Casual observers of the Israel-Hamas War (which is to say, probably not anyone reading this blog) may wonder what all the fuss is about, given that various Jihadist groups have been attacking Israel their entire lifetimes. In a rare, mostly readable New York Times piece, Thomas Friedman explains why this time is different.
With the Middle East on the cusp of a full-blown ground war, I was thinking on Friday morning about how Israel’s last two major wars have two very important things in common: They were both started by nonstate actors backed by Iran — Hezbollah from Lebanon in 2006 and Hamas from Gaza now — after Israel had withdrawn from their territories.
And they both began with bold border-crossing assaults — Hezbollah killing three and kidnapping two Israeli soldiers in 2006 and Hamas brutally killing more than 1,300 and abducting some 150 Israeli civilians, including older people, babies and toddlers, in addition to soldiers.
That similarity is not a coincidence. Both assaults were designed to challenge emerging trends in the Arab world of accepting Israel’s existence in the region.
And most critically, the result of these surprise, deadly attacks across relatively stable borders was that they drove Israel crazy.
In 2006, Israel essentially responded to Hezbollah: “You think you can just do crazy stuff like kidnap our people and we will treat this as a little border dispute. We may look Western, but the modern Jewish state has survived as ‘a villa in the jungle’” — which is how the former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak described it — “because if push comes to shove, we are willing to play by the local rules. Have no illusions about that. You will not outcrazy us out of this neighborhood.”
So the Israeli Air Force relentlessly pounded the homes and offices of Hezbollah’s leadership in the southern suburbs of Beirut throughout the 34 days of the war, as well as key bridges into and out of the city and Beirut International Airport. Hezbollah’s leaders and their families and neighbors paid a very personal price.
The Israeli response was so ferocious that Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, said in a now famous interview on Aug. 27, 2006, with Lebanon’s New TV station, shortly after the war ended: “We did not think, even 1 percent, that the capture [of two Israeli soldiers] would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me, if I had known on July 11 … that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not.”
Indeed, since 2006, the Israel-Lebanon border has been relatively stable and quiet, with few casualties on both sides. And while Israel did take a hit in terms of its global image because of the carnage it inflicted in Beirut, it was not nearly as isolated in the world or the Middle East over the short term or long run as Hezbollah had hoped.
Hamas must have missed that lesson when it decided to disrupt the status quo around Gaza with an all-out attack on Israel last weekend. This is in spite of the fact that over the past few years, Israel and Hamas developed a form of coexistence around Gaza that allowed thousands of Gazans to enter Israel daily for work, filled Hamas coffers with cash aid from Qatar and gave Gazans the ability to do business with Israel, with Gazan goods being exported through Israeli seaports and airports.
Hamas’s stated reasons for this war are that Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has been provoking the Palestinians by the morning strolls that Israel’s minister for national security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, was taking around Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and by the steps that he was taking to make imprisonment of Palestinians harsher. While these moves by Israel were widely seen as provocations, they are hardly issues that justify Hamas putting all its chips on the table the way it did last Saturday.
The bigger reason it acted now, which Hamas won’t admit, is that it saw how Israel was being more accepted by the Arab world and soon possibly by the birthplace of Islam, Saudi Arabia. Iran was being cornered by President Biden’s Middle East diplomacy, and Palestinians feared being left behind.
Very little about “Biden’s Middle East diplomacy” has anything to do with Biden, and a whole lot to do with Donald Trump, Mike Pompeo and Jared Kushner pioneering diplomacy first with Saudi Arabia (remember the “glowing orb”?) and later with the Abraham Accords. “Biden’s Middle East diplomacy” seems to largely consist of a retread of Obama’s “throw large sums of money at Iran and hope they play nice” (and possibly kick some back in the form of graft) wishful thinking.
And by “Palestinians feared being left behind” read “Hamas and Iran becoming even more irrelevant and isolated than they already are.”
So Hamas essentially said, “OK, Jews, we will go where we have never gone before. We will launch an all-out attack from Gaza that won’t stop with soldiers but will murder your grandparents and slaughter your babies. We know it’s crazy, but we are willing to risk it to force you to outcrazy us, with the hope that the fires will burn up all Arab-Israeli normalization in the process.”
Hamas has always been that crazy, always willing to blow up a pizza parlor or a disco. The only reason they didn’t behead Jewish babies before was insufficient opportunity thanks to Israeli security. Remember that Hamas believes all Jews to be apes and pigs and that their continued existence living on the face of the earth is a literal affront to God. Saudi-Israeli rapprochement may very well have been paymaster Iran’s trigger to greenlight the operation, but it wasn’t Hamas’ primary motivation for killing Jews any more than fish need a reason to swim.
Hamas kills Jews because Hamas exists to kill Jews.
Yes, if you think Israel is now crazy, it is because Hamas punched it in the face, humiliated it and then poked out one eye. So now Israel believes it must restore its deterrence by proving that it can outcrazy Hamas’s latest craziness.
Israel will apply Hama Rules — a term I coined years ago to describe the strategy deployed in 1982 by Syria’s president, Hafez al-Assad, when Hamas’s political forefathers, the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria, tried to topple Assad’s secular regime by starting a rebellion in the city of Hama.
Assad pounded the Brotherhood’s neighborhoods in Hama relentlessly for days, letting no one out, and brought in bulldozers and leveled it as flat as a parking lot, killing some 20,000 of his own people in the process. I walked on that rubble weeks later. An Arab leader I know told me privately how, afterward, Assad laconically shrugged when he was asked about it: “People live. People die.”
Welcome to the Middle East. This is not like a border dispute between Norway and Sweden or a heated debate in Harvard Yard. Lord, how I wish that it were, but it’s not.
Friedman is only intermittently interesting. Much of the time he’s merely doling out Trans-Atlantic globalist elite conventional wisdom (global trade, China, climate change), and a guy who’s occasionally three months ahead of the curve who’s plodding pronouncements are treated like Delphic declarations. (Ace of Spades offered up an epic parody that’s still worth your attention.)
Eventually the piece devolves into the inevitable “Netanyahu: Bad!” catechisms that run on the internationalist left’s wetware anytime that can spare cycles from their ever-present Social Justice, Trump Derangement Syndrome and Global Warming Alarmism subroutines. But it was a halfway decent piece up to then.
Now the reviled Netanyahu is leading a unity government in a declared war against Hamas, unlike the Second Lebanon War or Operation Cast Lead.
This time will be different, because Hamas will not be permitted to exist for there to be a next time.
