I See Hungary, I See France

April 12th, 2022

Let’s clear some tabs on recent European elections of note. First up: Hungary reelects Viktor Orban.

Viktor Orbán, who has served as prime minister of Hungary since 2010 — and spent a stint in the same office from 1998-2002 — won yet again in Sunday’s much-anticipated elections. His party, Fidesz, won two-thirds of the seats in parliament. Fidesz’s closest competitor was United for Hungary, an amalgamation of parties which included socialists, greens, and Jobbik, which was recognized as an antisemitic, neo-Nazi outfit until recently. Now, it presents itself as a moderate, “modern,” alternative to Fidesz.

Orbán’s triumph, we are meant to believe, represents a near-fatal blow to Hungarian democracy, and a painful one to the capital L, capital W, capital O, Liberal World Order.

Snip.

Now, Orbán is no saint, and yes, that is an understatement. He enjoys close relationships with both Vladimir Putin’s Russia (although he has denounced the invasion of Ukraine) and Xi Jinping’s China. As Jimmy Quinn detailed here, Orbán has helped China carry out its post-pandemic propaganda program, and pursued deeper financial ties between his country and the genocidal one to the east. This is not the behavior of a man keen on being what Rod Dreher calls “the leader of the West now — the West that still remembers what the West is.”

Moreover, Orbán’s domestic behavior can fairly be called authoritarian. He has championed what he calls “illiberal democracy,” and enacted reforms to the country’s judicial system that undermine its independence. Evidence points to significant financial corruption on his watch as well.

But the failure of many of Orbán’s critics to accurately report on his regime points to the weakness of many of their arguments. Take this piece from The Atlantic, which, as National Review alum Daniel Foster notes, doesn’t exactly describe Orbán as an autocrat. Its author argues that the formation of a private, pro-Orbán media conglomerate that receives government funding is damning evidence of the corrosion of democracy in the country at the hands of its leader. That’s not exactly convincing to those of us who have watched NPR hold a pillow to the face of the Hunter Biden-laptop story and erroneously smear Supreme Court justices.

Orbán is not a U.S.-style conservative fusionist or anything especially close to it, and that’s a bad thing, in this writer’s opinion. But he is, quite obviously, the kind of conservative who appeals to Hungarians, and despite his many warts, that might just be okay. People in other countries are allowed to hold different opinions on LGBT issues, European integration, etc. than your average undergrad at Middlebury. Indeed, the implementation of those policies at the public’s will represents democracy in action, not its antithesis.

Orbán, the prime minister of a nation with a population only slightly larger than New York City’s and something approximating a friend of the Chinese Communist Party, is no more the savior of Western Civilization than Joe Biden is. But he’s also no threat to self-government across the world, and his critics’ flubbing of basic terms they proclaim to love leaves the rest of us wondering if they even know what it is that they value.

Orban’s victory has generated much consternation among the Euroelite:

Viktor Orbán and his brand of conservatism faced a crucial popularity test in Sunday’s general elections, a test he passed with flying colors. The Hungarian premier and his Fidesz party thumped the opposition’s unity coalition—composed of liberals, greens, Communists, and the neo-Nazi Jobbik—by a humiliating margin of nearly 20 points; opposition leader Péter Márki-Zay was defeated even in his own district.

Orbán also struck a painful blow against his critics in Brussels. Ever since he returned to power in Budapest in 2010, and especially in recent years, Orbán has played lightning rod for seemingly the entire EU establishment, even as he has galvanized populist and national-conservative forces on the Continent. Reviled, denounced, sanctioned, and banished from the European Parliament’s center-right bloc, he has gone from internal critic of Brussels to an outright dissident.

In this, Orbán hasn’t been alone. For the past five years, the European Union has also locked horns with the national-conservative Law and Justice party, or PiS, in neighboring Poland. Both countries allegedly fail to uphold “rule of law,” as defined by Brussels. The European Commission charges Hungary and Poland with threatening media freedom and judicial independence, with not doing enough to tackle (or actively engaging in) systemic corruption, and with violating LGBT and minority rights—charges denied by political leaders in Budapest and Warsaw.

Some paragraphs on Hungary’s largely neutral stance on the Russo-Ukrainian War snipped.

Still, once the Russo-Ukrainian dust settles, it is likely that the older dynamic—Budapest and Warsaw together in the anti-EU trenches—will resume. PiS might have won some temporary favor with Western hawks by toeing a hawkish line on Russia, but the underlying tensions haven’t eased. Indeed, the issue that has received the most attention in recent years is the Polish government’s decision to establish, in 2017, a new judicial disciplinary body, composed of jurists appointed by the lower house of Parliament, to hear complaints against judges facing misconduct allegations. European officials claim, not entirely without reason, that this exposes the Polish judges to political control.

