The Ukrainian Armed Forces have reportedly deployed Abrams main battle tanks to the frontline near Avdiivka, where some of the most intense battles on the frontlines are currently taking place.
Russian forces have been making continuous efforts to capture this critical city and have been amassing substantial reserves, launching near-daily attacks.
Military analyst Damian Ratka claims that the tank shown in the broadcast on Ukrainian TV is an M1A2SEPv2 of the U.S. Armed Forces, which was likely filmed at one of the training grounds in Poland where Ukrainian crews were undergoing training at the time.
President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, confirmed the arrival of the first batch of 31 Abrams tanks on September 25, 2023. These initial tanks belong to the M1A1 Situational Awareness (SA) version, with approximately 650 units deployed within the U.S. Army.
Suchomimus has more on the Abrams deployment:
The M1A1 Abrams is pretty modern and very tough, but that doesn’t mean it can’t be killed, and Ukraine has already lost one:
The blowout panels might indicate that the crew survived.
A second was disabled, with a mine causing a thrown track, but it looks like it could be recovered:
Pakistan’s Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) held the roll-out ceremony of the inaugural serial production batch of the Haider Main Battle Tank.
Attended by Pakistan Army Chief of Staff General Asim Munir, the ceremony highlighted the unveiling of the Haider MBT, a third-generation tank designed and built entirely in Pakistan.
Based on the Chinese VT4 platform, the Haider boasts a formidable arsenal, including a 125mm Smoothbore gun capable of firing various types of ammunition, such as Armor Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot and Anti-Tank Guided Missiles.
Augmenting its firepower, the tank features a secondary armament comprising a 7.62mm coaxial machine gun and a remotely operated weapon station armed with a 12.7mm heavy machine gun.
The Haider is equipped with an advanced fire control system, integrating a range of sensors and targeting devices to optimize accuracy and lethality on the battlefield.
Powered by a turbocharged electronically-controlled Diesel engine generating 1,200 hp, coupled with a hydro-mechanical automatic transmission, the Haider achieves exceptional mobility, boasting a maximum road speed of 70 km/h and an impressive cruising range of 500 km.
The VT-4 is a pretty modern T-90 derived tank, including composite armor, but it’s an export model. It’s probably pretty good, but not up to the standards of Abrams, Challenger or Leopard 2, especially for fire control and other electronics.
When I originally saw the Ripsaw tank, it looked like a toy for rich people. But in its M5 fully-autonomous version with a 30mm autocannon, it looks like it could be a very effective raiding weapon.
In that context, even the low noise/low thermal signature electric motor makes sense.
Speaking of the Tank Museum, bonus video 1: Was the Sherman any good?
“Sherman was a well-built, reliable tank that arrived in numbers when it was most desperately needed. It was relatively inexpensive, for a tank it was quite easy to maintain, and there were some sophisticated features, things like the stabilized gun, and also, and this is quite remarkable, a relatively effective comms kit.”
“It’s often criticized for its tank-vs.-tank performance, but that’s not really what it was originally designed to do, even though it found itself in that position quite often. But the fact remains it could still hold its own against the majority of enemy armor.”
Tank Museum bonus video 2: The evolutionary dead end of the A1E1 Independent, a monstrously large interwar tank with five turrets.
Something interesting is unfolding in the skies over Ukraine’s south-central front. Over the last ten days, Ukraine has managed to shoot down no less than 12 Russian military aircraft:
First the shootdown list:
“17th of February: Two Su-34s and a Su-35.”
“18th of February A Su-34”
“19th: A Su-34 and a Su-35”
“21st: A Su-34.”
“23rd: A Su-34 and an A-50.”
“27th: A Su-34 and a Su-34.”
“And today the 29th: another Su-34.”
For what it’s worth, Livemap says that Ukraine shot down two Su-34s today.
The Russian air force lost another Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bomber on Thursday, the Ukrainian air force claimed. If confirmed, the Thursday shoot-down would extend an unprecedented hot streak for Ukrainian air-defenses.
The Ukrainian claim they’ve shot down 11 Russian planes in 11 days: eight Su-34s, two Sukhoi Su-35 fighters and a rare Beriev A-50 radar plane.
But those 11 claimed losses are worse than they might seem for the increasingly stressed Russian air force. In theory, the air arm has plenty more planes. In practice, the service is dangerously close to collapse.
Exactly how the Ukrainians are shooting down so many jets is unclear. It’s possible the Ukrainian air force has assigned some of its American-made Patriot missile launchers to mobile air-defense groups that move quickly in close proximity to the 600-mile front line of Russia’s two-year wider war on Ukraine, ambushing Russian jets with 90-mile-range PAC-2 missiles then swiftly relocating to avoid counterattack.
