One wonders if Vladimir Putin knew that not only would his three day “special military operation” in Ukraine drag on for at least two and a half years, but that Ukraine would launch a successful invasion of Kursk oblast, if he might have reconsidered ordering it.
Ukraine’s Kursk incursion continues to take territory in Russia.
A lot of observers (myself included) were puzzled by what endgame Ukraine is seeking in Kursk. So here are a couple of theories.
Peter Zeihan thinks the invasion is to cut off supplies to the city of Belgorod (one of the two major logistical hubs for Russia’s war effort).
“No one invades Russia on a whim.”
“The problem that the Russians have always had expanding for Moscow is that there’s no logical place to stop that’s within a thousand miles of them. So they expand, they conquer some minorities, they occupy them, they try to Russify them, they turn them to cannon fodder, and they throw them in the next line of minorities. They continue this process over and over and over and over and over until they eventually reach a geographic barrier that they can actually hunker down behind.”
“It works until it doesn’t. And what we’re seeing with Russia right now is that the demographic decline among the Russian ethnicity is so high that within a few years they’re going to be having problems occupying their own populations.”
“The incursion that the Ukrainians have made into Russia proper isn’t all that impressive from a territorial point of view. Basically in the last two weeks the Ukrainians have invaded Russia proper. They’ve taken over about a thousand square kilometers in the province of Kursk. And the question is why, and what is next.”
“They have already destroyed the three permanent bridges over the river Seym, which is a east-west river that cuts through Kursk province, and by doing that they’ve made it very difficult for the Russians to reinforce the territories around where this incursion has been.”
“The Ukrainians are currently expanding on at least four different axes, northwest, northeast, north and east, and in doing so they’re basically looking to swallow, at least temporarily, about half the province, about 6,000 square mile.”
“The thousand square kilometers that the Ukrainians have captured so far is greater than the entirety of what the Russian army has achieved in the Donbas in the last 18 months.”
Ukraine has taken out all the bridges, leaving Russians to use pontoon bridges for resupply, which are much more easily destroyed. And, as Suchomimus has shown in his recent videos, they seem to be rebuilding those bridges in the same spots, presumably because they’re the only suitable spots for building them, making it that much easier to take them out.
“I have always identified the city of Belgorad as one of the cities that the Ukrainians have to neutralize if they’re ever going to win this war, because it’s the tip of the spear for Russian forces. This is where, in the northern theater, all of their armies and all of their artillery are concentrated, because it’s at the end of the logistical lines. It’s a big rail and road hub. Well, if the Ukrainians are capable of basically taking the southern half of Kursk province, they take out most of the infrastructure that feeds into Belgorad.” Maybe, but there’s a whole lot of territory to take before Belgorad gets cut off.
“This took the Ukrainians scraping up the last of their reserve units, along with some advanced units that were training with NATO for future operations. I don’t think they’ve got a very deep bench beyond this.”
Invading here has allowed Ukraine to outflank Russia’s deep system of trenches, minefields and artillery. “The Ukrainians have been able to basically locate a battlefield that plays to their strengths rather than the Russian strengths and they’re kicking some serious ass.”
“The problem is they just don’t probably have enough men to fully take advantage of it, but neither do the Russians have the men necessary to eject the Ukrainians. Russia is also nearing the end of what they can scrape up through conscription of ethnic minorities. “The cupboard is getting dry.” They’re also extremely low on capable leadership (such as it is). Putin “just assigned one of his former bodyguards to run the operation in Kursk, and you can imagine how well that’s going.”
“What we’ve seen them do in the last two weeks is basically mobilize every military force that they have left in the country, which is not a lot.”
“They haven’t been able to find the 30,000 to 70,000 troops that they need in order to retake Kursk, and with the bridges gone they can only approach from the east, so the Ukrainians are having a bit of a heyday at the moment.”
The biggest fallout of the Kursk incursion is a dog that didn’t bark. “Nukes haven’t flown. Throughout this war, the Russians have, at every stage, identified a series of red lines, saying that if you cross this line we’re going to nuke Washington and Warsaw, Berlin and Paris and London and the rest, and at every stage it’s turned out to be a bluff. Well, now the Ukrainians have crossed the international border in force. They have castrated the Russian military in the area.”
“The Russians are showing an inability or an unwillingness to go to that level, and that tells me that the conservatism in Western capitals about challenging the Russians is about to evaporate. Because if the Ukrainians can do this without that sort of counter reaction, then pretty much every Russian threat to this point is meaningless.”
Next up: The Russian Dude, an anti-Putin and anti-Ukrainian War YouTuber who fled Russia just as the first conscription orders were coming down. He thinks the Kursk invasion may be a way to force Putin into calling up a second general conscription, something he has been loath to do since the first was so unpopular.