This clash is often framed by both camps in stark culture-war terms. “Pro-European” liberals and EU officials themselves present it as a conflict between the liberal-democratic values of the union and the illiberal and undemocratic practices of the two countries’ nationalist governments. Partisans of Hungary and Poland, meanwhile, frame the contest as one between two traditional and religious nations and an imperialistic Brussels bent on pushing a left-wing, globalist, and anti-Christian agenda.

Things are a little more complex. For starters, the crimes Hungary and Poland are accused of aren’t unique to those two countries, not by EU standards, at least. The high courts of EU states, where they exist, are all highly politicized, which usually means they hardly ever dare challenge the wisdom of EU legislation.

As for corruption, it’s notoriously hard to measure. To the extent that some institutions try to gauge it, on the basis of people’s perception of the levels of corruption in their country, Poland’s and Hungary’s governments come out as significantly less corrupt than those of other Eastern nations, such as Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria; they also come out better than governments in Spain, Portugal, and Italy.

Paragraphs on press freedom and “LGBT” issues snipped.

In light of all of the above, the real question isn’t whether what’s happening in these two countries is indeed worrying, or whether an a-democratic, supranational body like the European Union has any right to lecture the governments of two democratic member states and the people who elected them. The more interesting question is why Brussels has singled out Hungary and Poland for problems common to the bloc as a whole.

The answer has relatively little to do with the charges brought against the two countries, though of course they play a role. In the eyes of the European gatekeepers, the pair has committed a much more heinous crime: Hungary and Poland have openly challenged the authority and legitimacy of the European Union itself. More specifically, they have dared to reject what is arguably the most important article of faith of EU doctrine: the primacy of EU law over national law.

Thus, when Brussels claimed that Poland’s judicial disciplinary body, created in 2017, violated EU law and should be revoked “in accordance with the principle of the primacy of EU law,” the Polish government refused to comply, contending that the demand represented an unacceptable infringement on the country’s national sovereignty. In an attempt to resolve the dispute, Polish premier Mateusz Morawiecki asked the Polish Constitutional Tribunal in Warsaw this question: If push came to shove, and EU law were ever to clash with the Polish constitution, which should prevail?

The tribunal delivered its verdict in 2021: It voted 12 to 2 for the national constitution, holding that “the attempt by the [European Court of Justice] to involve itself with Polish legal mechanisms violates … the rules that give priority to the [Polish] constitution and rules that respect sovereignty amid the process of European integration.”

The Polish tribunal, in other words, insisted that national law enjoys primacy over EU law—a principle without which “the Republic of Poland cannot function as a democratic and sovereign state.” More than that, the tribunal accused the European Union and the ECJ of violating EU treaties themselves by claiming otherwise. Quite the bombshell.

Suffice to say, EU officials and pro-EU elites didn’t take it well. Luxembourg’s foreign minister, Jean Asselborn, claimed that the tribunal’s ruling put the very existence of the European Union in jeopardy. “The primacy of European law is essential for the integration of Europe and living together in Europe”, he said. “If this principle is broken, Europe as we know it, as it has been built with the Rome treaties, will cease to exist.”

To understand why the ruling represents such an existential threat to the EU, one must comprehend the fundamental role of EU law in the bloc’s superstate-building project. Legal scholars have contested the supposed primacy of EU law for half a century. In practice, however, national courts and governments, which tend to have an engrained pro-EU bias, have hardly ever contested the primacy principle. This has allowed the ever-expanding body of EU legislation, the so-called acquis communautaire, to become the main engine for so-called integration by law—the hollowing out from above and within of national constitutional and legal systems.

EU legal primacy has also bestowed huge powers upon the ECJ: Despite lacking the democratic legitimacy and accountability of national courts, the European court, by constantly creating new “laws” through its rulings, almost always in favor of “more Europe,” has effectively become the bloc’s most important legislative and, indeed, constitution-writing body. Alec Stone Sweet, an international-law expert, has termed this a “juridical coup d’état.”

By going against this principle—and by asserting the primacy of national sovereignty over EU law—Hungary and Poland have thus dealt a potentially deadly blow to one of the bloc’s main empire-building tools. This is ultimately what the two countries are being punished for. And to do so, the European Union is resorting to the most powerful tool at its disposal: money. Last year, in a move clearly aimed at Hungary and Poland, Brussels adopted for the first time ever a Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, which allows the European Commission to withhold the payment of EU funds to member states that are found to be in breach of the rule of law—as defined by the EU/ECJ itself, of course.

The commission has already used the new rule to refuse to approve the Next Generation EU Covid-19 recovery funds for the two countries—€7 billion for Hungary and €36 billion for Poland. And more funds may be withheld in the future. Budapest and Warsaw challenged the new rule at the ECJ, which predictably dismissed the two governments’ complaints.

Thou Shalt Have No Other Gods Before The EU.