But the distance at which the Ukrainians shot down that A-50 on Friday—120 miles or so—hints that a longer-range missile system was involved. Perhaps a Cold War-vintage S-200 that the Ukrainian air force pulled out of long-term storage.
It also is apparent the Ukrainians have moved some of their two-dozen or so 25-mile-range NASAMS surface-to-air missile batteries closer to the front line. After all, the Russians found—and destroyed with a missile—their first NASAMS launcher near the southern city of Zaporizhzhia on or before Monday.
He also suggests Russia may be flying more sorties close to the lines to follow-up on its costly victory in Avdiivka.
This surge in Russian sorties presents Ukrainian air-defenders with more targets. So of course they’re shooting down more Russian planes.
It helps the Ukrainian effort that Russian pilots increasingly are blind to Ukrainian missile-launches. The Russian air force once counted on its nine or so active A-50 radar planes—organized into three, three-plane “orbits” in the south, east and north—to extend sensor coverage across Ukraine.
In damaging one A-50 in a drone strike last year and shooting down two more A-50s this year, the Ukrainians have eliminated a third of this sensor coverage, and created blind spots where Russian pilots might struggle to spot approaching missiles.
In any event, the consequences of the Ukrainians’ recent kills, for the Russians, are dire. The Russian air force is losing warplanes far, far faster than it can afford to lose them. Russia’s sanctions-throttled aerospace industry is struggling to build more than a couple of dozen new planes a year.
Escalating losses, exacerbated by anemic plane-production, almost certainly are increasing the stress on the surviving planes and crews. The Russian air arm isn’t yet in an organizational death spiral. But it’s getting closer.
The numbers tell the story. On paper, the Russian air force has acquired 140 of the twin-engine, two-seat, supersonic Su-34s. Counting this year’s unconfirmed losses, the air force has lost 31 of the Su-34s.
But 109 Su-34s still is a lot of Su-34s, right?
Wrong, according to Michael Bohnert, an engineer with the RAND Corporation in California. Shoot-downs represent “only a portion of total losses” of Russian fighters, Bohnert wrote back in August. “Overuse of these aircraft is also costing Russia as the war drags on.”
“In a protracted war, where one force tries to exhaust the other, it’s the total longevity of the military force that matters,” Bohnert added. “And that’s where the VKS”—the Russian air force—“finds itself now.”
Bohnert assumed the air force went to war two years ago with around 900 fighters and attack planes and, in the first 18 months of fighting, lost around 100 of them to Ukrainian action. The problem for the Russians—besides the losses—is that the requirement for fighter and attack sorties hasn’t decreased even as the fighter and attack inventory has decreased.
So those 800 remaining planes are flying more frequently in order to handle taskings the Kremlin once assigned to 900 planes. And that means more wear and tear, deepening maintenance needs and a growing hunger for increasingly hard-to-find spare parts—imperatives that effectively remove airframes from the front-line force.
Given what we know of lax Russian maintenance practices, it’s probably safe to assume that considerably less of those 100 Su-34s are mission capable than would be the case in, say, the U.S. Air Force, which have mission-ready goals of 75-80%, but frequently falls short.
A few more weeks of disasterous losses like this and Russia will be at dire risk of having what remains of it’s air campaign collapse.
And Ukraine still has F-16s due to enter service this year.
Here’s an interesting follow-up to that two Bradleys wreck one T-90M post and video a few weeks ago. In this video, Task & Purpose provides more detailed breakdown of the engagement.
“In the interview with the Ukrainian Bradley commander Siri, he indicated that the three Bradleys made the conscious decision to seek out the Russian tank. However, one of their vehicles had issues and was not able to effectively engage the tank.”
The first Bradley engages the T-90M from a 90° angle, then both vehicles retreat.
The T-90 fires and misses. “Aiming at a target close to you in a tank becomes more difficult because you have to traverse the turret faster, and objects will move across your line of sight faster due to its close proximity.”
One under-appreciated factor: Turret turning speed. “In the 30ton MSA2 Bradley, the turret can spin 360° in about 6 seconds, or 60° per second…The most often cited metric I see [for the T-90] is about 9 seconds to do a full 360°, or about 40° per second.”
“They’re just 50 meters apart. This fight was essentially a ticking time clock for the T-90, because they had a very limited amount of time before the Bradley would manage to knock out their optics and blind them.”
“The T90 only had enough time to get off three cannon shots. The T90 has a stabilized turret and autoloader that can fire on the move with up to eight rounds per minute. The T-90 backed away from the road intersection while blindly firing through buildings.
