Another dispatch from one of China’s ghost city developments, but this one with a twist: All the homes were theoretically designed for rich people, but I’m having a hard time figuring out why they would want them.
More than 100 uncompleted McMansions sit in Shenyang City some 400 miles northeast of Beijing.
They were “built by Greenland Group, one of the more than 50 housing developers that have defaulted on their debt in recent years.”
“Construction in 2010 but came to a halt a few years later.”
I know that China is a very different country indeed, but I can’t figure out why the developers thought that these McMasions, all made on the same floorplan and jowl by jowl next to each other on pretty small plots of land, would be appealing to the wealthy in the first place. They houses themselves are big and stylish enough in the 19th century French style they were aping, but the rich want land, space and differentiation, not to live between two houses exactly like their own on a small plot of land.
Yet another example of China’s inexplicable, wasteful policies…
I haven’t been updating every twist and turn of the Evergrande collapse, but we’re going to look at it again because this Peter Zeihan video has a fairly staggering statistic. He asserts that there are 1.5 BILLION (with a B) unoccupied housing units in China. Even though we already knew about the ghost cities, that’s like an entire ghost nation for a China that was already headed down the economic crapper.
“A Hong Kong court has ruled that China’s largest property development group, Evergrande, is bankrupt and needs to be broken up. This is something that the Chinese government has spent a lot of effort on the last two years not happening.”
“There’s two big things that dominate the Chinese economy. The first is something I call hyperfinancialization: The idea that the government both de facto confiscates the savings of the citizen population so it can only go into projects funded by Chinese State Banks, as well as massively expanding the money supply to a tune of like almost triple what we have here in the United States.”
“It’s a public stability political control approach to finance. It’s not about profit, it’s about throughput, because throughput requires a lot of bodies.”
“Number one, you get companies like Evergrande, who gorge on all this bottomless supply of debt to build build, build, build, build, even if there’s no demand.”
“Second, you get a population who knows that their private savings is almost worthless, because the Chinese government is forcing them to keep it in the state banks, and they want to put it into a hard asset that preferably the state can’t control. And if they can’t get their money out of the country, then the next best thing is a hard asset in the country, which typically is property.”
“You have somewhere probably in the vicinity of 1.5 billion units in the country that have never been lived in, never will be lived in. So you’re talking about 100% overbuild, conservatively. Some estimates say it’s as high as three billion, which is just so far beyond stupid.”
“How many vacant homes are there now? Each expert gives a very different number, with the most extreme believing the current number of vacant homes are enough for 3 billion people,” said He Keng, 81, a former deputy head of the statistics bureau.
“That estimate might be a bit much, but 1.4 billion people probably can’t fill them,” He said at a forum in the southern Chinese city Dongguan, according to a video released by the official media China News Service.
That’s people, not homes. Still, even if you cut it in half, to 750 million vacant condos, that’s a huge number. That’s the equivalent of 30 empty Shanghais.
Back to Zeihan:
“Evergrande going down means that their debts aren’t going to be serviced anymore, and the physical assets they have are going to be parceled up and foreign investors are going to be coming in seeing what bits that they can get.” Any foreigners investing in Chinese real estate need their heads examined.
“These things are things that the Chinese Communist Party would not normally allow to happen, so there’s a couple ways that this can go, none of them are good.”
“Option number one is we follow a western style bankruptcy and restitution program where this system is broken up and a lot of their assets are sold at pennies, maybe dimes, on a dollar.”
“You can count on private citizens being up in arms. I mean, the best estimate I’ve seen out of China is at 70% of total private savings is wrapped up in real estate, and most of these assets are worth no more than 10 cents on the dollar.”
“You have a fire sale of the single largest player which controls one sixth of the market, holy shit, things are going to get real very, very, very quickly.”
“Option number two is that the Chinese step in and abrogate the Hong Kong ruling. Now legally this cannot happen, but the Chinese Communist party is not really big on legal details when it comes to Hong Kong in particular.”