How this will pan out remains to be seen. The European Union isn’t new to this kind of blackmail. The European Central Bank has repeatedly choked member states, to bring recalcitrant eurozone governments to heel or even to force regime change (the removal of Silvio Berlusconi in 2011, the shutdown of Greece’s banks in 2015). EU leaders seek a similar coup in Hungary and Poland. Only, Hungary and Poland aren’t in the eurozone; they control their own currencies. The money the pair receives from the European Union is significant, but it isn’t a lifeblood: Between 2010 and 2016, annual net transfers from Brussels—the difference between the total expenditure received and contributions to the EU budget—amounted to 2.7 percent of GDP in Poland and 4 percent in Hungary. This puts the two countries in a very different position than, say, Greece.

Meanwhile, over in France, incumbent Emmanuel Marcon and right-wing challenger Marine Le Pen head to a runoff. (Naturally, French antifa reacted to Le Pen making the runoff by rioting. If you’re a moron and all you have is a hammer…)

Remember how self-described “Bonapartist” Eric Zemmour was supposed to be the new hotness? Yeah, he finished a distant fourth. Le Monde describes his failure thus:

Eric Zemmour gathered 7.07% of the votes cast in the first round of the presidential election on April 10, according to official results. This defeat can probably be explained by several factors, which the far-right candidate saw creeping up on him over the past few weeks, leading him to seek supporters in all segments of the electorate.

Eric Zemmour failed to unite “the patriotic bourgeoisie,” apart from some who voted for François Fillon in 2017 and the Catholics in the “Manif Pour Tous” organization [a group opposing same-sex marriage] and “the working classes,” who have remained for the most part loyal to Marine Le Pen (23.15% of the vote). His Reconquête ! party was already showing these weaknesses: Eric Zemmour has in fact built a new Rassemblement National (RN) party to the right of the RN, where support from Les Républicains (LR) is rare. The only people to join him from the traditional right-wing party Les Républicains are the obscure senator Sébastien Meurant, an unknown former MP, Nicolas Dhuicq, and Guillaume Peltier, the former number two of LR, who is known for switching parties a lot (he is a former member of the Front National, of Bruno Mégret’s Mouvement National Républicain (MNR), of Philippe de Villiers’ Mouvement pour le France (MPF), and also of the UMP).

Yeah, for the most part I don’t know who those people and parties are either.

Eric Zemmour had reason to believe in victory: With barely 7% of intended votes in September 2021, he rose to 17% and 18% in polls in mid-October, before plunging down the rankings. He has obviously succeeded in forcing his campaign issues to the forefront, including on the traditional right, building a movement from scratch that now gathers more than 100,000 supporters who are extremely active on social media and drawing crowds to rallies like no other candidate.

“Extremely active on social media.” That should be a big ole red flag. Twitter is not the territory.

But the excitement that he generates among his supporters has not translated into votes. “I believe that the momentum is on my side,” he repeated on April 6 on France Inter public radio. “All the objective elements: the full rooms, the excitement, the television ratings, the number of supporters; all of that is me.” His sycophants around him have greatly elevated the hubris of a man who had no shortage of it, and who didn’t mind becoming a kind of a guru whose mere presence electrified the crowds.

Snip.

In the end, it is the war in Ukraine that led the candidate to plummet in the polls. Due in part to his admiration for Vladimir Putin (“I dream of a French Putin,” he had said in 2018), his inability to call him a “war criminal,” and finally his reluctance to welcome Ukrainian refugees – unlike Marine Le Pen.

Yeah, I’m not sure how much that had to do with it, since Le Pen is hardly tough on Putin herself.

Is Le Pen a nasty piece of work? Well, she’s certainly not my cup of tea, and I doubt she has a translated copy of The Federalist Papers on her bookshelf. (Though thankfully, she seems to have abandoned her father’s antisemitism.) Macron is arguably more “free market,” though that phrase has very little meaning in the matrix of current French politics. Yellow Vest voters seem to favor Le Pen, and she wants to lower VAT taxes. She opposes Flu Manchu passports. She’s still a Euroskeptic, wants to reform the European Commission, wants a referendum on immigration restriction, and opposes jihad. She wants to abolish the International Monetary Fund. She’s a Russo-phile who wants to remove France from NATO. Like Orban, she would be a big thorn in the side of the EU. Unlike Ortban, she would also be a big thorn in the side of the US as well.

Damned if you do and damned if you don’t.

Those in the chattering classes proclaiming Orban a grave threat to democracy are wrong. Those proclaiming Le Pen a threat to democracy (and American interests) are slightly less wrong, but Le Pen is less a long-term threat to democracy than the EU’s own transnational globalist elite. NATO survived over 40 years of France’s withdrawal from NATO’s command structure under de Gualle, and (to the extent the alliance is relevant to the 21st century) could survive France’s withdrawal once again.

