers, including the capital, Kyiv, remain in Ukrainian hands, surprising Moscow and indeed the world.

    Ukrainians’ grit and knowledge of the battlefield have played a large part in their effective defense, but weapons supplied by NATO and EU countries have also played a critical role in stalling the Russian advance.

    Ukraine has received billions of worth of weapons from the West — the US has provided $1 billion in security assistance just this week — and among that aid, three weapon systems stand out.

    Since the invasion began, US-made FGM-148 Javelins and FIM-92 Stingers and the Next Generation Light Anti-Tank Weapon (NLAW) designed by Britain and Sweden have been the terror of Russian troops.

    Tanks and armored vehicles are at the heart of the Russian military doctrine.

    Actually Russian military doctrine is usually described as artillary-centric, but tanks are a close second in importance.

    Russia’s battalion tactical groups — 75% of which have been committed to the invasion, a US official said Wednesday — are largely mechanized formations meant to use heavy firepower to overcome resistance.

    But BTGs are vulnerable to anti-tank defenses like the Javelin, a reusable, fire-and-forget guided missile.

    Javelins have two parts: a launch tube and a command launch unit, which has the controls and optical sights for day and night use. The Javelin missile’s nose has a homing infrared guidance system that allows the operator to fire the weapon and then relocate in order to dodge return fire.

    Snip.

    Against a tank or another armored vehicle, the Javelin will strike from a high angle of attack, targeting the top of the vehicle, where the armor is thinnest.

    Before the invasion, Russian tankers sought to counter that by building cages on top of their tanks to detonate the Javelin before it struck and reduce its force. Hundreds of destroyed Russian tanks suggest that has not been an effective countermeasure.

    Against a stationary target, like a building or bunker, the Javelin will strike from a more direct line of attack.

    Snip.

    Ukrainian forces have been using the British-supplied NLAW anti-tank weapon. Although less sophisticated than its American counterpart, the NLAW is extremely easy to operate, and with a 150 mm high explosive anti-tank warhead, it’s deadly too.

    Like the Javelin, the NLAW can strike targets from above, but its effective range of about 800 meters is more limited than the Javelin’s 2,000-meter range.

    Information on Stinger use against Russian aircraft snipped.

    The US on Wednesday announced another package of security assistance to Ukraine, which included 800 Stingers and 2,000 Javelins, bringing the total of each provided by the US to 1,400 and 4,600, respectively. The package also includes 1,000 light anti-armor weapons and 6,000 AT-4 unguided, man-portable anti-armor missiles.

  • Evidently, even some of the equipment Russian tanks supposedly have isn’t actually there:

  • A thread on uncommon and converted military vehicles seen in theater.
  • One of those that was particularly interesting: the only known prototype of a T-80UM2:

    The Russian military’s one-off T-80UM2 experimental main battle tank has been knocked out during recent fighting in Ukraine, marking one of the more unusual kills attributed to the country’s defenders, who continue to disrupt the Kremlin’s invasion plans. The fact that this unique fighting vehicle was even participating in combat in Ukraine is somewhat surprising, but it would not be the first example of new or experimental Russian weapons systems being deployed in the campaign.

    The team of researchers at the Oryx blog, who have been compiling photo and video evidence of materiel losses on both sides of the conflict, identified the wreckage of the T-80UM2 and stated that it was destroyed on March 17, or that its remains were uncovered on this date. The tank is rumored to have been knocked out in Sumy Oblast, in northeastern Ukraine, apparently in the vicinity of the town of Trostyanets.

    The T-80UM2 is said to have been part of a larger column of Russian vehicles that came under attack by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and photos show destroyed trucks alongside the T-80UM2. Its turret was knocked off and its hull burnt out, although it’s not immediately clear how it was hit and by what.

    The story of the T-80UM2 is a complicated one, tied up with a new-generation tank project with the project name Objekt 640, better known as the Black Eagle. A mock-up of the Black Eagle appeared as long ago as 1997, at which point it was being promoted for the export market.

    By 1998 it had become clear that work was also underway on the T-80UM2, as a further development of the Cold War-era T-80. There seems to be substantial overlap between the T-80UM2 and the Black Eagle, to the point that some sources consider them one and the same. If that’s the case, then the T-80UM2 may very well have been intended to serve as a prototype for the Black Eagle which, as it turned out, never entered production.

    As for the T-80UM2, this vehicle was based on an upgraded T-80U chassis, the main new addition being a welded-steel turret with advanced armor protection, including Kaktus explosive reactive armor (ERA), panels of which were also applied to the front of the hull. More Kaktus was fitted to the track skirts, while there were anti-fragmentation screens around the front of the turret.

    In its ultimate form, the T-80UM2 was also fitted with the Drozd-2 active protection system, a hard-kill system that uses radar to detect incoming anti-tank rockets and anti-tank missiles, before automatically firing high-explosive fragmentation munitions at them, with the aim of destroying, or at last disabling them, at a distance of 20-30 feet from the tank.

    The T-80UM2 featured a different crew arrangement compared to the T-80U, with the gunner seated on the right and the commander on the left of the turret, swapping sides compared to the earlier tank.

    Otherwise, the new tank used the same main armament as the earlier T-80 series, with a 125mm 2A45M smoothbore gun, but this was now fed ammunition via an improved type of automatic loading system. The magazine was moved from below the turret to the bustle, at the back of the turret, apparently in response to survivability concerns highlighted during fighting in Chechnya.

    In western armies, prototypes are rarely pressed into combat service, they’re generally preserved in tank museums (like Tortoise at Bovington or the T-28 at the Patton Museum of Cavalry and Armor). The fact that this one was pressed into frontline service may suggest a whiff of desperation to throw everything into the fight. Then again, the Russian military has never been known for being overly sentimental…

  • Will Russia’s T-14 Armata Ever See The Battlefield?