“Then Evergrande goes on some sort of state drip and everything with the system just kind of limps on, with the understanding now that Hong Kong has no legal authority over its own holdings, which will start an exodus of what few international firms are still there.”
“Regardless how this goes, don’t expect anything in the market to get better.”
“Evergrande may be the biggest player in this market, but it is by far not the only one who’s been doing stupid things like this, building condos that have no demand or running it like a Ponzi scheme. Every development company in the country basically operates this this way, and the second and third largest players in the industry are state-owned.”
“Even if all of a sudden this place were run by a bunch of Austrian economists, it’s too late.” Because of the one-child policy, there simply aren’t enough people of home-buying age.”
“I don’t want to say anything overly dramatic as ‘This is where it all starts to fall apart,’ because we’ve had a lot of things like that go down in the last 18 months. But this cuts to the core of what enables the average [Chinese] citizen to actually support the government, and there’s no way we move forward from this without a lot of side damage.”
The Chinese economy is already sucking. If the housing oversupply is really as bad as Zeihan makes out, China is in for an economic upheaval that makes 1929 look like a mild case of the hiccups.
Due to issues of politics, congestion, or just plain corruption, nations get the bright idea to build brand new capital cities far away from existing urban areas. Sometimes it works out (as with Washington D.C.), and sometimes it doesn’t. China’s Xi Jinping is trying something different with Xiongan, which is being built not so much a replacement to Beijing but as sort of “mini-me” Beijing to relieve overcrowding by offloading functions to the new built-from-scratch city in Hebei* province.
About 60 miles south of the center of Beijing, a new city is being built as a showcase of high-tech ecologically friendly development. Its massive high-speed rail station and “city brain” data center have been heralded by Chinese state media as evidence of the speed and superiority of China’s growth model—not least because the city is a “signature initiative” of Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Commies (and their American fans) do love their high speed rail projects. Never mind that high speed rail in China has mostly been a trillion dollar, money losing sinkhole.
Xiongan New Area is also a test for whether China can boost domestic innovation and climb into the ranks of advanced nations in the face of slowing economic growth and efforts by the United States and others to restrict its access to advanced technology.
Xiongan offers a window into what Xi’s vision of state-led innovation looks like on the ground. Xi has called the city his “personal initiative” and a qiannian daji, or “thousand-year plan of national significance.”
You know who else had a thousand year plan?
Sorry, I just can’t resist a good Hitler meme when you pitch a slow ball right over the center of the plate…
The plan for Xiongan, which was formally unveiled in 2017 to relieve pressure on Beijing and promote the “coordinated regional development” of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, has faced financial struggles due to the huge investment costs—even more of a problem given China’s mounting real estate crisis. Overall, the new area encompasses about 650 square miles, with a planned population of around 3 million; currently, the three counties comprising the zone have around 1.4 million long-term residents. As of September 2022, 400 billion yuan (about $57 billion) in completed investment had been reported in the city overall.
While Xi has stacked the new Politburo Standing Committee with officials loyal to him, he has also elevated those with strong science and engineering backgrounds. In his speech at the 20th Party Congress last October, Xi declared that “innovation will remain at the heart of China’s modernization drive” and that China has “worked hard to promote high-quality development and pushed to foster a new pattern of development.” Nevertheless, a confluence of factors including COVID-19 lockdowns and trade tensions is contributing to overall slower growth in China.
In Xi’s vision, however, party control is not a hindrance to innovation. Rather, Xi’s vision of innovation is one in which the state and party play a leading role. Xi has led a crackdown on private technology firms such as Alibaba but has also promoted policies, such as his Made in China 2025, that aim to boost research-and-development spending and subsidies to give Chinese firms competitive advantages in industries including biotechnology, robotics, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors.
We know from experience that this approach almost never works, because the profit motive of capitalism is always a superior discovery mechanism for innovation than top-down bureaucratic mandates. We know that the state-led approach has already been a colossal failure for semiconductors even before the sanctions came down, and it’s a good bet that it’s been just as colossal a failure in all the other areas mentioned.