“The initial reaction to Ukraine’s move into Kursk was mixed. Many, especially those in the Russian military establishment, dismissed it as a mere PR stunt or a psychological operation, a distraction intended to draw attention away from other fronts. But as the days progressed, it became clear that this was no mere show of force. The Ukrainian Army was committed, and their objectives were far more strategic than anyone had anticipated.”
Even “Z propagandists” in Russia are admitting that ejecting Ukraine from Kursk oblast will take time. “This was a wakeup call. The country’s military and political leaders had long been accustomed to dismissing Ukrainian operations as inconsequential. The belief was that Russia’s superior military power would always be enough to repel any significant threat. But the events unfolding in Kirsk challenged this assumption.” Even some of the most pro-war Russian milbloggers began to express doubts.
“Russian president Vladimir Putin is facing a very scary decision. For years Putin has positioned himself as a strongman, a leader who would stop at nothing to achieve his goals. But the events in Kursk revealed the limits of his power. The Russian military, once his unstoppable force, was now struggling to respond to a determined and well-coordinated Ukrainian offensive.”
“Putin’s dilemma is rooted in the fact that he has few good options left. The Russian military is stretched thin, its resources depleted by years of sustaining conflict the invasion of Ukraine, which was supposed to be a quick and decisive victory, has instead turned to a grinding war of attrition. And now, with the Ukrainian forces pushing into Russian territory, the weaknesses of the Russian military are becoming more apparent than ever.”
“One of the key indicators of this is the absence of a new mobilization effort, despite the heavy losses Russia has suffered. Putin has not ordered a new wave of conscription [because] another round of mobilization would likely would like destabilize his regime. The last call-up in 2022 was deeply unpopular, sparking protest and unrest across the country.”
“Many Russians who had previously been indifferent to the war suddenly found themselves directly affected and the backlash was significant. Putin knows that another mobilization would likely provoke a similar response, potentially undermining his hold on power, but without new recruits the Russian military is running out of manpower.”
“Russia’s defense industry is struggling to keep up with the demands of the war. Missiles fired at Ukrainian cities bare markings from 2023 and 2024, indicating that they were produced recently. This suggests that Russia has managed to bypass some of the sanctions imposed by the West to acquire the components needed to build these weapons. But it also means that there is no surplus. Every single missile produced is immediately sent to the battlefield. The same is true for other military equipment like tanks, drones, and ammunition.”
Everyone who could be tempted by a sign-up bonus has already joined, even though they keep increasing. “If you do announce another round of mobilization and start grabbing people from the streets and sending them to fight in Ukraine for free, well, I don’t think that’s going to sit well with these people.”
“While Russia grapples with these challenges, Ukraine’s western allies have been surprisingly quiet, in a good way.”
“This raises the question: Have they finally realized that Putin’s ability to escalate the war further is limited? The answer appears to be yes. After nearly two years of watching Russia’s military strategy unfold, it seems that western powers have concluded that Putin is already operating at his maximum capacity.”
“Now Western leaders seem more willing to allow Ukraine to use the weapons as it sees fit. The focus has shifted from preventing escalation to supporting Ukraine in its efforts to defend itself and reclaim its territory.”
“Ukraine is now receiving more advanced technology, including long-range missiles and sophisticated drones. These weapons are designed to not just defend against Russian attacks, but to strike deeper inside Russian-held territory, disrupting supply lines and targeting key military objects.”
Thus far Putin has avoided seriously conscripting soldiers from the only two areas of the country he cares about: Moscow and St. Petersburg. Ukraine’s Kursk gambit may force him into doing so, possibly triggering his downfall.
Ukraine has allegedly struck the NIP-16 space communications and tracking facility in Crimea. According to reports, the attack was conducted on Saturday (June 22), using U.S.-made MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) ballistic missiles.
This attack was one of two carried out by Ukraine over the weekend into the Crimean Peninsula. These come just over a month since the United States gave Ukraine the go-ahead to strike into Russian territory using U.S.-made weapons.
The first attack over the weekend targeted the space communications facility with approximately 20 radar dishes. Some of these were combined in large fixtures with eight dishes.
Low-resolution satellite images obtained by the War Zone (TWZ) appears to confirm that the NIP-16 facility was indeed attacked, as claimed. However, due to the image quality, it is difficult to determine the exact extent of the damage.
We’ll get to that in a minute. Snip.
After Russia seized it following the 2014 takeover of Crimea, the facility was handed over to its Aerospace Forces, which then began modernizing it, as reported by the Ukrainian Defense Express (UDE) news outlet.
