Posts Tagged ‘Stuxnet Worm’

The Hezbollah Pager Attack: How?

Wednesday, September 18th, 2024

By now I’m sure you’ve heard about the epic, ingenious pager attack that Israel carried out against Hezbollah:

At least nine people were killed and about 2,750 people were injured in Lebanon on Tuesday during the mass explosion of pagers belonging to members of Hezbollah, according to the country’s health ministry.

A Hezbollah official described the event as the “biggest security breach” the group has suffered since the start of the Israel-Gaza war nearly one year ago, according to a Reuters report. The Shiite terror group claimed that lithium batteries inside the pagers apparently detonated.

Some members allegedly felt the pagers “heating up” before abandoning them, according to an unnamed Hezbollah official speaking to the Wall Street Journal. Hezbollah officials have speculated that Israeli malware could be behind the infiltration.

Sky News Arabia, however, quoted sources insisting that Mossad, Israel’s primary intelligence agency, physically planted explosive materials inside the pagers before they were delivered to Lebanon.

According to the Times of Israel, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah turned to pagers after he directed members to stop using cell phones in February, fearing they could be tracked by Israeli intelligence. A Lebanese security source claimed the devices were imported five months ago, according to Al Jazeera.

Seven individuals were similarly killed in Syria around Damascus, according to Iran’s IRGC-affiliated Saberin News. This signals a coordinated effort to reach the group in multiple locations across different countries.

Everyone and their dog has posted this story, so I wasn’t going to note it outside the LinkSwarm, except I think some commenters are making erroneous assumptions about how the attack was carried out. I see three possibilities:

  1. The Sky News Arabia suggestion (also floated in this Washington Post article) that the attack was carried out via a supply chain attack planting explosive in each pager, seems clever and has a certain surface plausibility. But I think it very unlikely, mainly because, if you already have that level of access to their communication network hardware, planting explosives is probably the least rewarding attack you could carry out. No, the real play for a supply chain attack is to compromise the security of the devices themselves so you can use Hezbollah’s own devices to spy on their entire communications network. That’s a whole lot more valuable than a handful of deaths and a larger number of maimings. I also find the idea that they intercepted the batteries and loaded them with Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) even less likely. Just how would these batteries receive the detonate signal if they’re not directly in the circuit to access the antenna to receive the signal?
  2. My guess is that Israel discovered the type of battery and charging firmware Hezbollah’s pagers used, and used a remote exploit to trigger overcharging in the batteries. This also aligns with reports that several Hezbollah terrorists felt the pager getting hot before they exploded. That isn’t the way explosives work, but it is the way Lithium Ion batteries respond to overcharging. Further supporting this hypothesis is that Israel’s previous Stuxnet worm targeting Iran’s nuclear program used a broadly similar attack (a combination software/firmware exploit that caused physical destruction of the targeted system). Such attacks are by no means easy, but dozens of broadly similar hardware hacking exploits are revealed at DEFCON every year.
  3. A third theory I’ve seen proposed by various commenters: Israel was able to explode the pagers because Hezbollah equipped all of them with explosives from the git-go, either to use as improvised explosives or for data security if captured. The first is unlikely because we all know Hezbollah has access to a wide range of explosives to build bombs and IEDs with, and it doesn’t make sense to use something as small as a pager for any significant target. The second strikes me as deeply unlikely from a cost/benefit analysis.

(If someone can think of another theory than those three, let me know in the comments below.)

The heady onrush of the technological revolution has allowed non-state actors like Hezbollah to punch well above their weight by using commercial off-the-shelf technology to strike vulnerable targets (civilians and infrastructure) of larger state actors like Israel. But the downside of not controlling your own supply chain is that a technologically sophisticated state actor like Israel has the knowledge and resources to hack your consumer-grade equipment.

I just read that Hezbollah radios are now exploding as well, so I’m going to go ahead and post this before Israel manages to remote detonate still more of Hezbollah’s tech.

Hezbollah, of course, is talking about launching a full-scale war against Israel. Given the destruction of their communication networks, one wonders how long it will take them to learn semaphore to coordinate attacks…

Symantic’s Extensive Analysis of the Stuxnet Worm

Tuesday, November 16th, 2010

Available here.

My hacking skills are pretty much limited to writing “Hello World” in Python on a good day, but even a cursory glance shows that Stuxnet is a very sophisticated beast indeed. Let’s hope it delivered a critical blow to Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The Stuxnet Worm: Set Pants to Brown Alert

Sunday, October 3rd, 2010

The Weekly Standard has an interesting piece on The Stuxnet worm. It seems designed to attack Iran’s nuclear program, was in the wild for more than six months before being detected, featured stolen digital signature keys (which may have involved actual physical espionage) and used an off-the charts four zero-day exploits, which is pretty much unheard of.

We really, really better hope that we or the Israelis wrote this thing, because if not, there’s a team of scary-good black hat hackers out there (from the description of how large and sophisticated it is, and all the different things it does, makes me think it took at least ten really good hackers more than a year to create) that can physically destroy major infrastructure targets through code almost at will. You really, really don’t want a team of “non-state actors” to have those capabilities…

I suspect we’re getting a glimpse of what the opening rounds of the next major war will look like…