Xi’s policies favor “hard tech” over software-based platform app companies. The first party secretary of Xiongan was Chen Gang, who oversaw Beijing’s Zhongguancun high-tech park before being transferred to Guizhou, where under Xi ally Chen Miner he helped turn the southwestern province into a center of big data and cloud computing.
The approach to innovation in Xiongan involves embedding technology within the fabric of the city as well as innovation processes within the party-state. Xiongan Group was created as the investment vehicle for the area’s overall development, under the control of Hebei province but backed partially by loans from China Development Bank. The first central state-owned enterprises to begin construction of offices in the new area were China Satellite Communications Co., the energy giant China Huaneng Group, and Sinochem Holdings. Others now include the big three telecoms and China State Grid, as well as China Mineral Resources Group, a conglomerate set up last year to centralize China’s coal mining industry. These state-owned enterprises could use Xiongan as a test bed for new technologies. Research institutes and satellite branches of several Beijing universities are planning to open in the area around 2025. The relocation of these major units and their thousands of employees will determine how quickly Xiongan’s development proceeds.
Even as China’s economy has slowed during COVID-19 lockdowns and the global downturn, construction of the first phase of Xiongan has marched on: A huge high-speed rail station to connect the city with Beijing opened in 2020, followed by residential slabs, massive underground utility corridors, and the city brain data center, which will serve as the nerve center of the city’s digital systems. The first section, Rongdong, has been mostly completed, with housing for 170,000 people. Media reports of new schools opening show the effort to build high-quality public amenities to attract residents to the city: Branches of Beijing institutions such as Shijia Primary School and Tsinghua University High School are among the new educational institutions being built in Xiongan.
The Foreign Policy piece is OK as a sort of sanitized, high level overview, but lacks several key words (“shoddy,” “rotten,” “unsafe,” “tofu dregs,” etc.) that reflect the grittier reality of Xi Jinping’s dream:
Takeaways:
“This is arguably the world’s biggest rotten tail project.”
“The project, which was billed as a Millennium Project and a major national event, fell apart after only five years.”
“According to the official website of Xiongan New Area, in 2021 the area arranged more than 230 key projects with a planned investment of more than 200 billion RMB. In 2022, 232 key projects were arranged with an investment of another 200 billion RMB and the cumulative total investment has exceeded 700 billion RMB, i.e. nearly 100 billion US dollars.”
Add area rail and road infrastructure investments and the total rises to $150 billion.
“Located 105 kilometers from both Beijing and Tianjin, the new area is positioned to decongest Beijing’s non-capital functions and will host administrative and institutional units, corporate head offices financial institutions, universities, research institutes and other organizations evacuated from Beijing.” I bet workers who have already gone through the expensive and difficult process of buying their own condos in Beijing will just love being forced to move an hour away.
“The initial planning area is about 100 square kilometers, with plans to slowly expand to an eventual area of about 2,000 square kilometers.” 2,000 square kilometers works out to about 772 square miles, or larger than Houston, one of America’s most sprawling cities.
“Average folks have wondered why did the central government put this new area…in a sparsely populated and heavily polluted poor rural area.”
The idea seems to be to bring Beijing, Tianjin and Xiongan into a single economic circle with a population of 130 million.
Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao each decreed creation of their own special areas, and Xi is following in their footsteps.
After the new area was announced, “real estate speculators from all over the country flocked overnight. The local property price soared from 4 000 RMB per square meter to 40,000 RMB, catching up with the first tier cities such as Beijing and Shanghai.”
There was an explosion of construction, but then it stopped.
“For more than five years, the large-scale construction of the Xiongan New Area didn’t move. The streets were empty, and people from outside had left one after another.”
A high speed rail station said to be the largest in Asia the size of “66 soccer stadiums” has only one train a day.
“In August 2021, the CCP issued a regulation that downgraded Xiongan to a regional level jurisdiction.” So instead of being it’s own special area, it’s now run by Hebei province, which means “this ‘Millennium Project’ is no longer possible, and the central government has simply dumped this hot potato on the local government.”
Official use words like “expedite, start construction, registering land, basically confirmed, etc didn’t explain any more specific progress. This actually allowed the public to read its true meaning, that is there is no substantial progress.”
