I know that any time I talk about semiconductors, a significant percentage of my readership’s eyes glaze over, but this is Big Freaking News.
Intel shares rose 6% in premarket trading after Reuters reported that Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing, or TSMC, had approached US chip designers Nvidia, Advanced Micro Devices, and Broadcom about taking stakes in a joint venture that would operate the struggling chipmaker’s factories.
Four sources told Reuters that the Taiwanese chipmaking giant would run Intel’s foundry division under the new proposal, producing chips tailored to customer requirements but not owning more than 50%. The sources added that Qualcomm has also been approached about the venture.
TSMC is far and away the largest chip foundry (a company that builds chips for other companies, but doesn’t design its own chips) in the world, and the one with a clear technological lead over everyone else. TSMC has the third largest market cap of any semiconductor company.
Broadcom is the second-largest semiconductor company in the world by market cap, and they have their fingers in a lot of different pies: networking, wireless, storage, you name it. They’re generally considered a fabless chip designer, but the company is such a weird amalgamation of other companies (what we call Broadcom used to be Avago until they acquired Broadcom in 2016) that they might still have a lower end fab or two lurking somewhere in the company. They also use TSMC as a foundry, though I’m not sure how extensively. They’ve also recently made a big move into software, acquiring CA Associates and VMWare, among others.
Nvidia is a fabless chip designer (the sort of company that contracts with foundries to fab their chips) that went heavily into high end GPUs (the chips that render video for your PC, in Nvidia’s case geared toward high end games and other highly demanding tasks), then crypto-mining chips, and more recently into chips geared for AI applications, all very lucrative market segments, which has made Nvidia not only first among semiconductor market cap, but among the largest companies by market cap in the world (along with Apple and Microsoft). Nvidia has their chips fabricated by TSMC, as well as some by Samsung and GlobalFoundries, which was spun off from…
Advanced Micro Devices, which used to be an Integrated Device Manufacturer (or IDM, a company designs their own chips and builds them in their own fabs) creating Intel-compatible CPUs, but eventually spun off their fabrication plants as GlobalFoundries because they couldn’t keep up with Intel’s capital spending. AMD also has some of their highest end chips fabricated by TSMC. If AMD were to help take over Intel, it would be an extremely ironic ending to a longtime rivalry.
Qualcomm is a lot like Broadcom: A mostly fabless design house with its fingers in lots of different pies, and they’re about the sixth largest semiconductor company by market cap. Broadcom tried to acquire Qualcomm in 2017-18 and was blocked by the Trump45 administration.
Intel is an IDM, and for decades was the undisputed “chipzilla” of the semiconductor world. Intel’s CPUs were the dominant processor for the vast majority of the last 40 years and a huge ingredient for helping create the PC revolution. Intel used to be the technology process leader as well, but somewhere along the way they screwed up their sub-10nm process nodes, allowing TSMC to take the process technology crown. Indeed, they screwed up so badly that they’ve been forced to have TSMC fab some of its highest end chips. Despite having a vast number of fabs, Intel’s market cap has slipped down to 16th among semiconductor companies.
Back to the piece:
The sources noted that the Trump administration is exploring ways to revive Intel and strengthen US manufacturing under the ‘America First’ agenda. They added that TSMC’s joint venture pitch to chip designers took place before the company, alongside President Trump, announced plans last month to invest $100 billion in semiconductor manufacturing in the US, building on its existing $65 billion investment in its Phoenix, Arizona, factories.
Any deal between TSMC and Intel would be subjected to approval from the Trump administration.
If the Trump Administration’s goal is to increase available sub-10nm wafer starts (and it should be) and maintain American control of Intel’s fabs, then this proposal is a win-win. Intel’s fabs plus TSMC’s tech would create a foundry powerhouse. It wouldn’t happen overnight (nothing in semiconductors happens overnight), but probably in 12-24 months, depending on how quickly the new entity can acquire the necessary pieces of equipment to upgrade Intel’s fabs to thee new tech (I’m guessing that the availability of ASML steppers will, as usual, be the gating factor). And all this without the tens of billions in taxpayer subsidies for the CHIPS Act.