“As of 2017, reports stated the center had received ten new systems, and the upgrading was still proceeding,” UDE explained. “The initial plan was to spend 1.8 billion rubles on the reconstruction of one radio telescope alone: at the exchange rate of that time, cost about $28 million,” it added.
The Kyiv Post reported that Russia is now using it for ballistic missile early warning, looking towards the Middle East, Africa, and Southwest Asia. Others have postulated that it may be used for GLObalnaya NAvigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema in Russian (GLONASS), Russia’s equivalent of the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS).
We’ve got a pretty good idea what was hit because the after satellite photos are already available:
Starting at the top right where the signs of burning are, there’s a pair of laser rangefinders. Moving down around them and in the central area of damage a six meter radom and a five meter radom. And in a bottom bit of damage some items I don’t understand: parabolics on a gimbal, one of them is called, who I’m sure appeared at Glastonbury last year [it’s a radar dish that came move around, like the ones in the Very Large Array]. An M 6 meter case grain [I suspect he means a 6 meter gain antenna], and a 15 meter retractable radar.
Plus “Three new structures which were built since October 2020 the bottom one built in March or April 2021 during Russia’s military buildup.”
OK, let’s talk about GLONASS. According to Wikipedia (the source of all vaguely accurate knowledge), GLONASS has an accuracy range of 4.46–7.38m, which is fine for nuclear weapons, or to track positions of planes and ships, or to hit most buildings, but falls woefully short of tactical battlefield accuracy. During the Desert Storm, U.S. generals would brag that military band GPS would let a cruise missile target an individual M&M in a bowl. Even if we’re limiting Ukrainian access to military band GPS, Civilian GPS + differential GPS (basically using fixed ground tower signals to provide higher accuracy) is probably at least an order of magnitude more accurate than GLONASS.
Differential GPS was something the Russians were going to try to bring online as part of a constellation upgrade, but the Ukraine war (and the sorry state of Roscosmos) might have sidelined that goal. On the other hand, the only scheduled Russian space launches for the rest of this year are all for upgraded GLONASS K1 sats, so maybe that’s the one thing they’re still doing.
Peter Zeihan thinks this move has the Russians way screwed.
“You use a deep space system to basically keep track of all your satellites in orbit and communicate among them and to the ground. And since satellites typically are [orbiting], you need several of these stations around the world in order to provide good coverage.”
“The Russians have never had that, because the Russians have never had a series of allies that they can trust on a global basis. So they have four of these networks within the Russian Federation and that’s it and apparently one of them was completely destroyed within the last 36 hours.”
“It pretty much is the end of the Russian civilian space program. It was already floundering and wasn’t economically viable, especially with the advent of SpaceX because the Russians used to use their old ICBMs as launch vehicles. Basically you use one of them and then it’s gone and then you use another one you keep doing that until they’re all gone and, well, they’re all gone now unless they actually want to go into their active reserve they were using the ones that were decommissioned after the end of the Cold War, so they’re no longer cost effective at all.” I’m not sure that this is true, as all recent Roscosmos space flights have used the Soyuz-2 rocket, whose development split off from ICBM development a long damn time ago.
“Second, military satellites. Most military satellites, like most civilian satellites, are whipping around the planet, and now the Russians have lost one quarter of what was left of their capacity to track and communicate with them. That’s going to provide a real problem for the Russians in terms of satellite communications. Not to mention anyone who was looking at getting the Russians to launch and maintain a military satellite for them now has to find someone who is not Russia to maintain it.”
“And if your goal was to get away from the United States, there just aren’t a lot of options here, because the Chinese don’t have a good network for this either. So basically you’re down to Europe with the Airbus Consortium or the United States.”
“Third and perhaps most significant moving forward is, with the loss of this the Russians are losing the ability to not just keep tabs on their satellites but but to get good telemetry for things like repairs. And if the Russians lose the capacity to do that, then their GLONASS, system which is their equivalent of GPS, starts to fall offline.”
“Now there are already parts of the world that don’t have very good coverage all that often, but if you remove meaningful launch capability and monitoring capability and maintenance capability from the Russian system (losing one more radar system would probably do that) then you’re talking about the Russians losing the capacity to use precision guided munitions using geographic tags, that would be an end to things like, say, glide bombs, which are the newest military innovation that the Russians have used, basically dropping one to two to three ton bombs from within Russian territory and then having them glide and hit targets. If you lose their ability for satellite communication that goes away.”