The same pagoda seems to have been constructed several times.
“No one wants to go there at all. Even if you force them out of Beijing, they still don’t want to go there. There are no actions from the universities either.”
Chinese people think the area has bad “Feng Shui,” and it’s in a low-lying area near a lake that used to be flooded. The local lake and river also have very poor water quality. “However, the [water] treatment project hasn’t yet been completed.”
“Xiongan New Area is like building a mansion in a garbage dump, and people don’t want to live there.”
“More than five years later, no decent state-owned enterprises have really moved to Xiongan.”
“Given China’s objection to objective reality, the only way to make people move to Xiongan is by force. This is what happened in 2017, when the Beijing government forcibly evicted the so-called low-end population and people took to the streets in protest.”
Shenzhen New Area benefited from China’s opening, foreign investment and proximity to Hong Kong. “The dysfunctional mechanism of the CCP which had suppressed economic momentum for decades was released at the moment when the country opened its doors, so that Shenzhen could rise with the momentum.”
By contrast, Xiongan suffers from global economic headwinds and local finances are “very poor.”
Banks poured money into the area, accompanied by corruption. Natives forced out of their homes got low compensation and the new homes were shoddy. Many still haven’t found new homes.
“Videos provided by local residents show that the most common problems with homes are water leaks cracked exterior walls and sinking floors in some homes water leaked all over the floor.” A video shows a stairway turning into a waterfall during heavy rain.
It’s hard to find on Google maps, but I think this spot shows the same cookie cutter buildings seen in the video.
Ghost city, tofu dregs, rotten tail; parts of Xiongan seem to check all three boxes.
*Note: Hebei Province is completely different from Hubei Province further south…
Remember the bank runs in China story after all those bank accounts in Hunan were frozen? I’ve been looking for signs of wider contagion amidst the Chinese banking sector, and mostly haven’t seen it. But I have seen a lot of other cracks appear in China’s overall economic system, so here’s a roundup.
One reaction to the frozen accounts: “Chinese Bank Run Turns Violent After Angry Crowd Storms Bank of China Branch Over Frozen Deposits.”
A large crowd of angry Chinese bank depositors faced off with police Sunday in the city of Zhengzhou, and many were injured as they were taken away, amid the freezing of their deposits by some rural-based banks.
The banks froze millions of dollars worth of deposits in April, telling customers they were upgrading their internal systems. The banks have not issued any communication on the matter since, depositors said.
According to Chinese media the frozen deposits across the various local banks could be worth up to $1.5 billion and authorities are investigating the three banks.
On Sunday, about 1,000 people gathered outside the Zhengzhou branch of China’s central bank on Sunday to demand action; they held up banners and chanted slogans on the wide steps of the entrance to a branch of China’s central bank in the city of Zhengzhou in Henan province, about 620 kilometers (380 miles) southwest of Beijing.
China’s communist government reacted to the protests with their usual tact and understanding:
But it looks like some of them will finally get some money back:
(Plus more on the property slump.)
The official line on the Hunan account freeze: “Henan police said in a statement on July 10 that further investigations showed that, since 2011, a criminal group led by a suspect named Lu Yi had gradually taken control of several rural banks, through companies including the Henan New Wealth Group, to illegally transfer out funds. The police said they had arrested more suspects and seized more assets involved in the case.” I have no doubt the aforementioned were probably guilty, but I bet a whole lot more bank officials, regulators, and CCP officials (to the extent that those are separate groups and not mostly-overlapping Venn circles) were in on the scheme, plus a whole bunch more in dozens of other schemes that siphoned off depositor money into various pockets and a host of entirely different schemes. As I’ve said before, it’s smoke and mirrors all the way down.
Another thing driving unrest: “Rotten tail buildings,” that is residential buildings on which all construction is stopped, but for which those with mortgages for individual units are still expected to pay for:
A rapidly increasing number of “disgruntled Chinese homebuyers” are refusing to pay mortgages for unfinished construction projects, exacerbating the country’s real estate woes and stoking fears that the crisis will spread to the wider financial system as countless mortgages default.