As National Review once said of Jean Le Pen, “we have no frog in this fight.”

Breaking: Lina Hidalgo Aides Indicted On Corruption Charges

April 11th, 2022

Several previous LinkSwarms have reported on the burgeoning Harris County corruption scandals (many reported by Holly Hansen) involving corrupt no-bid contracts and FBI raids. Now the scandal has finally resulted in indictments.

Three employees of Harris County Judge Lina Hidalgo have been indicted by a grand jury on charges related to how they helped award a contract for COVID-19 vaccine outreach last year.

The Harris County district clerk lists two felony counts each for chief of staff Alex Triantaphyllis, policy director Wallis Nader and policy aide Aaron Dunn. The charges are misuse of official information and tampering with a government record.

The charges add weight to a scandal Hidalgo has attempted to dismiss as politically motivated, and they threaten to tarnish her image as an ethically minded public servant as she seeks reelection this year. Hidalgo is widely seen as a rising star in the Texas Democratic Party and a future statewide candidate.

The three employees were part of a selection committee to choose a vendor for a COVID-19 vaccine outreach campaign Hidalgo wanted. The committee, which also included members of the county health department, unanimously awarded an $11 million contract to Elevate Strategies, a small political consulting firm owned by Felicity Pereyra, who has previously worked on Democratic campaigns.

Republicans have seized on this as evidence of corruption, alleging without evidence [Ahem – LP] that Hidalgo was funneling money to help the Democratic Party build relationships with voters. Hidalgo accused Republican county commissioners of spreading conspiracy theories, though she agreed to cancel the contract in September because she said it had become too politicized.

Court records filed by the Texas Rangers, who are assisting prosecutors, suggest the inquiry focuses on whether Hidalgo’s office inappropriately involved Pereyra in designing the bid proposal she would later win.

My working assumption is that any time you see smoke like this, the fire is almost invariably channeling taxpayer money to the pockets hard-left Democratic Party cronies.

When Holly has a piece up on the story I’ll link it here.

Edited to Add: Holly’s piece is now up, and provides important context left out of other stories.

The affidavits also allege that in April 2021, after the University of Texas (UT) Health Science Center earned a higher score at a lower cost than Elevate Strategies, Triantaphyllis texted Nader that they needed to “slam the door shut on UT.” The selection committee later instructed purchasing agent Dwight Dosplauf to disqualify UT for underperforming on another project.

In August of 2021, The Texan first reported that Harris County had awarded an $11 million vaccine outreach contract to Pereyra’s Elevate Strategies. Prior to founding the company in 2019, Pereyra had previously served as the deputy campaign manager for county Commissioner Adrian Garcia (D-Pct. 2). Pereyra had also been with Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign and worked with the Democratic National Committee.

During the August 26, 2021 meeting of the commissioners court, Hidalgo accused Commissioner Jack Cagle (R-Pct. 4) of telling a “bold-faced lie” after he posed questions about the “one-woman firm” handling the contract.

Following Monday’s indictments, Cagle said on social media that he “took no pleasure in being right about this.”

“This is a major black eye for Harris County. Now it’s time for the courts to sort it out.”

Last September, emails obtained by The Texan showed that Dunn, Nader, and Triantaphyllis had instructed Dopslauf to revise vendor experience requirements for the vaccine outreach project. Documents obtained by FOX 26 Houston also showed that UT had earned a score of 240 and bid $7.5 million compared to Elevate Strategies’ score of 204 with a cost estimate of $19 million. Some time before the project award, Elevate Strategies lowered the cost to $10.9 million.

Even before the scoring of proposals, however, on January 14, 2021, Hidalgo had texted about the scope of a project mentioning “Felicity,” and Triantaphyllis later clarified to Nader, saying, “She was trying to add to Felicity’s scope relating to engaging community groups and stuff.”

Q: Can You Double-Pattern Rather Than Use EUV? A: You Don’t Want To

April 10th, 2022

This is going to be pretty esoteric for many of my readers, but in previous semiconductor posts covering ASML, some commenters have suggested that fabs can do multi-patterning for smaller nodes rather than having to use ASML’s extreme ultraviolet stepper. The following video explains why, below a certain threshold, no, you really can’t.

I’m not going to summarize every point, but the largest takeaway is that multi-patterning is computationally prohibitive. Double-patterning splits a single mask into two masks, each of which only create half of the mask pattern on the die. Double-patterning was fine for a while, but triple patterning and self-aligned double-patterning start making finding optimal solutions to the mask splitting problem exponentially more difficult.