If this goes through, it would have mostly winners, with a few losers:
Winners
Every company that’s part of the deal. TSMC gets to radically expand production capacity without spending $20 billion+ to build a new fab. Nvidia, AMD, Broadcom and Qualcomm gain a lot more capacity for expanding production of their high end chips. Ditto for Apple (who’s not part of the deal, but who is TSMC’s biggest customer and a big demand driver for cutting edge fab capacity) and every other consumer of sub-10nm chips.
AMD additionally gets the egoboo of partially taking over its longtime hated rival and confirming it’s crown as the x86/x64 chip manufacturer of choice. Plus their then-risky decision to spin off GlobalFoundries looks like a genius move in hindsight.
The Trump Administration, which gets to take credit for vastly increasing American Foundry capacity at zero additional taxpayer expense and keeps Intel under American control.
Semiconductor equipment manufacturers like ASML, Applied Materials, LAM Research, Tokyo Electron and KLA (short term). It’s likely most or all of those companies (along with smaller players like Axcelis and Teradyne) will receive a bump in extra sales from leveling up Intel’s fabs to run TSMC’s process.
American chip startups: With so much high end capacity becoming available, existing and potential chip startups are going to look like more attractive investment capital opportunities.
ARM Holdings: ARM doesn’t make chips, they’re an IP design house that licenses their functional chip blocks to other chip designers. Just about every foundry and IDM is a licensee (yes, including Intel and TSMC), so unleashing more chip designs will almost certainly result in more royalties for ARM. (Nvidia tried to buy ARM in 2020, and regulators quashed that idea good and hard.)
Intel investors, who will either get a big lump-sum payment or shares in the new, probably far more profitable company (depending on how the buyout is structured).
Even Intel wins long-term by unleashing existing fab capacity to take on new business not tied to its faltering CPU manufacturing model. And actually, with TSMC’s process, Intel has a chance to recover in the CPU space as well.
Losers
Samsung: Along with TSMC and Intel, Samsung (which has both IDM and foundry components) has some of the best sub-10nm process tech in the world. They gain a whole lot of unleashed competition and stand on the outside looking in.
Intel‘s dreams of reclaiming their spot at the top of the heap, and suffering the indignity of being partially owned by AMD. How the mighty have fallen.
Every Chinese fab, which goes from “very far behind” to “even further behind.”
Semiconductor equipment manufacturers (long term): They better enjoy the out-of-band upgrade money from retrofitting Intel’s fabs, as it will likely mean a significant delay in anyone building a new cutting edge wafer fab for quite a while. And having two of their biggest customers team up is probably going to put them under a lot of downward pricing pressure.
GlobalFoundries (and other trailing edge foundries) might lose some business, but there’s very little overlap between Intel/TSMC cutting edge processes and GlobalFoundries trailing-edge fabs. Ditto UMC.
Are there anti-trust concerns with such a heavy accumulation of cutting edge process technology? Oh yeah. Big time. But almost all of those concerns were already there in some form or another thanks to the interconnected “cooperation” nature of the industry. All those companies going in with TSMC were already getting chips fabbed by TSMC. Samsung could try to claim that the deal would result in TSMC having a de-facto monopoly on sub-10nm foundry business, but it wouldn’t start with one, and that business isn’t the whole of foundry business (though it is the most profitable part), much less semiconductors as a whole.
Given that this would go a long way toward achieving Trump’s goal of increasing cutting edge fab capacity in America, I would imagine that the Trump47 administration could very well be persuaded to let this deal go through.
The administration of US President Joe Biden next month is to broaden curbs on US exports to China of semiconductors used for artificial intelligence and chipmaking tools, several people familiar with the matter said.
The US Department of Commerce intends to publish new regulations based on restrictions communicated in letters earlier this year to three US companies — KLA Corp, Lam Research Corp and Applied Materials Inc, the people said, speaking on the condition of anonymity.