“The Ukrainian Bradley does the same thing here, with its 25mm chain gun firing dozens of rounds while flooring it along the road away from the tank.”
The encounter took place in the town of Stepove, which is about 12km NW of Avdiivka, where some 40,000 Russian troops have been trying to take the pocket for months.
“Forbes reports that Ukraine’s knocking out 13 Russian vehicles here for every one that they lose.” But Ukraine may still have to fall back here.
“Most of the buildings are completely destroyed, but the rubble is going to be a major advantage for the Bradley’s to fire and then duck and weave behind for cover.”
“The next thing that happens is the T-90M fires off a smoke canister, which is a textbook act to conceal its position and disrupt the thermal sites in the Bradley. There different perspectives on what exactly happened when the smoke was set off. It appears like maybe one of the T-90’s explosive reactive armor pieces might have blown at about the same time, causing that large explosion that we see here. It could have also been from a misfire from the smoke grenade.” I’ve also heard the theory that the Bradley’s 25mm fire may have already damaged the smoke dispenser at this point, triggering the explosive misfire.
The physical damage to the T-90s turret may appear minimal to us, but to a Russia tank crew, it would like being inside a large bell being hit by a hammer. “The Russian tank crew would have been extremely disoriented by the blasts, even if the chances of that smaller caliber round penetrating was very unlikely. It’s easy to forget the human factor in these fights.”
The Bradley’s “M242 25mm bushmaster chain gun fires roughly 200 rounds per minute at the highest cyclical setting.”
“Inside the turret are two ready boxes which feed the linked ammo into the receiver. This gives you the ability to fire two different types of ammo on the fly. That includes the M919 APDST, or armor-piercing discarding sabo tracer depleted uranium round, and the M792 high explosive incendiary tracer rounds.” There’s a switch to change between the two.
“The Bradley’s anti-armor 25mm cannon round can penetrate between 30mm to 100mm of steel, depending on the angle at which the round strikes the target.”
“However, the Russian T90 reportedly has 400 to 900mm” of armor. Unmentioned here is that the T-90M (like the US, UK and Germany) uses composite armor rather than just steel.
So how did the Bradleys disable the T-90? Theory #1 is they destroyed both the commander and gunner’s optics. “If you’re able to hit them, then the crew is completely blinded and essentially combat ineffective.” Ukrainian commander Siri said he learned the tactic from War Thunder. (Are American tanks taking sufficient precautions to keep this from happening to them? To be fair, the chance of enemies getting a 25mm auto-canon this close to an Abrams seems…remote.)
Theory #2: Turret ring connection destroyed (much more likely electronics than hydraulics) sent the turret into auto-rotation as seen at the end of the video.
Why wasn’t the TOW missile not used? Maybe it wasn’t working, or maybe it was just too close for the TOW to arm properly.
The Bradley crew might have run out of APDST and switched to high explosive.
Russian tanks have slower reverse speeds than American armored vehicles.
There are some 78 Russian attacks a day in this sector. “Ukraine counterattacks with Bradleys, raking the tree lines with 25mm cannon fire. Bradley’s also transports small assault teams that clear out Russian stragglers from time to time. Once Stepove and the tree lines by the railroad are clear, or mostly clear, of Russian troops, Ukraine pulls back to their functional defensive positions and waits for the next Russian attack.”
There’s lots more interesting technical and doctrinal details I’ve cut for the sake of brevity.
Russia has been pouring a lot of men and resources into capturing Avdiivka, a town just north of Donetsk, to evidently very little gain. The best overview of the situation I’ve seen is this Twitter post:
After days of intense combat in Avdiivka, I've decided to make a preliminary analysis of the ongoing events. I'm looking at the bigger picture, aiming to spot key patterns and notable signs that can help us understand the situation better. This analysis will cover both the… pic.twitter.com/jXmGblcbMZ
The scale of the Russian assault on Avdiivka underscores their determination to achieve their objectives. Russians have deployed what I’ve identified as at least two mechanized battalions or two battalion-tactical groups in the primary attack directions, alongside smaller units in other areas, constituting an operation of approximately regimental size. This represents a significant departure from the smaller company and platoon-sized tactical groups that both sides have employed in recent months.
Based on information from various sources, it appears that the Russians have deployed a substantial number of units, potentially constituting a force of at least a few brigades. However, the exact total number is difficult to accurately assess at this time.
One group advanced from the South-West of Avdiivka, while another attempted to advance from the North-Eastern side of Avdiivka. The group originating from Krasnohorivka initially made progress, overrunning defensive positions in the North, with some elements even reaching the railroad. Both groups suffered losses, but the northern group achieved tangible results, primarily due to the element of surprise and the concentrated firepower of a mechanized force.
