We’ve covered some of this before, but here’s a nice roundup of why Russia’s major weapons systems suck. It’s a handy tour through the world of over-promised, under-performing vaporwear.
“Before February 24th, 2022, the Russian Federation looked like it would deploy or soon be able to field some pretty formidable new weapons.” At least among those who hadn’t noticed Russia’s previous vaporware claims.
“In everything from fifth generation fighter jets to modern tanks, to new body armor and even tsunami-causing nuclear torpedoes, there was enough hype to make even informed Western national security experts worry about what they were seeing.”
“Little wonder that they believed Ukraine would fall in days in the months prior to the invasion. Those predictions did not turn out to be the case. And now two years later, Russia still finds itself fighting a war of attrition with no end in sight.”
It covers Russia’s one aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, how it’s been under repairs since 2018, is markedly less technologically advanced than American carriers, and how it has a history of corruption as well. It”s supposed to enter service again this year. I wouldn’t count on it.
Admiral Kuznetsov isn’t Russia’s only naval problem. “It is steadily retiring its Soviet-era ships and replacing them with lighter, less combat-worthy vessels.”
There’s the new, formidable (on paper) Lider-class destroyers, first unveiled in 2015 and capable of using a host of advanced new weapons. Tiny problem: “On paper” is the only place you can see them, since they haven’t started building them yet.
Then there’s “the Belgorod submarine, and particularly its Poseidon Torpedo, are two other items of hype in the Russian Navy that don’t seem to stand up to scrutiny. The Belgorod and Poseidon have often been items of fear in Western media and national security circles, which have nicknamed the former Russia’s ‘Doomsday Submarine.'”
“According to the Kremlin’s hype, the submarine and its arsenal of smart drone Poseidon torpedoes can unleash a 100 megaton yield capable of creating radioactive tsunamis that would inundate coastal communities and make them unlivable.”
“However, tests of the Poseidon have seemingly proven less than satisfactory. That shouldn’t be too surprising, because for the Poseidon torpedo to work as the Russians claim, it would need to be able to house all of the equipment needed for a nuclear reactor to convert atomic fission into electricity and propulsive force, while ensuring negligible waste heat (to avoid detection). It would also need the hardware to shield its sensitive electronics from the nuclear fission process.”
“Unfortunately for Moscow, the torpedo is too small to do this, meaning that it is either an object of hype or Russian engineers have come upon a technological leap enabling exotic engineering methods. We’ll let you decide which of the two scenarios is likelier.”
“The likeliest scenario is a yield of about one to two megatons per torpedo, which would be enough to inundate a coastal area with dangerous radioactive waters, but not to create a tsunami.” And the hundred knot speed is also bunk for numerous technical reasons.
“We now journey from the sea to the skies and look at the Russian answer to the American fifth generation F-22 and F-35 fighter jets – the Su-57 Felon. To be fair, the Su-57 does have some impressive features, like its 3D thrust vectoring engines, climb rate of 64,000 feet per minute, 66,000-foot service ceiling, Mach 2 speed, and range of 2,186 miles without refueling. In a plane vs. plane battle, the Su-57 should be a capable opponent against almost any fighter jet on the planet.”
“However, the Su-57 has a big drawback – its comparative lack of stealth. Aviation experts regard the Su-57 as being by far the least stealthy of the fifth generation fighters currently in service. For example, the F-22 Raptor is detectable at a range only under 10 miles, while the Su-57 would be detectable at a range of 35 miles.”
“Its stealth features are also concentrated in the front of the plane, meaning that if it turns or maneuvers, it is far more detectable.” Good thing fighter aircraft never need to turn or maneuver…
“Some aviation experts are even less kind and believe the Su-57’s radar cross section is similar to that of the F/A-18 Super Hornet, which is 1,000 times less stealthy than the F-35 Lightning II.”
“The Su-57 has played little part in the war in Ukraine, as the Russian aerospace forces have refused to field it in Ukrainian airspace. Instead, it has only attacked targets at long range from within Russian airspace.”
Then there’s the ridiculously low production rate. “The Kremlin ordered 76 Su-57s in 2019. 22 are in service as of December 2023, after several years of delays.” And we only have Russia’s word that they’ve produced that many. The real total could be lower. By contrast, Lockheed Martin has produced over 1,000 F-35s.
Next it’s a familiar punching bag, the T-14 Armata. “To be fair, the T-14 Armata does have significant improvements over the tanks Russia has usually fielded in Ukraine – the T-72, T-80, and T-90. These tanks have been lost in their thousands during the fighting in Ukraine, thanks to bad doctrine and their own design flaws. Because they do not segregate their ammunition magazines in a sealed compartment, they have often suffered from complete destruction with jack-in-the-box explosions.”
“The T-14 Armata mitigates this flaw with a protective capsule isolating the crew from their vehicle’s ammunition magazine.”