According to researcher China Real Estate Information, homebuyers have stopped mortgage payments on at least 100 projects in more than 50 cities as of Wednesday, up from 58 projects on Tuesday and only 28 on Monday, according to Jefferies Financial Group Inc. analysts including Shujin Chen.
And that was over a week ago.
According to Citi analysts, average selling prices of properties in nearby projects in 2022 were on average 15% lower than purchase costs in the past three years. Meanwhile, it’s only getting worse as China’s home prices fell for a ninth month in May, with June figures set for release Friday.
The crisis engulfing Chinese developers is reaching a new phase, with a debt selloff expanding to firms once deemed safe from the cash crunch, including investment-grade names such as Country Garden Holdings, the largest builder by sales.
The payment refusals, which come at a time when China’s economy is set to post what may be a negative GDP print due to the latest economic shutdown over Xi’s catastrophic zero covid policies, underscore how the storm engulfing China’s property sector is now affecting hundreds of thousands of average citizens, posing a threat to social stability ahead of a Communist Party Congress later this year. Chinese banks already grappling with challenges from liquidity stress among developers now also have to brace for homebuyer defaults.
As a result of the unprecedented push for a debt jubilee, shares of China’s banks extended their recent decline Thursday, with the CSI 300 Banks Index falling as much as 3.3% before closing down 2.2%. A Bloomberg Intelligence index of Chinese developer stocks slid as much as 2.7%, even though Chinese lenders were quick to try and dispel fears that the movement could crash the economy: according to Bank of Communications, its outstanding balance of overdue mortgage loans linked to housing projects with risks of delayed delivery is 99.8 million yuan, accounting for 0.0067% of its domestic housing mortgage balance. The bank added that its housing mortgage loan quality is stable and risks are controllable, the Shanghai-based lender says in an exchange filing. At the same time, Postal Savings Bank of China says its overdue mortgage loans linked to halted housing projects is 127m yuan, and risks are controllable. Of course, it’s not like Chinese banks would ever lie, now is it?
The Great Debt Jubilee is picking up speed: China’s homebuyer mortgage boycott, which prompted Beijing to scramble to avoid a potentially devastating crash in what is the world’s biggest asset is spreading, and according to Bloomberg, some suppliers to Chinese real estate developers are now also refusing to repay bank loans because of unpaid bills owed to them, a sign that the loan boycott that started with homebuyers is starting to spread.
In a jarring case study of what happens when a ponzi scheme goes into reverse, hundreds of contractors to the property industry complained that they can no longer afford to pay their own bills because developers including China Evergrande Group still owe them money, Caixin reported, citing a statement it received from a supplier Tuesday.
Similar to homebuyers who have taken a stand and refuse to pay for properties that remain uncompleted, one group of small businesses and suppliers circulated a letter online saying they will stop repaying debts after Evergrande’s cash crisis left them out of pocket.
“We decided to stop paying all loans and arrears, and advise our peers to decline any requests to be paid on credit or commercial bill,” the group said in the letter dated July 15, which was sent to the developer’s Hubei office. “Evergrande should be held responsible for any consequence that follows because of the chain reaction of the supply-chain crisis.”
As Bloomberg oh so perceptively puts it, “the payments protest is the latest sign of how a movement by homebuyers to boycott mortgages on unfinished homes in China is spreading to affect other sectors in the economy.”
Yes it is, and it’s also why Beijing should be freaking out (if it isn’t), because what is taking place in China is far worse than what took place in March 2020 when the global credit machinery ground to a halt, only back then it’s because there was no other option, now it’s a voluntary development and not even fears of reprisals from China’s ruthless, authoritarian, Lebron-beloved dictatorship is stopping millions of people from calling for a systemic boycott, one which can topple China’s entire $60 trillion financial system in moments.
Probably an overstatement, just because it takes a whole lot to overcome the inertia of the average Chinese citizen just wanting to keep their head down and not be the nail that sticks up.