Positive Aspects:
– A conservative estimate from our team, based on visual evidence, indicates that Russian forces lost a minimum of 45 vehicles, predominantly tanks and IFVs, by the morning of October 12th. The actual number is likely higher, as we lacked visuals from some areas, especially the South and South-Western regions of Avdiivka.
– The initial Russian assault did not seem to achieve the desired results of securing areas beyond the railroad in the north and seizing Sieverne and Tonenke in the south, which would significantly impact the operational environment for Ukraine.
– This operation appears to be primarily politically motivated rather than militarily necessary. Following the loss of Pisky and most of Mariinka, Avdiivka remains the only sizable settlement under Ukrainian control in close proximity to Donetsk. However, given the realities of warfare, it is unlikely that Ukraine will launch a ground offensive into Donetsk from this location in the near future. Avdiivka is well-fortified, and the Russians have suffered significant losses in multiple attempts to capture it since 2022. The Russian motivation appears to be securing a substantial public victory before winter, in contrast to the limited successes of the Ukrainian army in liberating territories in 2023 and the loss of Bakhmut.
– Despite the initial challenges and the element of surprise, Ukrainian soldiers on the ground demonstrated remarkable resilience and managed to halt the progress of the mechanized enemy groups. This achievement can be attributed to individual acts of heroism, skill, and determination to hold their positions.
– From a combination of sources, including photographs, drone videos, and personal accounts, Russian mechanized units have incurred significant losses as a result of Ukrainian drones, which have been supplied by volunteers and regular citizens, properly set mines, timely deployed AT teams, and artillery fire.
Negative Aspects:
– Despite prior knowledge of the enemy’s buildup for an offensive operation, the attack still caught Ukrainian forces off guard, and it appears that some areas were ill-prepared for such an assault, revealing some vulnerabilities.
– The Russians executed a regiment-sized operation by deploying several battalions and smaller auxiliary forces. This demonstrates their capacity to conduct larger-scale operations and access to sufficient resources.
– They managed to penetrate the rear and flank areas of Avdiivka. While this does not necessarily guarantee an immediate encirclement, it presents a perilous situation and an unwelcome development. The Bakhmut operation also began with substantial and seemingly unsustainable losses for the Russians, but after securing control over the flanks, the situation deteriorated for Ukrainian forces. While the operational context is different, we cannot yet assert that the situation is stable.
A top Ukrainian commander has claimed that Russia’s biggest offensive in months – involving tanks, thousands of soldiers and armoured vehicles in an attack on the eastern Ukrainian town of Avdiivka – is failing, as he admitted Kyiv’s own attempts to advance in the south were proving “difficult”.
Russian forces have pummelled the town over the past week, a key bulge surrounded by Russian-held territory on the eastern Donbas front.
It is one of the largest assaults by Moscow since last year’s full-scale invasion and comes at a time when Ukraine’s counteroffensive is moving slowly, and the world is focused on the imminent Israeli ground invasion of Gaza.
At least three Russian battalions, each supported by an estimated 2,000-3,000 troops, began a dawn attack on Tuesday. Drone footage showed a line of military vehicles trundling forward. There has been intense fighting ever since. Russia has bombarded the city with relentless artillery fire and airstrikes.
Ukrainian military officials say Moscow’s goal is to encircle Avdiivka, but so far the attackers have made modest gains. Russia’s 25th combined arms army pushed forward from the south and north. It seized the nearby village of Berdychi and closed in on a 150-metre high slag heap next to the town’s coke and chemical factory.
The Russians have suffered serious losses. At least 36 Russian tanks and armoured vehicles were destroyed in the first 24 hours. According to the Kyiv Post, that figure has risen to 102 tanks and 183 armoured vehicles lost, with 2,840 troops killed. There were chaotic scenes. One tank fell off a pontoon bridge into a river. Another crushed a Russian soldier as it reversed; a Ukrainian munition then blew it up.
Here’s a Suchomimus video showing the Russian vehicle losses:
For a bit of comic relief, he also has a video of The Russian Armored Recovery Vehicle That Decided To Become A Submarine:
Though the early part of the offensive saw something of return of combined arms attacks, utilizing helicopter air power, Russia appears to have reverted almost immediately to their classic tactics of stupidity. “The Russian military appears to be using human wave tactics where they throw masses of poorly trained soldiers right into the battlefield without proper equipment, and apparently without proper training and preparation.”
Russia seems to have lost a lot of armor for very little gain in territory.