Take a square. A square has four nodes in it. With double patterning, each of the two masks handle opposing sides of the square. And with this four-node shape, there are two double patterning options available for coloring. The EDA software thus has to check through them for design rule violations and whatnot. With triple patterning, the number of variations explodes exponentially. For that same square four node structure, triple patterning has 18 variations rather than just two with double patterning. A five node structure, 30. And so on. A semiconductor design can have hundreds of different nodes and design variations. The software needs to check through at least a good portion of these. This problem is not solvable in polynomial time. In other words, for you computer science nerds out there, it is an NP complete problem.

And then there’s the cost. “Depending on whose cost model you consult, [10nm]’s triple patterning makes its lithography module 3.85x higher than [28nm].” And the non-EUV 7nm node required triple-patterning and something called “self-aligned quadruple patterning.” And on Intel: “Brian Krzanich has said that in certain cases the company needs to use quad (4x), penta (5x), or hexa (6x) patterning for select features, as they need to expose the wafer up to six times to “draw” one feature. I am not super surprised that it wouldn’t yield. No wonder GlobalFoundries ditched their 7nm node.”

And this summary glosses over big differences between different fab technologies on different companies. TSMC’s 7nm isn’t the same as Intel’s 7nm.

Anyway, all this goes a long way to explain: Multi-patterning is much more painful than simply ponying up the cost for an ASML EUV stepper. And if you want to do 6nm, you have to use EUV.

On Conservative Inc.’s Culture War Disdain

April 9th, 2022

You would think that by now, even the more dandified blue bloods of Conservative Inc. would have learned something from the Trump uprising about the power of populist and culture war issues. But increasingly it seems like even some of those that didn’t develop full-blown Trump Derangement Syndrome objected not only to Trump’s style, but his actual substance. They seem more afraid of alienating liberal MSM and Hollywood friends over culture war issues than paying attention to outrage among actual voters.

That’s why this Twitter thread is fire.

I’m not sure that’s the case. I think a number of them are worried that they’ll be blocked from obtaining cushy corporate-funded sinecures at colleges and think-tanks if they ruffle too many feathers. They want their bread to stay well-buttered, and are willing to keep quiet in order to stay on as some sort of pet opposition as long as the left is willing to throw them occasional “strange new respect” bones and rub their furry bellies.

The Social Justice Warrior-infected Democratic Party has moved so far, so fast, to such radical extremes, that it’s even woken up the normies. When a school board revolt breaks out in San Francisco, you would think that even the dullest blades in the Conservative Inc. silverware closet would sense the once-in-a-generation realignment opportunities, but no. They seem to be off daydreaming of their next Ahoy cruise or a Jeb! restoration rather than detecting the smell of blood.

The “moderate” Biden Administration is declaring that it may mutilate your children in the name of transgenderism without telling you. And that’s not a hill to die on? Is there any hill they’ll die on that doesn’t involve marginal tax rates?

These is a giant red wave building to sweep left-wing crazies from power almost everywhere that cuts across all previous demographic, geographic and class lines. Conservative Inc. can ride that wave, or be drowned by it.

Russia Reorients

April 8th, 2022

Just because Russia is obviously retreating from Kiev due to getting mauled doesn’t mean there isn’t some truth in the argument that their biggest aims lie in eastern Ukraine. This video suggest three main remaining goals for Russian forces:

  • Restore and control the flow of water to Crimea (Ukraine dammed up the Dinappa river following the seizure of Crimea, which has put them in a world of hurt).
  • Gain control of “the Yokosuka Gas Field, which was discovered in 2010 and it has about 42 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, that could threaten Russia’s oil dominance in the region.”
  • Controlling all Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.
  • More details on each in the video.

    If they can achieve those goals, if Russia can achieve capturing those three goals they will have landlocked and absolutely wrecked Ukraine’s entire economy. So when they say that the main war is in the east, they’re actually, on some level, telling the truth. The problem for Russia, though, is that without having captured Kiev their chances of holding on to those objectives is greatly reduced.

    (Between getting my house cleaned, relatives visiting (Yes, those two are related), and tax season, no time to put up a LinkSwarm today. Tomorrow is not looking good either…)

    Biden Family Corruption Update for April 7, 2022

    April 7th, 2022

    Now that the Hunter Biden dam has finally burst for the MSM, we’re finally getting the “Hey, the Biden family sure seems to be involved in a lot of shady business deals” stories we should have gotten well before the 2020 election if the media weren’t so in the tank for Democrats.

    A roundup:

  • Hunter and Joe aren’t the only crooked members of the Biden clan.

    While conservative heat has for three years focused on the past business activities of President Biden’s son Hunter, a key Senate Republican told CBS News this week that newly obtained banking records raise similar concerns about first brother James Biden.

    “We have people with the Biden name, dealing with Chinese business people that have a relationship to the Communist Party,” Senator Chuck Grassley, the ranking Republican on the Judiciary Committee, told CBS News senior investigative correspondent Catherine Herridge. “I think James Biden was very much a part of this.”