Embattled Chinese real estate giant Evergrande is expected to deliver a preliminary restructuring plan this week, following the exit of two bosses.
The firm says its chief executive and finance head have resigned, after an internal probe found that they misused around $2bn (£1.7bn) in loans.
Chinese businessmen misusing funds? Try to contain your shock.
Evergrande has more than $300bn in liabilities and defaulted on its debts late last year.
The crisis has spooked traders who fear contagion in China’s property sector.
On Friday, Evergrande said it found that chief executive Xia Haijun and chief financial officer Pan Darong were involved in diverting 13.4bn yuan ($2bn; £1.7bn) in loans secured by its property services unit to the wider group.
The firm said in a filing to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange that Mr Xia and Mr Pan had resigned because of their “involvement in the arrangement of the pledges”.
Getting caught trying to cook the books even after it’s hit the fan. Classic Chinese management.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has started the process, compelled by a 2020 law, and investors have started to pay attention. So has China, which moved to potentially clear a big hurdle that stymied U.S. regulators for years.
1. Why does the U.S. want access to audits?
The 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in the wake of the Enron Corp. accounting scandal, required that all public companies have their audits inspected by the U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. According to the SEC, more than 50 jurisdictions work with the board to allow the required inspections, while two historically have not: China and Hong Kong. The long-simmering issue morphed into a political one as tensions between Washington and Beijing ratcheted up during the administration of President Donald Trump. The Chinese chain Luckin Coffee Inc., which was listed on Nasdaq, was found to have intentionally fabricated a chunk of its 2019 revenue. The following year, in a rare bipartisan move, Congress moved to force action.
2. Where does it stand?
As required by the law, known as the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act or HFCAA, the SEC in March started publishing its “provisional list” of companies identified as running afoul of the requirements. While the move had long been telegraphed, the first batch of names fueled a sharp decline in U.S. shares of companies based in China and Hong Kong as it dashed hopes for some kind of compromise. In all, the PCAOB has said it’s blocked from reviewing the audits of more than 200 of those businesses. The companies say Chinese national security law prohibits them from turning over audit papers to U.S. regulators. SEC Chair Gary Gensler said in late March that the Chinese authorities faced “a hard set of choices.” Days later, China announced it would modify a 2009 rule that restricted the sharing of financial data by offshore-listed firms, potentially clearing one obstacle.
3. What is China changing?
The China Securities Regulatory Commission said the requirement that on-site inspections should be mainly conducted by Chinese regulatory agencies or rely on their inspection results would be removed. It said it would provide assistance for cooperation with foreign regulators. The CSRC said it’s rare in practice that companies need to provide documents containing confidential and sensitive information. However, if required during the auditing process, they must obtain approvals in accordance with related laws and regulations.
4. What’s the broader issue?
Critics say Chinese companies enjoy the trading privileges of a market economy — including access to U.S. stock exchanges — while receiving government support and operating in an opaque system. In addition to inspecting audits, the HFCAA requires foreign companies to disclose if they’re controlled by a government. The SEC is also demanding that investors receive more information about the structure and risks associated with shell companies — known as variable interest entities, or VIEs — that Chinese companies use to list shares in New York. Since July 2021, the SEC has refused to greenlight new listings. Gensler has said more than 250 companies already trading will face similar requirements.
5. How soon could Chinese companies be delisted?
Nothing is going to happen this year or even in 2023, which explains why markets initially took the possibility in their stride. Under the HFCAA, a company would be delisted only after three consecutive years of non-compliance with audit inspections. It could return by certifying that it had retained a registered public accounting firm approved by the SEC.
6. How many companies will be affected?
There’s not much discretion. If a company from China or Hong Kong trades in the U.S. and files an annual report, it will soon find itself on the SEC’s list simply because those have been identified as non-compliant jurisdictions. In the March interview, Gensler pointed out that the law focuses on non-compliant countries, rather than specific companies.
For that and other reasons, Beijing is looking to impose more controls to prevent capital flight.
What would a “China is screwed” roundup be like without a Peter Zeihan video?