I think Zeihan slightly overstates the problem for Russia, or more specifically immanentizes the crisis more than is warranted, especially in relation to the Russo-Ukrainian War. First, GLONASS precision wasn’t exacting to begin with, so its ability to hit tactical battlefield targets was questionable. Second, it takes time for sat global positioning errors to add up, even if you couldn’t use one of the three other stations for measurement and precision correction. Third, Russia hasn’t demonstrated much in the way of precision munitions in this war, the overwhelming majority of their weapons seem “dumb” anyway, and changing that has been made harder by sanctions. Finally, Russia could pull a sneaky end-around and relying on GPS as well as GLONASS for any precision weapons (as many civilian devices, including iPhones, have the capability to use) and the US has evidently retired “Selective Availability” for GPS.
My suspicion is that the GLONASS damage will be secondary to the destruction of whatever military radar capabilities Russia added to NIP-16, and which were evidently taken out by the strike as more battlespace preparation for the arrival of Ukrainian F-16s in theater later this year.
Here’s Peter Zeihan to state what conservatives knew a decade ago: Venezuela is headed for collapse.
It’s just over 6 minutes long, so even though I’ve excerpted it, you might want to watch all of it to listen for the one word Zeihan doesn’t say.
“Under 20 years of ridiculous mismanagement and theft by the governments of Hugo Chavez and now Nicholas Maduro, the state’s broken.”
“Basically we’ve had two decades of the governing authorities literally stealing everything that wasn’t stripped down, and then getting a wrench and getting a lot of the stuff that was stripped down [I think he means “strapped down”], to the point that they simply didn’t just confiscate materials they stripped it of equipment and melted it down or sold it for parts and there’s really nothing left.”
“So the country that used to have the highest educational levels in Latin America, the country that used to have the highest standard of living and the most cultural achievement, is now teetering on the verge of being a broken state, a failed state.”
“Roughly 1/3rd of the population that has out migrated since uh the last 6-7 years.”
“In calendar year 2022 and calendar year 2023, the Biden Administration did a partial lifting of sanctions on the regime, basically saying that if you start working in the direction of free and fair elections, we will allow investment to come in to stabilize the energy sector and get some more oil out of the ground. Uh, we’re going to trust your word for it, and then we will reassess when we get closer to elections in 2024.”
I bet everyone reading this can figure out exactly how well that worked out. “We’ll just take your word that your three card monte game is on the level.”
Chevron came in and got oil output up to a million barrels a day.
“But in the last several weeks it’s been clear that the government of Maduro has no intention of having real elections.” You don’t say. What you mean is “It’s been clear for decades that Venezuela’s socialist thugs have never had any intentions of holding free elections.” Only and idiot would think otherwise.
But the Biden Administration is doing everything it can to increase oil production in the rest of the world to help Biden’s reelection chances, while supressing oil production at home. “There’s a lot of things about that that are inconsistent.” You don’t say.
Oil production is now under three-quarters of a million barrels and falling.
“The really high-end stuff, the stuff that was part of the outcome of Venezuela being such a successful state, left a long time ago, and in bits and pieces ever since the the middle management and the secondary skill set and now there’s really nothing left.”
“People like to talk about the Chinese, the Russians, the Iranians coming, in but they don’t have any experience in this sort of oil patch, so we are probably going to see a collapse of what’s left of the output this year and early in the next year.”
“One of the many, many, many, many, many mistakes that Chavez and Maduro made is they hated the United States so much, and their spending was so crazy, that they started pre-selling their oil specifically to China and to a lesser degree to Russia. ‘We’ll take X number of billions of dollars from you now and we will pay you back with raw crude in the years to come.’ Well, what that means is that the Venezuelans are already not getting money from the oil that they produce.”
“So we are going to see this collapse, and as that happens, the ability of getting even a modicum of foreign currency to pay for the 80% of their food that they now import because they destroyed their agricultural sector is on deck.”
“So the famines of the past, the dislocations of the past, the migrations of the past these have all just been the appetizer course, and over the next very few years we’re going to see the full collapse of Venezuelan society.”
Leave it to the Biden Administration to enable foreign leftist enemies for temporary political gain.
Did you notice the word missing from Zeihan’s analysis?
I haven’t been updating every twist and turn of the Evergrande collapse, but we’re going to look at it again because this Peter Zeihan video has a fairly staggering statistic. He asserts that there are 1.5 BILLION (with a B) unoccupied housing units in China. Even though we already knew about the ghost cities, that’s like an entire ghost nation for a China that was already headed down the economic crapper.
“A Hong Kong court has ruled that China’s largest property development group, Evergrande, is bankrupt and needs to be broken up. This is something that the Chinese government has spent a lot of effort on the last two years not happening.”
“There’s two big things that dominate the Chinese economy. The first is something I call hyperfinancialization: The idea that the government both de facto confiscates the savings of the citizen population so it can only go into projects funded by Chinese State Banks, as well as massively expanding the money supply to a tune of like almost triple what we have here in the United States.”