Unfortunately, the video goes on to say the T-14 has a low profile, which simply isn’t true. As I’ve noted before, the T-14 is 3.3 meters high vs. 2.44 meters for the M1A2, 3 meters for the Leopard 2, and 2.49 for the Challenger 2. 3.3 meters is higher even than the World War II M3 Lee tank the Soviets (who got them via Lend-Lease) called “a coffin for seven brothers.”
“The Armata’s main weapon is a 125mm 2A82-1M smoothbore gun which can fire related rounds and laser-guided missiles. This weapon would be a significant threat to the Western main battle tanks that Ukraine began fielding in larger numbers last year.” The “large numbers” are pretty small numbers.
“Unfortunately for Russia, this gun is not backward-compatible with its older tanks, which means only the Armata can field it, and that’s a problem, because there has never been a confirmed sighting of the T-14 in Ukraine. Russia has even fewer T-14 Armata tanks than it does Su-57 fighter jets.”
There follows a discussion of the T-14’s X-shaped engine that has evidently engendered a lively debate online, so I’m not going to get into it here.
“Meanwhile, the electronics for the Armata’s sensory and fire control systems are no longer as widely available due to the sanctions put in place as a result of its invasion of Ukraine. Indeed, there has not even been an assembly line built for the Armata and all of the prototypes have been made by hand. Given all of these problems, don’t expect to see the Armata fielded in large numbers, if at all, anytime soon.”
“Russia’s body armor has also been a subject of embarrassment. Many of Russia’s soldiers, especially the conscripts Putin mobilized in the autumn of 2022, have lacked proper protection. Infamously, some Russian troops were issued airsoft versions of the Ratnik body armor. Despite its problems in this area, Russia has made bold claims about what it has coming down the pike – its next-generation Sotnik body armor, which it says will be able to stop a .50 caliber Browning Machine Gun round.” Yeah, no.
We’re not even going to bother with the MiG-41, which doesn’t exist yet. Vaporware all the way down.
It’s always safest to assume that the latest Russian wunderwaffen is vaporware unless proven otherwise.
I can’t remember if I’ve included a LinkSwarm link on the problems of Zumwalt-class destroyers, which the navy killed after only three of the projected thirty-two ships were built. This video offers a solid overview of the issues that led to the cancellation.
Zumwalt-class destroyers turned out to be quite stable, and the stealth design worked well, but they require far more personnel to run than originally specified, and the small number of Zumwalt class actually built resulted in the radical new shore-attack munitions costs spiraling to more than $1 million for each projectile, or more than the cost of a Tomahawk cruise missile, which offers 15 times the range and 30 times the payload.
Other problems include having to retrain crew to take into account the unique shape and handling characteristics:
The combination of the Zumwalt ’s size and inability to switch quickly from ahead to astern propulsion or vice versa (because of fixed pitch propellers) creates substantially more inertia than on a smaller vessel, a characteristic magnified by the large sail area.
…The outward-sloping tumblehome design creates the illusion that the ship is farther away from the pier than it is.
…All the mooring stations are internal. (it) makes it impossible for the bridge to see progress in the mooring stations.
…A relatively low height of eye of 35 feet, along with large gun mounts on the forecastle, result in a substantial shadow zone of 469.2 feet dead ahead.
If all this is disheartening, realize that technical innovations have just as many teething problems for the Chinese navy as well (and probably much worse quality control). I would say the Russians as well, but almost all of their much-hyped “superweapons” turn out to be pure vaporware.
Yesterday marked the 75th Anniversary of the start of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the last great naval battle of World War II, and arguably the largest naval battle in history. American naval forces (with help from Australia’s Task Force 74) decisively defeated the Japanese Imperial Navy, sinking four aircraft carriers, three battleships, six heavy cruisers and four light cruisers.
Leyte Gulf was a sprawling naval engagement that took place in roughly four areas around the Philippines October 23-26, 1944. The Battle of the Surigao Strait featured the last battleship-on-battleship engagement in history, where overwhelming American firepower sunk two Japanese battleships and caused the rest to turn back. One of the most decisive actions was The Battle Off Samar, in which two American ships, destroyer escort USS Samuel B. Roberts (laid down in Houston shipyards) and destroyer USS Johnston, carried out some of the greatest badassery in American naval history, attacking a much larger and heavier armed force of Japanese battleships and cruisers in order to screen the retreat of six escort carriers.
Here’s a machinima recreation of The Battle Off Samar:
They sank three Japanese cruisers, disabled another three, and caused the Japanese battleships to turn tail and run, ensuring the successful American invasion of the Philippines and destruction of Japan’s access to vitally needed war materials.
After Leyte Gulf, the remainder of the Japanese fleet would stay in port bereft of fuel. It wouldn’t engage the American fleet directly again until one last suicidal attempt during the invasion of Okinawa.