Russia has begun using its new T-14 Armata battle tanks to fire on Ukrainian positions “but they have not yet participated in direct assault operations,” the RIA state news agency reported on Tuesday, quoting a source close the matter.
RIA said that the tanks have been fitted with extra protection on their flanks and crews have undergone “combat coordination” at training grounds in Ukraine.
The T-14 tank has an unmanned turret, with crew remotely controlling the armaments from “an isolated armoured capsule located in the front of the hull.”
The tanks have a maximum speed on the highway of 80 kilometres (50 miles) per hour, RIA reported.
In January, British military intelligence reported that Russian forces in Ukraine were reluctant to accept the first tranche of the tanks due to their “poor condition.”
It also said that any deployment of the T-14 would likely be “a high-risk decision” for Russia, and one taken primarily for propaganda purposes.
“Production is probably only in the low tens, while commanders are unlikely to trust the vehicle in combat,” the British military said.
“Eleven years in development, the programme has been dogged with delays, reduction in planned fleet size, and reports of manufacturing problems.”
Here’s a brief overview video:
The T-14 has had more than its share of developmental problems, and there are plenty of articles and videos detailing its shortcomings. Lazer Pig’s “The T-14 Armata tank sucks” is a long example of the genre.
If your interest level doesn’t support viewing a full hour of Armata-bashing, here are some takeaways:
“The T14 combines all the ultimate Russian technology previously introduced onto NATO tanks 25 years ago in a way that only a country trying to inflate the share prices of Raytheon would understand.” (Raytheon makes Javelin.)
“It does away with all the unnecessary ERA systems of the T90, which cannot protect the tank against missiles that were invented in the 80s, and instead replaces them with an active protection system that can almost defend the tank against missiles that were invented in the 90s.”
“An auto loader famous for jamming that now cannot be accessed and cleared when it does jam, is somehow heavier and slower than the tank it has replaced, and comes combined together in a package so expensive the company that made it immediately went bankrupt. The country that bought it cannot afford it and it has about as much export potential as English whiskey.”
“For a while, every idiot with even the vaguest sense of military interest was banging on about this tank as if Stalin had come back to life and had personally forged the hull from his own ball sack. And that all tanks across every nation in the world had just been rendered obsolete.”
Sections on repeated post-Soviet tank design failures, like the T-95 and Black Knight, and coverage of Russian brain drain, omitted.
The weird, Tiger-2 derived engine is unreliable.
The driver’s vision sucks.
No crew access to the turret internally.
The autoloader is slower than the manual fire rates on T-80s, T-72s and Abrams.
“The qualifying time for [an Abrams] loader to pass training is seven seconds, and the best crews claim they can reload in about four to five seconds. Meaning a good Abrams can fire twice before the T-14 has reloaded.”
“Ukrainian hackers found that most of the electronic systems on board, including the digital sights, the night vision, the infrared, were all in fact western imports. Most notably, these were last generation French optics from Leclerc MBTs left over from when they were all upgraded to ICONE in 2009.”
Current Russian tank optics are actually available to the general public. “They’re not even the best that are currently available. If you’ve got a spare five grand, you can go into any high-end spy gadget store and buy a drone that will give you better night vision and IR tracking capabilities than the latest generation of modern Russian tanks.”
China reportedly found out that none of the tank’s systems actually worked. “The soft kill defense systems were simply smoke screens, and the hard kill systems designed specifically to stop the Javelin and the TOW missile could not detect if either of these systems had been fired at the tank, and relied entirely on the crew being able to notice a missile traveling at the speed of sound flying towards them.”
“To top it off, there was no evidence of the supposed electronic warfare systems that could render guided missiles and mines inert.”
“Nothing in the Armata is new.”
The idea that western tanks need to catch up to the Armata is laughable. “By the time the Armata enters service, it will already be outdated.”
“Everything the Armata is has been done before, and in many cases has been done better.”