    Bank records released by Republican senators this week indicate James Biden’s company, the Lion Hall Group, received payments from a Chinese-financed consulting group in 2018, before his brother Joe announced he was running for president. Grassley says that same year James Biden and the president’s son, Hunter, received monthly retainers totaling $165,000 — $100,000 to Hunter and $65,000 to James.

    Grassley said his team obtained the records directly from the bank where the consulting group did business. He has spent three years investigating and described James and Hunter Biden’s business dealings as “very concerning.”

    Really, who of us hasn’t received $65,000 in monthly consulting fees from a communist Chinese company?

    In a September 2020 report with Senator Ron Johnson, Republican of Wisconsin, Grassley alleged Hunter, James, and James’s wife Sara tapped into a line of credit Hunter set up with a Chinese business executive to purchase more than $100,000 in airline tickets, hotels and restaurants.

    Newly released records from Republican investigators show what appears to be the 2017 application for that $99,000 line of credit bearing the signatures of Hunter Biden and the Chinese executive.

    Hunter gets a $99,000 expense account. Meanwhile, HR rejects your expense report for spending $26 on lunch.

  • “Joe Biden’s Released Tax Returns Don’t Explain Millions In Income. Where Did It Come From?”

    In the week prior to the presidential election, I wrote a piece that asked the question, “Where Is Hunter Biden’s Money?” It was an important question then, even more so now. Given the legacy media’s recent validation of Hunter’s laptop that discussed a slice of equity planned for the “Big Guy” in a deal that involved an entity controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), we should know if any money from it (or other foreign sources) ended up in Joe Biden’s pocket, but we don’t.

    Recall that despite then-presidential candidate Biden having bragged that he had released his tax returns with what his team called “a historic level of transparency,” the truth is that he only released his individual returns. Those returns provided no detail regarding the source of most of his income, dollars that flowed to him and his wife Jill by way of S-corporations they set up shortly after his departure from the office of vice president. Those entities, CelticCapri Corp (his) and Giacoppa Corp (hers), contained more than $13 million of the $17 million the couple had reported in income after Biden left office, most of it in the first year (2017).

    The same media that ignored Hunter’s laptop has shown a complete incuriosity about these entities, accepting the premise that Joe and Jill raked in $13 million from their book deal to generate their huge increase in income. We simply don’t know if that’s true, though. What we do know is that their book sales were dismal.

    Perhaps sensing smoke starting to build just before the election, USA Today published a “fact check” piece that attempted to support that the Bidens earned “$15.6 million … from speaking fees and book deals” in the years 2017 through 2019 and that “more than $10 million of that total income was profits from Biden’s memoir ‘Promise Me, Dad’ and $3 million in profits from Jill Biden’s book.”

    Follow the source link provided to that $10 million number, though, and you’ll end up at Joe Biden’s campaign website with financial disclosure links to only their individual returns — no S-corporation tax returns. So, in reality, readers were left with a smokescreen. (Now the financial disclosure links for 2016, 2017, and 2018 have even been changed to connect to a Democratic National Committee fundraising site via ActBlue rather than the tax documents.)

    I noted back in 2020 that, “While (Joe Biden’s) financial disclosures reasonably support the $2.7 million of net income reported by CelticCapri in 2018, a notable $8.7 million gap exists between its $9.5 million net income in 2017 and the $809,709 of disclosed income in that year from book tour and related speaking events. Since his disclosure covers only part of 2017, we lack the insight into other income that may explain it.”

    Enter (yet again) Hunter and China.

    Sens. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, and Ron Johnson, R-Wisc., recently showed proof of payments from what they said were CCP-controlled firms “that prove just how connected the Bidens were and how compromised President Biden probably is.” An August 2017 wire receipt showed $100,000 sent from CEFC Infrastructure Investment to Owasco, and a copy of a November 2017 check from CEFC Limited revealed $1 million paid to Hudson West III, LLC. Both recipient entities were tied to the president’s son.

    Did any of that money, or other overseas income, go to Joe or Jill? We would know if the president provided a copy of their S-Corp. tax returns with all partner K-1’s that flowed through them. But the only detail we have is aggregate numbers reported on the couple’s individual returns.

    Read on for how there’s no way he made that money off book sales. (Hat tip: Stephen Green at Instapundit.)

  • How many “concerning transactions” are there? Would you believe 150?

  • “Biden wrote college recommendation letter for son of Hunter’s Chinese business partner.”

    President Biden, in 2017, wrote a college recommendation letter for the son of a Chinese executive who did business with Hunter Biden, according to emails reviewed by Fox News Digital.

    The president has repeatedly denied discussing Hunter’s business ventures with his son.

    Fox News Digital obtained emails between Hunter Biden and his business associates involved in his firm Rosemont Seneca’s joint venture with Chinese investment firms Bohai Capital and BHR.