“It’s a public stability political control approach to finance. It’s not about profit, it’s about throughput, because throughput requires a lot of bodies.”
“Number one, you get companies like Evergrande, who gorge on all this bottomless supply of debt to build build, build, build, build, even if there’s no demand.”
“Second, you get a population who knows that their private savings is almost worthless, because the Chinese government is forcing them to keep it in the state banks, and they want to put it into a hard asset that preferably the state can’t control. And if they can’t get their money out of the country, then the next best thing is a hard asset in the country, which typically is property.”
“You have somewhere probably in the vicinity of 1.5 billion units in the country that have never been lived in, never will be lived in. So you’re talking about 100% overbuild, conservatively. Some estimates say it’s as high as three billion, which is just so far beyond stupid.”
“How many vacant homes are there now? Each expert gives a very different number, with the most extreme believing the current number of vacant homes are enough for 3 billion people,” said He Keng, 81, a former deputy head of the statistics bureau.
“That estimate might be a bit much, but 1.4 billion people probably can’t fill them,” He said at a forum in the southern Chinese city Dongguan, according to a video released by the official media China News Service.
That’s people, not homes. Still, even if you cut it in half, to 750 million vacant condos, that’s a huge number. That’s the equivalent of 30 empty Shanghais.
Back to Zeihan:
“Evergrande going down means that their debts aren’t going to be serviced anymore, and the physical assets they have are going to be parceled up and foreign investors are going to be coming in seeing what bits that they can get.” Any foreigners investing in Chinese real estate need their heads examined.
“These things are things that the Chinese Communist Party would not normally allow to happen, so there’s a couple ways that this can go, none of them are good.”
“Option number one is we follow a western style bankruptcy and restitution program where this system is broken up and a lot of their assets are sold at pennies, maybe dimes, on a dollar.”
“You can count on private citizens being up in arms. I mean, the best estimate I’ve seen out of China is at 70% of total private savings is wrapped up in real estate, and most of these assets are worth no more than 10 cents on the dollar.”
“You have a fire sale of the single largest player which controls one sixth of the market, holy shit, things are going to get real very, very, very quickly.”
“Option number two is that the Chinese step in and abrogate the Hong Kong ruling. Now legally this cannot happen, but the Chinese Communist party is not really big on legal details when it comes to Hong Kong in particular.”
“Then Evergrande goes on some sort of state drip and everything with the system just kind of limps on, with the understanding now that Hong Kong has no legal authority over its own holdings, which will start an exodus of what few international firms are still there.”
“Regardless how this goes, don’t expect anything in the market to get better.”
“Evergrande may be the biggest player in this market, but it is by far not the only one who’s been doing stupid things like this, building condos that have no demand or running it like a Ponzi scheme. Every development company in the country basically operates this this way, and the second and third largest players in the industry are state-owned.”
“Even if all of a sudden this place were run by a bunch of Austrian economists, it’s too late.” Because of the one-child policy, there simply aren’t enough people of home-buying age.”
“I don’t want to say anything overly dramatic as ‘This is where it all starts to fall apart,’ because we’ve had a lot of things like that go down in the last 18 months. But this cuts to the core of what enables the average [Chinese] citizen to actually support the government, and there’s no way we move forward from this without a lot of side damage.”
The Chinese economy is already sucking. If the housing oversupply is really as bad as Zeihan makes out, China is in for an economic upheaval that makes 1929 look like a mild case of the hiccups.
It’s hard to report on Houthi rebels telling U.S. armed forces to “bring it on” and keep a straight face. It’s like Steve Urkel declaring he’s going to kick Mike Tyson’s ass, or Bambi vs. Godzilla.
I mean, their video features a Northrup F-5, a plane introduced to service in 1964 and last manufactured in 1987. It would be very, very unlikely to defeat an F-15, much less an F-35, which would probably splash it from 50 miles away with an AIM-120 and be back in time for breakfast.
I’m a bottomless well of Skiffy pop culture references.
And the rest of their air force (or what little of it survives after Saudi air strikes) is old (and probably ill-maintained) Soviet crap of the type that got smoked by F-15s during Desert Storm more than 30 years ago.
Beyond that, the Houthis probably only have the shitty drones Iran sells to Russia, and the even shittier rockets they give to Hamas, and neither of those will get the job done, either.
So: Yeah.
So instead of the laughable idea of direct Houthi-U.S. military confrontation, let’s turn to Peter Zeihan (yeah, him again) to talk about who the biggest losers are in the Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping. (Hint: It’s not the U.S., or Israel.)