“Russia is not an equal to the United States and NATO, it’s an equal to North Korea, both technologically backwards nations.”
Will all those problems still be present when the Armata engages enemy armor in Ukraine? Some certainly will. I doubt Armata electronics or optics can compare to those on western vehicles, and I bet that its active protection package is miles behind Trophy (which I don’t think will be on any Ukrainian tanks anyway). But I do suspect they’ve had enough time to improve the reliability of the engine, and I’m guessing the armor and autoloader improvements will improve survivability for the tank crew.
Can the Armata take out Ukraine’s legacy Soviet tanks? Almost certainly. Can it take out Challenger 2s, Leopard 2s, and M1A2 Abrams? If it’s able to close in and get off the first shot, probably. But I’m guessing it will find the opportunities to do so few and far between.
The big advantage that Carl-Gustav offers is that it’s much cheaper per round than smart munitions like Javelin.
“In the case of Ukraine [they’re] using these things for against everything from guys behind cover to light armored vehicles, soft skin vehicles and, of course, main battle tanks.”
Used by more than 40 countries.
Carl-Gustav can’t fill the top attack role NLAW and Javelin use against tanks. “But it can cripple a main battle tank. And with some of these advanced warheads, it can affect a not just a mobility kill, but an outright Kill, at least from the rear.”
“And if you blow off a track, the thing isn’t moving and it can then be killed perhaps another way, or the crew will simply abandon it.”
There are 15 different types of shells, including smoke and illumination.
They’re also working on guided munitions.
They’re also working on a confined-space munition with reduced back-blast, which sounds really useful for urban warfare.
Models produced are M1 (starting 1946) through M4 (2014).
A wide variety of rounds, including antipersonnel and two-phase charge designed to defeat reactive armor.
Most of NATO uses it, including the U.S., UK, Germany, Poland and all three of the Baltic states.
Ukraine managed to take out a T-90 with it.
Whether it’s better than an RPG-7 probably comes down to training and use case. The RPG-7 looks to be a lot more portable, but I’m betting the average Carl-Gustav build quality is better.
Chris Copson of The Tank Museum has an in-depth look at the RPG-7 and its history as an effective hand-held tank-killing weapon and poor man’s artillery.
Some highlights:
How a HEAT RPG charge works: “There is a trumpet-shaped liner in this section inside an aerodynamic fairing. And behind that is a copper cone, and underneath that is the RDX explosive charge. When that detonates, it fires what’s effectively an enormously powerful bolt of kinetic energy forward. That’s what’s called the Munroe effect, and it will penetrate up to 260mm of rolled homogeneous armor.”
The Russians were thought to have lost over 100 tanks in Grozny during the first Chechan War.
Seven of eight U.S. helicopters brought down in Afghanistan were from RPG fire.
Four Black Hawk helicopters taken down in Mogadishu were taken down by RPG fire.
Methods evolved to combat RPGs include explosive reactive armor, improvised outer armor, and slat armor.
“Can an RPG 7 round penetrate the composite frontal armor of the modern main battle tank? No, it can’t. But it was never intended to.” But the more modern RPG-29 can.
I’ve posted a lot of videos to help people understand the war in Ukraine. This is another one, though I’m not sure much understanding will ensue, as the tactics of both sides seem strange for those familiar with modern western combined arms combat.
It’s an interesting video because so much about it doesn’t make sense. (I believe it’s the one a commenter mentioned.) It shows a Ukrainian tank clearing a trench of Russian soldiers near a village with the mouthful name of Verkhn’okam’yans’ke (near Severodonetsk).
The video starts with two Ukrainian tanks advancing on a trench, one following the other’s tread tracks. (That part makes sense, as a way to pass through a minefield.) After that, a whole lot of the video seems very strange.
It’s a stark reminder, yet again, that the map is not the territory. We see the front lines on various map sites like Deep State, but the Russo-Ukrainian War is taking place across vast areas, some of which are quite thinly populated with troops. This tiny skirmish is probably more indicative of average troop density across the entire front line than dense urban areas like Bakhmut.