    Sunday, July 26th, 2020

    Yesterday’s post on autloaders made me wonder how Russia’s T-14 Armata main battle tank project is coming along. The answer seems to be: not so hot.

    Despite a reduction in Russian defense spending caused by lower oil prices, which came after the Kremlin opted not to cut production, the Russian military is charging ahead with its Armata combat vehicle program. It is being overseen by Rostec Corporation – the Moscow conglomerate that specializes in consolidating strategically important companies in Russia’s defense sector.

    This includes the Armata T-14 main battle tanks (MBT) first demonstrated during the May 2015 Victory Parade in Moscow. Sergi Chemezov, Rostec Corporation’s chief executive officer, told reporters last week that while any new projects would be discontinued the Armata projects – which include the T-14 as well as the T-15 heavy infantry fighting vehicle and T-16 armored repair and recovery vehicle – were still on track.

    However, when these tanks might be delivered is still very much in question.

    As of January, the Russian Ground Forces (RGF) had not taken delivery of its first batch of the third-generation T-14s, and delivery has been delayed multiple times around. Delivery was expected on the first nine tanks by Russian tank manufacturer Uralvagonzavod (UVZ) in 2018, before the target date was pushed back to 2019.

    Work on the Armata project began in 2010, when the Russian Ministry of Defence terminated work on “Object-195” – the T-95 program. The entire project was seen to be a huge technological leap from Soviet-era military hardware designs and from the ground up the T-14 is very much distinct from past Soviet/Russian tank platforms.

    The outline of the tank, from its hull to its long and boxy turret, which resembles Western tank turret designs, is a notable departure from past Soviet designs.

    Interestingly, the conventional long, boxy turret wasn’t part of the early Armata sketches released, which showed a radical, low-profile design theoretically made possible by the autoloader. That was completely gone by the time the first prototypes appeared (and stalled) at the 2015 Moscow Victory Day Parade.

    It isn’t just the profile of the Armata T-14 that sets this tank apart from its predecessors.

    Among its innovative characteristics is its unmanned turret, which includes a remotely controlled 125mm 2A82-1M smoothbore main gun with fully automated loading. The turret’s magazine contains a total of 45 rounds of ammunition, but the main gun can also fire laser-guide missiles. In addition, the 2A82 125mm gun can even be upgraded to the 2A83 152mm gun, while the T-14 can also be fitted with secondary weapons such as the Kord 12.7mm machine gun or a PKTM 7.62mm machine gun.

    I don’t believe the the T-14 can ever be uparmed with the 152mm cannon. There simply doesn’t seem to be enough room to fit it in. That was what was supposed to go in the cancelled T-95/Object 195 program, which was a larger platform, and which Russia killed in 2010 after Uralvagonzavod produced a prototype which it never showed to the press and for which no field maneuver footage seems to exist. Which means it was even more good old-fashioned Russian vaporware than Black Eagle, of which they seemed to have produced one running prototype. Oh, and they also said Black Eagle could have been uparmed to the 152mm cannon as well. So a 152mm cannon-armed T-14 isn’t just vaporware, it’s third generation vaporware (if not even older).

    As important to its offensive capabilities is the MBT’s ability to keep its crew protected. Here too is where the T-14 excels. This tank features a low-silhouette that reduces exposure to enemy fire, and that enhances the safety and survivability of the three-man crew.

    The “low-silhouette” point is simply wrong. The T-14 is 3.3 meters high, compared to 2.2 meters for the T-90 and 2.44 meters for the M1A2. That’s higher even than the World War II M3 Lee tank the Soviets (who got them via Lend-Lease) called “a coffin for seven brothers.”

    The driver, gunner and tank commander are housed in a crew compartment that is located in an armored capsule at the front portion of the hull, isolated from the automatic loader as well as the ammunition storage in the center of the tank.

    The crew compartment is made from composite materials and protected by multilayer armor, which according to analyst reports can withstand a direct hit of nearly any type of round that currently exists including sub-caliber and cumulative rounds.

    This smells like more hype. The crew compartment does seem to be very well-protected, but it remains to be seen whether it can stand up to a strike from a Javelin or Hellfire 2. RPG-29s (hardly state-of-the-art anti-tank tech) have taken out Challaneger 2s and Merkavas when it hit them just right, and they had proven Chobham composite armor rather than whatever composite armor Russia has managed to develop.

    Supposedly the T-14 was tested in Syria, according to TASS, and if you can’t trust Russia’s own propaganda organ, who can you trust?

    Speaking of untrustworthy sources, one Russian media outlet claims that a T-14 was reportedly destroyed by a TOW-2B anti-tank missile in Syria. But there’s no footage or pictures of that as well, so I’d take that report with a whole shaker of salt.

    Here’s a video that discusses various T-14 problems from a YouTuber who tends to be a lot more positive about the T-14 (and Russian tanks in general) than I am.

    The main problem plaguing the T-14 is the same one plaguing the rest of the Russian military: Russia is broke and they can’t maintain their current military infrastructure, much less adequately fund future weapons development. They were broke before oil prices hit the toilet, and the strain of Vald’s Excellent Adventures in Syria and Ukraine haven’t helped. That’s why dry docks sink and nuclear subs explode.

    And even if all those problems are overcome, Russia has only ordered 100 of them, and production seems to be so slow they may not even hit that. Its fate may be like the Type 3 Chi-Nu tanks Japan produced late in World War II: A formidable peer to American tanks on paper, but produced in such small numbers they never saw combat.