“Militants in Yemen are launching a combination of low-grade ballistic missiles and drones at commercial shipping in the Red Sea. And that’s led the 10 major shipping companies of the world to basically suspend operations in that area, and either tell their ships to wait [until] the threat passes, or simply sail around the Red Sea completely, which means going all the way around Africa for the Asia-Europe run.”
“Here we have basically a bunch of drug-adled militants, some of the world’s least competent ones, operating from some of the world’s least valuable land in Yemen, probably at the instigation of the Iranians who are their primary supporter, because this is a little conflict that is a needle in the side of Saudi Arabia cost them very little.”
“This is is not a formal shutting down of trade, this is more of a heavy annoyance.”
It’s not the danger of being sunk deterring traffic, it’s the dangerous of losing insurance for going into a zone of conflict.
Who’s hurt worst by all this? First, China. “Roughly 30% of all global containerized traffic [goes through Suez], and the biggest single chunk of that is Chinese exports to the European Union…it increases the sailing distance by 1/3rd to 2/3rds, and that means you need 1/3rd to 2/3rd more container ships to maintain the same flows. So we’re going to see a lot of pinches in the supply chains for finished goods.”
“In an environment where consumption is basically seized up in China and all they have left are exports, it’s also going to make it a little bit easier for the Europeans to put trade sanctions on the Chinese for product dumping.”
The Saudis might find it a bit more difficult to ship crude to Europe, but there are some ways around that.
Then there’s Russia: “Because of a lack of infrastructure, Russian crude had to be exported through the same port points on the Black and Baltic Sea, but it had to be then shipped through the Mediterranean through Suez through the Red Sea across the Arabian Sea to India, southeast Asia and China.”
“Well, that is barely an economically viable route now, which is one of the reasons why the Russians are typically selling their crude at a $20 to a $30 a barrel discount. But if Suez is closed, then they can no longer send these small tankers through it, and these small tankers don’t have the reach to go all the way around Africa.” I find the last assertion dubious, as they are surely ports in Africa they can resupply and refuel at, especially since I don’t think any countries in Africa have signed up for sanctions against Russia.
“So you’re looking at something like 1.5 to 2 million barrels a day of Russian crude that might finally actually be stranded if this isn’t solved pretty quickly now.”
Russian insurance update: “You have some Russian players, some Indian players, and some Chinese players who have started started to offer indemnification insurance. So we might get this really colorful situation where the real shipping companies stop using Suez and the Red Sea, but these shadow companies that have never had to pay out start using it and then we get to find out what happens if an Iranian-backed militant Force hits a Chinese Indian or Russian ship.” Good times, good time…
I also have to wonder if there are mercenaries Ukraine could hire to carry out letters of marquis and reprisal on Russian ships…
For all that Democrats at the state and national level want to force adoption of them, electric cars are no panacea to solving the “climate change crisis” those same Democrats claim will kill us all.
Peter Zeihan explains why.
“A lot of major auto manufacturers are scaling down their plans to make electric vehicles. Ford and GM have both suspended, well, cancelled plans to build a couple new facilities for battery and EV assembly. No changes to their internal combustion engine vehicle plans.”
Tesla production is also slowing. “They’re going to suspend and maybe even cancel the plans for the gigafactory that they were going to be building in Mexico, although that’s very TBD.”
“From an environmental point of view most EVs are at best questionable.”
“The data that says they’re a slam dunk successes assumes that you’re building the EVs with a relatively clean energy mix and then recharging it with 100% green energy, and that happens exactly nowhere in the United States.”
“The cleanest state is California they are still 50% fossil fuel energy, and they lie about their statistics, because they say they don’t know what the mix is for the power that they’re importing from the rest of the country, which is something like a third of their total demand. And the stuff that comes, say, from the Phoenix area in Arizona to the LA Basin which is something like 10GW a day, which is more than most small countries, is 100% fossil fuel.”
“More importantly on the fabrication side, because there are so many more exotic materials and because energy processed to make those materials is so much more energy intensive, all of this work is done in China, and in most places it’s done with either soft coal or lignite.”
“You’re talking about an order of magnitude more carbon generated just to make these things in the first place compared to an IC [integrated circuit, AKA computer chips]. And that means that these things don’t break even on the carbon within a year. For most you’re talking about approaching 10 years or more.”
But Zeihan is leaving the most important variable out of this equation: The smug sense of satisfaction and moral superiority American leftists feel when driving these cars. Isn’t that worth all those extra coal plants?
Number 2: Materials. “These vehicles require an order of magnitude more stuff, more copper, more molybdenum, more lithium, obviously, more graphite. And the energy content required to put those in process is where most of the energy cost comes from.”
“If we’re going to convert the world’s vehicle fleets to these things, there’s just not enough of this stuff on the planet. I’m not saying that we can’t build on in time, but that time is measured in decades.”