Save a trailing BMP and the hovering drone recording the footage, there’s no sign of Ukraine conducting any sort of combined arms operation for the trench clearing. (Though there are some artillery strikes in the background.)
In an age of automatic range finders and fire control computers, it’s something of a surprise to see both sides struggle to find their proper range, misses from each at about 3:45 in.
The tank continues to fire it’s main gun as it approaches, but doesn’t seem to use it’s secondary machine gun for supressing fire.
For those used to the mechanized maneuver warfare on display in Iraq, the approach the tank takes to the trench seems unusually slow and methodical.
Not sure what the tank is firing at 7 minutes in. Maybe part of the trench?
The same lack of combined arms is evident on the Russian side as well. Where are their own tanks? Their artillery support? Air support? Their own anti-tank weapons beyond that initial miss? None are in evidence.
In fact, nothing the Russians do as a tank approaches and blows up large chunks of their trench makes sense. They don’t run. They don’t use any anti-tank weapons. Maybe “vodka” is the reason they seem incapable of taking action.
They don’t retreat and flee, they only huddle further back in the same trench the tank has been methodically blowing up.
At around 10:07, one of them throws a grenade, which is not only a futile gesture on a tank, but the grenade isn’t even tossed in the right direction, but simply off to the side, like he was too scared to even look at the tank.
By the end of the video, I’m pretty sure every Russian in those trenches were goners.
As I was finishing this up, the Daily Mail put up a follow-up video. In that one the tank drove over the trench, just to make sure everyone there was dead…
A couple of weeks ago, I posted a piece on how Russia was pulling ancient T-55s out of storage to send to Ukraine. In the interest of balance and fairness (to my readers, not to Russia), here’s a video on how Ukraine fielding their own upgraded T-55s.
“Ukraine has also had to look to the past, the distant past, for compatible tanks. The Ukrainians are fielding, since last autumn, a design of tank dating from over 70 years ago, the venerable T-55.”
“The 28 vehicles that the Ukrainians brought into service last autumn are a radically improved version of this model of tank called the M-55S obtained from Slovenia.”
“Taking standard T-55s into battle in 2023 would not be advisable. The 40-ton tank has a semi-stabilized 100mm d10 gun, a 500 horsepower diesel engine, and steel armor of a maximum thickness of just 200mm, meaning even old RPGs can knock them out. The gun site requires a semi-infrared spotlight that betrays the tank’s position, instant death on the modern battlefield.”
“The type also soldiers on in many armies around the world, particularly in the Third World, where T-55s saw action recently in the 2014-20 Libyan Civil War, the Yemeni Civil War from 2015 to present…and the Tigray War in Ethiopia, which ended last year.”
“Via Israel, [Slovenia] was able to heavily modernize its existing T-55s into something that is still fairly capable in 2023.”
“The old Soviet gun was replaced with the British Royal Ordnance L7 105mm rifled gun…Although the L7 is getting on in years it is still highly effective, and plenty of ammunition abounds for them.”
The tanks also received new fire control systems, incorporating a laser rangefinder and second generation night vision, a digital ballistic computer, new rubber metal tracks, an upgraded diesel engine increasing horsepower from 500 to 800, giving a maximum speed of 50 kph, and of course the tank is covered in reactive armor bricks, changing the entire look of the old tank and drastically increasing its ability to survive on the modern battlefield.
Even without knowing exactly what upgrades Russia is performing on its own T-55s, I feel safe in assuming that Israeli tech > Russian tech.
“No one is sensibly suggesting that the upgraded T-55s could deal with modern tanks deployed by Russia, but they will be lethal against all other non-tank armored vehicles the Russians deploy. And of course they can also fire high explosive rounds, which would be excellent support for Ukrainian infantry.”