“Demographically they’re in collapse…China’s not even going to survive this decade. They don’t even have the numbers to try…China doesn’t have the naval capacity to secure markets and resources….Xi Jinping has enacted a cult of personality that is tighter than anything that has existed through Chinese history. It’s gotten so tight that no one wants to bring him information about anything…This is how countries die.” Plus: China doesn’t know how to store grain.
The widely acclaimed globalization of the post-Cold War era is now running in reverse. A protracted slowdown in global trade has been reinforced by persistent pandemic-related supply-chain disruptions, ongoing pressures of the US-China trade war, and efforts to align cross-border economic ties with geostrategic alliances (“friend-shoring”). These developments tighten the noose on China, arguably the country that has been the greatest beneficiary of modern globalization.
Of the many metrics of globalization, including financial, information, and labor flows, the cross-border exchange of goods and services is most closely tied to economic growth. Largely for that reason, the slowdown in global trade, which commenced in the aftermath of the 2008-09 global financial crisis and intensified in the COVID-19 era, points to a sea change in globalization. While global exports went from 19% of world GDP in 1990 to a peak of 31% in 2008, in the thirteen years that followed (2009-21), global exports have averaged just 28.7% of world GDP. Had world exports expanded on a 6.4% trajectory – halfway between the blistering 9.4% pace of 1990-2008 and the subdued post-2008 rate of 3.3% – the export share of global GDP would have soared to 46% by 2021, far above the actual share of 29%.
China’s gains from the globalization of trade have been extraordinary. In the decade prior to China’s 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization, Chinese exports averaged just 2% of total world exports. By 2008, that share had risen nearly fourfold, to 7.5%. China had timed its WTO membership bid perfectly, just when the global trade cycle was on a major upswing. While the financial crisis took a brief toll on Chinese export momentum, the interruption was short-lived. By 2021, Chinese exports had surged to 12.7% of world exports, well above the pre-2008 peak.
China is unlikely to maintain this performance. Overall growth of global trade is slowing, and China’s slice of the trade pie is under mounting pressure.
The ongoing trade war with the United States is especially problematic. During the first phase of China’s export-led growth surge in the aftermath of WTO accession, the US was consistently China’s largest source of external demand. Largely due to former US President Donald Trump’s tariffs, that is no longer the case. By 2020, US imports of Chinese goods and services had fallen 19% below the peak levels of 2018. Despite rebounding sharply on the heels of the US economy’s post-pandemic snapback, in 2021, US imports from China remained 5% below the 2018 peak. Partial tariff rollbacks for selected consumer products, which President Joe Biden’s administration is apparently considering as an anti-inflation gambit, are unlikely to jump-start bilateral trade.
At the same time, enduring pandemic-related supply-chain disruptions are likely to take a sharp toll on China and the rest of the world.Over the six months ending in April, a “global supply chain pressures index” constructed by researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York averaged 3.6, well above the 2.3 reading in the first 21 months following the February 2020 onset of pandemic-related lockdowns, and sharply higher than the “zero” reading associated with the absence of supply-chain disruptions.
This is a big deal for a world connected by supply chains. Global value chains accounted for more than 70% of the cumulative growth in overall global trade from 1993 to 2013, and China has enjoyed an outsize share of this GVC-enabled expansion. As supply-chain disruptions persist, exacerbated by China’s zero-COVID policies, pressures on Chinese and global economic activity are likely to remain intense.
Mounting geostrategic tensions are the wild card in deglobalization, especially their implications for China. “Friend-shoring” in effect turns Ricardo’s efficiency calculus of cross-border trade into an assessment of the security benefits that come from strategic alliances with like-minded countries. China’s new unlimited partnership with Russia looms especially relevant in this regard. With China edging closer to crossing the line by providing support to Russian military efforts in Ukraine, the US has recently moved to impose sanctions on five more Chinese companies through its so-called Entity List.
You’ve heard about the ghost cities. Did you hear about the failed ghost developments that were built as weird, cheap imitations of western structures?
Is Xi Jinping in danger from a coup?