“Supposedly we need 10x a much nickel on all the rest. So the stuff just isn’t there. So even if this was an environmental panacea, which it’s not, we would never be able to do it on a very short time frame. You’re talking a century.”
They’re also way more expensive. “This is not a vehicle that’s for most people.”
“And that’s before you consider little things like range anxiety. I’ve rented an EV. It’s real. There just aren’t enough charging stations.”
“EVs are building up on the lots and people just aren’t buying them without absolutely massive discounts and the discounts are now to the point that the whole industry is no longer profitable even with the subsidies that came in from the Inflation Reduction Act.”
“1% of the American vehicle Fleet to EVs, and it looks like we may be very close close to the peak.”
Not every one of his points hits home (there are, in fact, lots of overpriced gas powered cars and trucks sitting on dealers lots, as a lot of YouTube channels will show you), but he’s mostly correct.
Our conservative estimate is that the average EV accrues $48,698 in subsidies and $4,569 in extra charging and electricity costs over a 10-year period, for a total cost of $53,267, or $16.12 per equivalent gallon of gasoline. Without increased and sustained government favors, EVs will remain more expensive than ICEVs for
many years to come. Hence why, even with these subsidies, EVs have been challenging for dealers to sell and why basic economic realities indicate that the Biden administration’s dream of achieving 100% EVs by 2040 will never become a reality.
I have a whole host of “China is Screwed” videos I’ve gathered to post, but haven’t had the time to properly queue them up. So here’s a big picture piece from Peter Zeihan on China’s immediate economic foe: deflation.
“They never really recovered from Covid.” Aw. My heart bleeds.
“Growth is actually lower now than it was over the course of the last two years when they were supposedly under complete lockdown.”
“Consumption is down. Imports and exports both dropped in July compared to a year earlier by double digits of percentages. Normally the sort of stuff you only see out of a country like, say, Ukraine or Russia when a war starts.”
“We saw a demographic bomb go off in China before Covid. going back to as early as 2017, the demographics really turned negative from 2017 to 2021. The birth rate dropped by about 40%.”
“We’ve had all of these trends with four, five, six, years behind them, and as they’re manifesting in a more normal environment, the numbers are really, really, really bad.”
A whole lot of that is due to the One Child Policy.
Problem two: Deflation. The rest of the world suffered inflation when the lockdowns ended.
“The consumption boom never happened, so supply chains never had to adjust. What has happened is people are less confident in their future, so they’re consuming less.”
“We’re seeing mounting trade wars out of Europe, Japan, the United States, and increasingly secondary states like the Koreans are joining in. And that means the Chinese have fewer places to send stuff.”
“Product that was normally produced for export from China is now being locked up within the Chinese system at the same time that the population is purchasing less. You have an oversupply of goods and an under demand, both at home and abroad. With all those extra goods prices go down, and you get deflation.”
“This is what you would expect when you’re at the beginning of a deflationary spiral that’s caused by a fundamental mismatch between supply and demand, which is where we are going with deglobalization and the Chinese demographic. Trends which are now well past the point of no return.”
Japan’s deflationary spiral lasted 20-25 years.
Deflationary spirals are very hard to pull out of.
“The Chinese economic system isn’t really based on exports or consumption, it’s based on investment, the idea that the state fosters mass borrowing in order to build industrial plant infrastructure. Based on whose numbers you’re using, those are somewhere between 40-70% of the entirety of the Chinese economy, and has generated the vast majority of economic growth.”
“You can only do that for so long. Eventually you don’t need any more bridges, or any more factories, and I would argue the Chinese reached that point before Covid. Again, there’s been this three, four year lag between reality and the data finally manifesting.”
More spending won’t help.
“The amount of growth they get for every Yuan spent has been dropping steadily for 40 years, and now it’s in far less than one to one. So it really doesn’t matter how much more fuel and how much cheap capital the Chinese pump into the system, it’s never going to generate more economic activity than what it costs to put it in the first place.”
…and I’ve just run out of time to do a decent LinkSwarm. Instead, in honor of police finding Hunter Biden’s cocaine unexplained cocaine of unknown origin at the White House, here’s a video of Norm MacDonald doing cocaine jokes, followed by a mini-LinkSwarm.
I’ve covered Peter Zeihan videos on China’s crashing demographics before. We already knew China was “the fastest aging society in human history, with the largest sex imbalance in human history.” Now he’s dug into new some new data.
It’s much worse than he thought.
“We’ve gotten some new data out of the Chinese that has made it way to the U.N, and so the updates have allowed us to update our assessment, and oh my God, it’s bad.”