Every wafer fabrication plant in the world uses equipment from one of those three companies. Applied Materials and LAM Research (along with Tokyo Electron) have their fingers in almost all areas of chipmaking equipment (PVD, CVD, Etch, etc.), while KLA (formerly KLA-Tencor) dominates the wafer inspection equipment segment. Add ASML in the Netherlands, and those five absolutely dominate the semiconductor equipment market.
The letters, which the companies publicly acknowledged, forbade them from exporting chipmaking equipment to Chinese factories that produce advanced semiconductors with sub-14 nanometer processes unless the sellers obtain commerce department licenses.
This is where things get tricky. SMIC claims they can do 7nm, but everyone outside China doubts they can do it reliably, repeatably and profitably. SMIC announced they’re about to start manufacturing 14nm, and that they can probably do. Practically, they’re the only semiconductor manufacturer in China that can do sub-14nm, as just about everyone at the top of the next biggest semiconductor manufacturer, Tsinghua Unigroup, just got arrested in July.
Without a continued stream of machines, spare parts and technical know-how from those five semiconductor giants, China’s semiconductor industry is doomed. China’s domestic semiconductor equipment industry is essentially garbage, and they’re so far behind in so many areas that they can’t even steal their way to parity. The knowledge gulf is just too vast.
According to World Trade Organization statistics, China’s trade deficit in integrated circuits and electronic components (including Hong Kong’s trade deficit) has almost doubled from the equivalent of $135 billion in 2010 to $240 billion in 2020.
The growing trade deficit in integrated circuits reveals one crucial fact: Achieving technological self-reliance is still a faraway Chinese dream. To keep its exports growing, China has no other way but to keep importing advanced chips to assemble into consumer goods with high-tech intensity (e.g., smartphones, tablets, and the like).
Although China (including Hong Kong) is also the largest exporter of semiconductor chips in the world, less than 7% of chips produced in China were made by Chinese semiconductor companies in 2021.
More than 90% of chips produced in China are made by foreign firms. In other words, China’s exports of semiconductor chips are overwhelmingly dominated by foreign companies.
Its inferior level of technology is the main reason for China’s chip reliance on foreign firms. While Chinese firms are stuck with advancing toward 7nm chips, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. and Samsung are progressing towards mass production of 3nm chips this year. Intel plans to take over TSMC’s leading role in semiconductor technology by 2025.
The competition among a few tech giants in the U.S., Taiwan, and South Korea is clear, and the Chinese firms are not likely to jump into the global technology competition in the semiconductor industry anytime soon.
The U.S. restrictions on exporting chipmaking equipment to China’s largest semiconductor firm, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp., have not only deterred China’s technological advancement, but also exposed the fundamental mismanagement problems inside China’s semiconductor industry.
Xi might not have noticed his industry’s poor performance had China been able to continue to produce chips with foreign equipment.
Some parts about the Tsinghua scandal snipped.
Several Taiwanese executives leaving China’s semiconductor industry last year is another major setback in the development of China’s semiconductor industry.
China not only spent tremendously on building chip plants and purchasing expansive equipment, but also on recruiting talent from overseas. Over the past few years, China recruited more than 3,000 skilled workers from Taiwan to work in China’s semiconductor industry.
China amassed enormous capital, talent, and foreign equipment, but the problem is with governance. Xi’s absolute authority encouraged a rush into China’s semiconductor industry. Moreover, the extraordinary integration of the public and private sectors in China has twisted industrial development toward short-term profit-making, instead of long-term accumulation of manufacturing strength and technological improvement.
Xi’s “wolf warrior” diplomacy has further overshadowed the outlook of its semiconductor industry. China’s success relies on close partnerships with various suppliers and customers in different countries across the globe. Alienating them on the geopolitical front only undermines those relationships.
The U.S. ban on exporting chipmaking machines to China was the straw that broke the Chinese semiconductor industry’s back.
On top of that, the CHIPS and Science Act just signed into law bans semiconductor companies receiving U.S. government subsidies from investing in China for the next 10 years. There are major loopholes in that prohibition, but if Congress can manage to keep the administration’s feet to the fire—including by tightening the legal restrictions—it could have a major impact on China’s tech development.