As the plucky underdog in the fight, it’s no surprise that Ukraine is fielding older, upgraded tank designs as a stopgap (or supplement) until more modern western tanks can be fielded. The surprise is that Russia, with it’s reputed 12,500 or so tanks when the conflict began, having to resort to pulling out T-55s to send to Ukraine. So much of Russia’s equipment has been so poorly maintained that it’s difficult to tell how much might remain operational. And day by day, poor Russian tactic and Ukrainian precision weapons continue to whittle that number down…
Back when I reviewed The Beast, I said “While the Russians have been demothballing old Soviet tanks to send to Ukraine, they haven’t become desperate enough to send T-55s to the front lines, assuming they still have any that are able to run.”
Guess what?
Russia is demothballing T-54s/55s and sending them to Ukraine. Maybe not for front-line duty (or at least I bet that’s what they’re telling the probably green tankers they’re stuffing into them). Maybe they’re putting in new thermal sights, and maybe not. Some have suggested they’re also adding explosive reactive armor as well, but since much of the stuff found on captured newer tanks turned out to be fake, I rather doubt it.
Does this mean Russia is running out of tanks? Not necessarily. Maybe they’re saving more modern tanks in reserve for a spring or summer offensive and sending all this old crap in as a stopgap. But a whole lot of slightly less ancient T-62s are up on Oryx, so I suspect we’ll start seeing Ukrainian forces take out T-55s in Ukraine sooner rather than later.
Given how antiquated T-54/55s are on the modern battlefield, I would suggest that the U.S. government demothball a goodly number of original M1 Abramss, maybe with some slight equipment upgrades, and ship them to Ukraine, assuming enough 105mm rounds can be scrounged up. They were effective enough to destroy Soviet armor in Desert Storm, and the stuff Russia is currently shipping to Ukraine is considerably older than that.
During World War II, the Wehrmacht developed the remote-controlled Goliath tracked mine to take out tanks, fortifications, and other targets. Despite some models packing a whopping 220 pounds of explosive, they sort of looked like a toy a child could ride on, and would almost be adorable if it weren’t for the fact that they were Nazi death bombs.
Who’s an adorable little Nazi death bomb? You are! You are!
As in so many things, Ukrainians have rediscovered and deployed (kinda) another lost weapon/tactic from World War II. Namely, they’re using remote control vehicles as suicide antitank bombs.
I’ve long thought you could use even smaller, slightly modified off-the-shelf RC cars in mass to take out softer targets like trucks. Or drive into a enemy barracks with just a couple of pounds of plastique studded with roofing nails.
The Russo-Ukrainian War continues to expand the possibilities of drone warfare, and I trust the Pentagon (and every other military in the world) is taking notes.
We’ve already talked about the Battle of 73 Easting, so let’s talk about the battle that followed close on it’s heels, the Battle of Medina Ridge, the 32nd anniversary of which just passed, and which some regard as the largest tank battle of Desert Storm.
Following 73 Easting and the Battle of Norfolk, The Adnan Republican Guard division of motorized infantry launched an artillery spoiling attack against the U.S. First Armored to slow their advance, only to be slaughtered by MLRS cluster bombs, Apaches and A-10s.
This is simultaneous with the destruction of loot-laden Iraqi vehicles on the Highway of Death and the burning of Kuwaiti oil fields.
Despite the Iraqis believing that the rugged terrain south of the Euphrates valley is too difficult for an armored division to negotiate, the 24th Infantry Division reached their objective, securing Highway 8 east of where the 101st had done so a couple of days earlier. They blockade the highway, destroying over 100 vehicles retreating westwards with tank and TOE fire. Bedouin nomads watching from atop a nearby ridgeline politely applaud as tank rounds hit their targets.
The Medina Division of the Iraqi Republican Guard is the last organized combat force standing against the U.S. and its allies.
While the Iraqis have entrenched behind a small hill the Americans must crest, they’ve made the mistake of being just out of range of their T-72s.