“Here is the new data, and as you can see, the number of children who are under age 5 has just collapsed, and they’re now roughly twice as many that are age 15 as age 5.”
“What happened back in 2017, well before Covid, is that we had a sudden collapse in the birth rate, roughly 40% over the next five years among the Chinese, the ethnic Han population, and more than 50 percent among a lot of the minorities. And that is before Covid, which saw anecdotally the birth rate drops considerably more.”
“We’re never going to get good data on death rate, or at least not anytime soon, because the Chinese, when they did the reopening, just stopped collecting the data on deaths and Covid and everything because they didn’t want the world to know how many Chinese died, so they don’t know.”
And if you look at the data from the Shanghai Academy of Science, it’s even worse than the official state numbers.
“China aged past the point of demographic no return over 20 years, ago and it wasn’t just this year that India became the world’s most populous country, that probably happened roughly a decade ago. And it wasn’t in 2018 that the average Chinese aged past the average American, that was probably roughly in 2007 or 2008.”
“This is not a country that is in demographic decay, this is a country that is in the advanced stages of demographic collapse. And this is going to be the final decade that China can exist as a modern industrialized nation state, because it simply isn’t going to have the people to even try.”
“Labor costs you’re having now or as low as they’re ever going to be. Consumption is as high as it’s ever going to be.”
“So even before you consider the political complications or issues with operating environment or energy access or geopolitical risk or regulational risk, the numbers just aren’t there anymore so you have to ask yourself why you’re still there.”
Add to that the fact that China economy is probably overstated by 60%, and it looks like China’s brief days in the sun are already over.
At such a remove from the actions in a vast country with no free news services, it’s hard to definitively say what’s going on with the Russian coup. So here are a variety of “state of play” snippets from various sources (Suchomimus’s discord, MSM, YouTube, Twitter, other social media, etc.). Some of these are rumors that may later turn out to be false, so treat with as many grains of salt as you deem necessary.
Wagner Group forces under Yevgeny Prigozhin continue their open rebellion against Russian defense minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov.
They evidently took full control of Rostov-on-Don without firing a shot, and reports are that many Russian regular soldiers there have gone over to their side.
Wagner forces headed for Moscow.
Reports of Russian aircarft hitting Russian gas and ammo depots along the way to deprive Wagner of them.
None of Prigozhin’s statements seem to directly attack Russian dictator for life Vladimir Putin.
There are reports of Wagner shooting down at least one (and possibly two) Russian helicopter over Voronezh, where small arms clashes have been reported.
Unconfirmed reports of unrest in Belarus, with soldiers there being tired of living under Putin’s thumb.
Reports that Putin-ally leader of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko flew out of the country, switched off his plane’s transponder, and turned it on again when he was over Turkey.
Chechen strongman and bought Putin ally Ramzan Kadyrov has evidently announced he’s opposing Wagner’s coup.
There are persistent rumors that Prigozhin wouldn’t have launched this coup without at least some support among powerful Russian oligarchs and command elements of the Russian military.
Here are some update videos. From Peter Zeihan on the Ukraine war:
I think Zeihan is too optimistic about the hole Ukraine put in the Chongar bridge, and I think Russians will try to at least run supply trucks around it and hope it doesn’t collapse.
From Suchomimus:
Wagner reportedly has 25,000-50,000 men, plus tanks on transporters and anti-aircraft systems. “This isn’t a ragtag army.”
Russia was “also building defensive positions near Serpukhov, 100 kilometers away from Moscow. So far the troops based around Moscow look like they do remain loyal to Putin.”
Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov announced a deal late on Saturday that Wagner mercenary boss Yevgeny Prigozhin would depart for Belarus in return for being spared prosecution, after an abortive rebellion in which his troops made a dash for Moscow.
The announcement, carried by the Tass news agency, came shortly after embittered warlord Prigozhin announced his men were turning back from Moscow to avoid a devastating civil conflict. In a voice recording posted to his Telegram channel, Prigozhin said his troops would turn back after advancing within 200 kilometers of the capital.
It was the culmination of an extraordinary day, in which Putin had accused the Wagner group of “treason” and said that their uprising risked tipping Russia into civil war.
Prigozhin, smarting over the Kremlin’s handling of the war in Ukraine, announced early on Saturday that his mercenaries had seized the major southern Russian city of Rostov-on-Don, a logistics hub for Putin’s war, and threatened to push on to Moscow. Wagner forces also appeared to be well established in the city of Voronezh, 500 kilometers south of the capital.
Well, that’s a disappointment to all of us who thought it would allow Ukraine to liberate itself from a distracted Russia.
Prigozhin’s coup didn’t even last the three days of the 1991 Soviet coup…