    Hunter held a 10% stake in BHR as recently as last year, the White House previously acknowledged. Hunter’s attorney told the New York Times in November that he had since divested.

    In an email dated Jan. 3, 2017, and sent to Hunter Biden and his business associates Devon Archer and Jim Bulger, CEO of BHR Jonathan Li writes:

    “Gentlmen[sic], please find the attached resume of my son, Chris Li. He is applying the following colleges for this year,” Li writes, listing Brown University, Cornell University, and New York University.

    Remember how Biden swore up and down he never interacted with Hunter’s business partners?

  • “The Media Campaign to Protect Joe Biden Passes the Point of Absurdity.”

    In confirming that federal prosecutors are treating as “authenticated” the Biden emails, the Times story applies the final dollop of clown makeup to Wolf Blitzer, Lesley Stahl, Christiane Amanpour, Brian Stelter, and countless other hapless media stooges, many starring in Matt Orfalea’s damning montage above (the Hunter half-laugh is classic, by the way). All cooperated with intelligence officials to dismiss a damaging story about Biden’s abandoned laptop and his dealings with the corrupt Ukrainian energy company Burisma as “Russian disinformation.” They tossed in terms thought up for them by spooks as if they were their own thoughts, using words like “obviously” and “classic” and “textbook” to describe “the playbook of Russian disinformation,” in what itself was and still is a wildly successful disinformation campaign, one begun well before the much-derided (and initially censored) New York Post exposé on the topic from October of 2020.

    Not to be petty, but — well, yes, let’s be petty, just a little, and point out that many of the people who were the most pompous about this story turned out to be the most wrong, including the conga line of Intercept editors and staffers who essentially knocked Glenn Greenwald all the way to Substack over the issue. There are more important things going on in the world, but for sheer bootlicking conformist excess and depraved journalist-on-journalist venom the “Russian disinformation” fiasco has no equal, and probably needs recording for posterity before it’s memory-holed via some creepy homage to Severance, or a next-gen algorithmic witch-hunt, or whatever other federally contracted monstrosities are being readied for deployment somewhere far up the anus of Silicon Valley. For comic relief, start with the Intercept.

    Much blow-by-blow analysis of Bursima and Ukrainian investigations snipped.

    Note all this took place before the New York Post ran its October, 2020 piece about the trove of Biden emails culled from the laptop, which included an ominous email from Pozharsky ostensibly thanking him for the “opportunity to meet your father.” It’s never been verified that this meeting actually took place, but what has absolutely been verified by now — not just by the Times but via the extensive digging done by Politico reporter Ben Schreckinger in his book The Bidens — is that the laptop is, in fact, Hunter Biden’s laptop, and the emails they contain are real.

    In a just world this would be career-altering news for the parade of media figures who spent months loudly insisting the opposite, cheered the unprecedented decisions by Facebook and Twitter to restrict access to the story, and repeated the Langley-driven fiction that it was a Russian smear. The fact that none of them are bothering to comment on any of this shows that the line between the intelligence community and commercial media has blurred to the point of meaninglessness. They know everyone knows they screwed this up and are long past pretending to care. This is like someone committed to a life in sweats who eats another piece of pie at night, because what difference will it ever make? That weight is never coming off anyway.

    I long thought the decision by Facebook and Twitter to block the Post just before an election was a bigger deal than the actual story, which to me was mislabeled “smoking gun” evidence of major corruption because almost none of the information in those emails had been confirmed then. After reading this latest Times piece, which among other things confirms that Joe Biden (if not the Burisma official) was present at the infamous “meeting” referenced in the original Pozharsky email, I’m not sure so sure.

  • The Hunter Biden laptop whistleblower says he has 450 GB of deleted material recovered from the laptop. “[Jack] Maxey says the data includes 80,000 images and videos, and more than 120,000 archived emails.”
  • “Secret Service paying over $30K per month for Malibu mansion to protect Hunter Biden.” Are cocaine and underage prostitutes the only things Hunter has to spend his own money on?
  • Except maybe fundraising…for his own father. “President Joe Biden’s chief of staff Ron Klain allegedly emailed Hunter Biden in 2012 to ask him for money for his father.” (Hat tip: Director Blue.)
  • If I’ve missed any important Biden corruption news, feel free to leave links in the comments.

    Know Who’s Bummed About Russia’s Military Failure In Ukraine? China

    April 6th, 2022

    A goodly part of the world is pleased about the manifest failure of Vlad’s Big Ukraine Adventure, some are indifferent to it, but only Russia, client-state Syria, and puppet-state Belarus really seem upset about it.

    Know who else is bummed? China.