In addition, the U.S. has extended the export restriction to 14 nm chipmaking machines to the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. and other foreign chipmakers in China. A specific electronics design automation software for making advanced chips is also banned from exportation to China.
Without foreign investment and inputs, China is only likely to deepen its reliance on importing advanced chips from overseas.
Peter Zeihan notes (correctly) that China’s semiconductor industry has been singularly unable to fab advanced chips on their own.
Not to mention that fraud still abounds. Chinese CPU semiconductor startup Quillion Technology closed up shop three months after raising $89 million.
$89 million is probably enough to get you to tape-out for a fabless semiconductor house designing a smaller chip (or maybe even a low-power ARM-based CPUs for embedded markets), but it’s a woefully small sum for a real cutting-edge CPU company, and laughable if they intended to be an integrated design manufacturer fabbing their own chips, where building even a trailing edge fab starts in the billions.
More on that topic:
Takeaways:
“Money seems to have a strong corruptive power over CCP officials that they can’t resist. Like China’s real estate industry, China’s semiconductor industry is also plagued with corruption, over-construction, and highly leveraged capital maneuvers.”
She goes over the history of the Chinese “Big Fund” for semiconductors I covered here, and later talks about the indictments.
“The state-run Semiconductor Investment Fund was used more as an instrument to speculate in stocks than an institution for conducting basic R&D. The government-backed fund, aka the “Big Fund,” has investments in 2,793 entities within three layers of ownership.” Very few of them have the word “semiconductor” in their names. (Like I said before, shell games all the way down.)
From 1984 to 1990, the Ministry of Electronics Industry delegated the management of the vast majority of state-owned electronics enterprises to local provincial and municipal governments. While these state-owned enterprises (SOEs) obtained more autonomy, something strange happened. These companies imported outdated integrated circuit production lines that had no commercial value. The wasteful projects cost money, but people used the opportunities to take foreign trips, receive kickbacks, and send their children abroad. And this happened on a large scale.
Pretty much classic ChiCom behavior.
China’s high-tech industry, like its financial industry, is dominated by powerful CCP families, and the Jiang Zemin family is one of them. In 1999, Jiang Zemin gave his oldest son, Jiang Mianheng, the reins of China’s “autonomous chip development.” As vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and president of the Shanghai branch for many years, the junior Jiang has long held the turf of China’s science and technology sector. He is also personally involved in the semiconductor business. His Shanghai Lianhe investment has holdings of Shanghai Zhaoxin Semiconductor Company.
Classic story:
Chen Jin, a former junior test engineer at Motorola, joined Shanghai Jiaotong University in 2001 after returning to China.
He was given the responsibility to develop the “Hanxin” chip, an important part of the state-run high-tech development program known as the “863 Program.” In just three years, Chen obtained 100 million in R&D funding and applied for 12 national patents. On Feb. 26, 2003, Chen’s team officially released the “Hanxin 1” chip. The Shanghai Municipal Government, the Ministry of Information Industry, and the Chinese Academy of Sciences all backed his work. The expert panel declared the “Hanxin 1” and its related design and application development platform as being the first of its kind in China and achieving an important milestone in the history of China’s chip development. Subsequently, Hanxin 2, 3, 4 and 5 chips were launched, all of which were claimed to have reached an advanced level globally. The Hanxin series of chips even entered the General Equipment Procurement Department of the Chinese military. However, 3 years later, on Jan. 17, 2006, “Hanxin 1” was revealed to be completely fake. Chen downloaded a Motorola chip source code through a former Motorola colleague. Then he secretly bought a batch of Motorola dsp56800 series chips, paid a peasant to scrape the original Motorola logo with sandpaper, and asked a local Shanghai print shop to print the “Hanxin” logo on it.
China correctly identified semiconductors and semiconductor equipment as key technologies for truly becoming the world’s preeminent technological manufacturing giant. Unfortunately for them (and fortunately for us), the CCP’s endemic culture of corruption and their top-down command economy are antithetical to the onrush of capitalist technological innovation that powers Moore’s Law.