No doubt I’ve missed many other examples of cracks in China’s economic edifice. Feel free to share them in the comments below.
Larger cities will be limited to 250 metres — less than half the height of China’s tallest buildings.
Now, special exemptions may still be given if a small city really needs a new skyscraper, but they absolutely, definitely cannot go above 250-metres.
Likewise, a bigger city could go higher than that if it has a convincing case, but if it wants to go over 500-metres then forget it. No more Shanghai Towers or Ping An Finance Centers — and that’s final.
There are even new rules to follow past the 100-metre mark. To go higher than that a building will need to meet certain seismic performance and fire safety requirements.
Which sort of suggests that they didn’t have seismic performance and fire safety requirements before. Or maybe not adequate requirements. (Previously.)
Here’s the article in video form:
The usual subjects are touched on: The real estate market collapse, buildings so large there was no way all the space in them would ever be rented, Ghost Cities, etc. But the fact that the skyscraper boom got so far out of whack with economic reality is just another indication of how much of China’s “economic miracle” is a complete mirage.
Back in 2014, a scandal erupted when media reports confirmed what many had previously speculated about China’s banking system: namely that much of China’s staggering loan issuance had been built (literally) upon air and that billions (or trillions) in loan collateral had been “rehypothecated” between two, three or many more debtors – or never even existed – forcing banks to accept that they would never recover much if any of the pledged collateral – in most cases various commodities – if the economy were to suffer a hard-landing resulting in mass defaults. The most famous example involved collateral fraud at China’s 3rd largest port, Qingdao, where numerous borrowers were found to have “pledged” the same collateral of steel and copper to obtain funding from various banks.
So how extensive is the problem?
At risk of spoiling the surprise, what has been going on in China, either in conventional asset-backed lending, as well as among the more esoteric, complex commodity-funded deals, which we discussed extensively in the early part of 2013 is nothing less than pure fraud: in some cases, collateral that has been pledged simply doesn’t exist. In others, it disappears as borrowers in financial distress sell the assets. There are also instances in which the same collateral has been pledged to multiple lenders, i.e. rehypothecated. “One lawyer said he discovered that the same pile of steel was used to secure loans from 10 different lenders” Reuters reports.
And while China was able to brush off its “ghost collateral” problems three years ago when it still had substantial debt incurrence capacity, and debt/GDP was about 100% lower, now that it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep the Ponzi scheme – by definition – running, especially with the recent crackdown on shadow banking, the pervasive collateral problems are about to become a huge headache for Beijing again: with the mainland facing its slowest growth in over a quarter of a century, defaults are mounting as borrowers struggle to repay their loans.
It’s long been known that China’s economy is built, to some extent, on smoke and mirrors (even more so than our own economy). But it looks like it might be smoke and mirrors all the way down…
The problem with doing a LinkSwarm is there’s just no end to links! I suppose I could post each and every one as I find it, but then I’d be be traveling in the wake of Instapundit, without his indefatigable will. (Or, this week, his army of star assistants.)
Anyway, these are from the last few weeks:
Nothing says “religion of peace” quite like crucifying children for breaking a Ramadan fast.
ObamaCare has fallen short of its enrollment target, hiked insurance premiums, failed to cut down on ER visits, and flopped in its attempt to improve hospitals’ bottom line.
On the other hand, if you’re a Republican congressman, and you make $172,000 a year, you don’t get to complain about it. That means you, Rep. Phil Gingrey.
Biggest story you’re not hearing much about? German elections this weekend. If Angela Merkel’s party should lose, and be replaced with a party less enthused with endless PIIGS bailouts, well, things could get interesting.
Obama official refuses to release information pertaining to a a Freedom of Information Act request. Stonewalling the press and withholding evidence? Obviously he must be bucking for a promotion.
Across the paper’s many departments, though, so many share a kind of political and cultural progressivism — for lack of a better term — that this worldview virtually bleeds through the fabric of The Times.
As a result, developments like the Occupy movement and gay marriage seem almost to erupt in The Times, overloved and undermanaged, more like causes than news subjects.