“For the next 40 minutes, the engaged elements of the First Armored Division simply sit there picking off Iraqi tanks and armored vehicles with impunity. The Iraqis desperately call in artillery support, but the rounds fall behind the front line of Abrams tanks.”
“The 1st and 25th Field Artillery Regiments respond. Using artillery acquisition radars, the U.S. artillery is able to detect the firing of an Iraqi artillery piece, pinpoint its exact position, and return counter artillery fire on it before the Iraqi round has even landed. Within just a few minutes, two entire artillery battalions of the Medina division have been wiped out.”
“40 minutes after the battle began, the Medina’s right flank has been completely destroyed, and the right flank of the American force is just beginning to smash into the Medina’s left. In this sector, many Iraqi tanks are pointing southwest. The nearest tanks are destroyed before they can even rotate their turrets towards the Americans. Those that do fire back find that they are again outranged.”
Apaches and A-10s join in here as well.
“The battle would become known as The Battle of Medina Ridge. It lasts just two hours during which 186 Iraqi tanks and 172 armored vehicles are destroyed. Four American Abrams tanks are lost.”
I’m skipping over some secondary action and friendly fire incidents, but the Iraqis were complete routed and Americans took minimal casualties.
If more modern American and NATO tanks using combined arms operations took on even more antiquated Soviet tanks in Ukraine, the result is likely to be similar.
Here’s a video from Samir Puri and the Imperial War Museum that echoes something Nicholas Moran said ten months ago, namely that the tank is not obsolete on the modern battlefield, it’s just that the Russians are using them wrong.
Takeaways:
Russia, despite a century of data, isn’t using tanks properly in combined arms operations in concert with infantry, artillery and close air support.
Ukraine is, though much of their close air support has taken the form of drones. “These unmanned aerial vehicles have proved very effective especially against slow-moving Russian armored convoys.”
“We don’t really see this kind of tight combined arms operations being mounted by the Russians. They really struggled to do this. Instead, what we saw were quite disconnected Russian elements, and that meant that often the Russians were moving into positions it was still very well defended that hadn’t been softened. Which is why as the war has moved on sixth, seventh, eighth month [this video came out two months ago], the Russians have changed tack very much to I guess quite brutal indiscriminate bombardment of the cities they want to take.”
“There are no massed tank battles for which the Cold War T-72 was designed. In fact, engagements in Ukraine are on a much smaller scale with platoons and companies clashing together rather than divisions and corps.”
“There has also been an absence of close air support, a crucial tool for supporting tanks as part of combined arms operations. There was a lot of aerial activity, there was a lot of dog fighting as well, early on in the in the invasion. But the aerial defense systems that both sides have gotten and can deploy to cover their their more fixed positions are effective enough that the attrition rate amongst combat aircraft has risen. And the Russians interestingly appear to be husbanding the resources of their air force.”
“In the early months of the war, Russia had little infantry with which to protect its tanks, particularly in urban settings. That that allowed small groups of Ukrainians to mount what almost seemed like guerrilla operations. Getting in close to Russian armor and taking them out with anti-tank guided missiles before they knew what was happening.”
“Russia has now launched a much larger mobilization of manpower to try and fix this problem, but with many of its best troops and equipment already expended, there are questions about the quality, supply, and morale of these new soldiers.”
“The fact that the Ukrainians are actually able to capture intact or largely intact T-72s is a testament to the Russian logistics. Meaning that you find in captured Russian equipment low supplies, some Russian PWOs complaining of a lack of lack of proper support from their headquarters and have simply given up or run away.”
Drone warfare has also made it much harder for Russia to use tanks in a traditional defensive role in static positions on systems of defensive trenches.
Though Russia’s forces have shown some small signs of increasing technical competence in various areas, the fact that they lost so much armor attacking Vuhledar shows that they still have a long way to go when it comes to staging competent combined arms operations.