    Operation Desert Storm was a turning point in modern Chinese military history. As military planners with the People’s Liberation Army watched U.S. and allied forces make short work of the world’s fourth-largest military (on paper), equipped with many of the same systems as the PLA, it became obvious that China’s quantitatively superior but qualitatively lacking massed infantry would stand no chance against the combination of modern weaponry, C4ISR, and joint operations seen in Iraq. The result was new military concepts and over two decades of often-difficult reforms, which produced the modern, far more capable, “informationized” PLA of today.

    Today, the PLA is no doubt closely observing its Russian contemporaries in Ukraine as they under-perform in multiple areas, from failing to take key targets or claim air supremacy to running low on fuel and supplies and possibly experiencing morale collapse, and surely taking away lessons that will shape its own future. Of note, Russia’s experience appears to have confirmed many of China’s recent assumptions behind its investments, such as the utility of unmanned aerial systems in high-intensity conflict, as well as the necessity for the PLA’s 2015 reforms, which aim to fix many of the issues driving Russian failure that the PLA recognizes in itself.

    Of the many issues that have contributed to Russia’s physical battlefield woes in Ukraine, one of the most important has been the lack of effective joint or combined arms operations, widely considered essential to any effective modern fighting force. Russia’s poor level of coordination between its various services and branches can only be generously described as incompetent. For example, it has repeatedly failed to provide effective air support to its ground forces or deconflict its air and air-defense forces to avoid friendly fire.

    The PLA has long had its own serious issues with joint operations. Traditionally dominated by the Army, the PLA had little success developing a truly joint force until a series of sweeping reforms in 2015 that replaced the former Army-dominated system with a series of joint theater commands. The PLA is thus aware of its own shortcomings and taking steps to fix it, but likely remains far off from being able to conduct truly effective, seamless joint operations. Efforts to conduct joint exercises are becoming more common, but most senior PLA leaders are still relatively inexperienced with joint operations, and even new officers typically do not receive joint education below the corps level. Further, it remains to be seen how far these reforms will go or to what extent they will “stick;” indeed, one reason the PLA did not attempt these reforms until 2015 was because of strong institutional pushback from the Army, whose leaders wished to retain their dominant status.

    To China, the Ukraine invasion will reinforce the importance of joint and combined arms operations, while also making clear that such operations are highly difficult to conduct in practice. Russia’s stumbles may give the PLA pause as to whether it is truly ready for all the joint elements that a successful Taiwan seizure would require, including close coordination between sea, air, and land forces.

    As well they should be. Russia shares a giant land border with Ukraine, was able to through something like 150,000 troops into the fight, and still got mauled while failing to meet their initial objectives. A giant land border is world’s away from having to conduct fiercely contested landing operations against the heavily defended island of a sophisticated, technological peer foe who’s had over half a century to prepare.

    Also, it can’t be encouraging that Russia was unable to hold control of Hostemel Airport during the early stages of the war, since airport seizures for an airbridge into Taiwan has played a large role in many wargamed invasion scenarios.

    Some paragraphs on conscript armies and information warfare skipped.

    China has also taken note of Russia’s disasterous logistics:

    Another ongoing issue has been Russia’s serious problems with poor logistics. The sight of broken-down or abandoned vehicles has become common as Russian forces run out of fuel and other vital supplies. To its credit, the PLA has also been rapidly reforming and modernizing its logistical system as part of the same broad set of 2015 reforms. As part of these reforms, the PLA has emphasized its logistics organizations and created the Joint Logistics Support Force. This force’s training has focused on cooperation with other branches of the PLA, and it has cut its teeth training to establish supply lines during natural disasters. In 2018, the JLSF launched its first major exercise, dubbed “Joint Logistics Support Mission 2018,” featuring medical drones, helicopter-dropped refueling depots, and operations in harsh and remote terrain.

    Hey, remember all that stuff I said about long land borders vs. amphibious and airborne invasion? It applies double (if not quadruple) for logistics. China can’t assume it will have complete air and sea control of the Taiwan strait, and it’s really hard to run an invasion if you’ve run out of ammo, food and fuel.

    However, while the outward manifestation of many of the issues faced by the Russian military appear to be logistical in nature, the true heart of the issue may be corruption. There are reports that before the invasion Russian military officers sold off their fuel and food supplies, and that these corrupt practices may be responsible for the stalling of a Russian tank column outside Kyiv. In this regard, the PLA has much to fear. Corruption has plagued the PLA for decades, with some PLA officers bluntly stating in 2015 that it could undermine China’s ability to wage war. Reportedly, more than 13,000 PLA officers have been punished in some capacity for corruption since Xi Jinping took power, including more than a hundred generals. This was a particular problem in the logistics sector, where there are more opportunities for corruption and links to the civilian economy.

    Yet, despite the reorganization of the PLA and widespread prosecution of corruption cases, it still appears to be a major issue. Anti-corruption efforts are ongoing, with Chinese Gen. Zhang Youxia recently calling for innovative measures to keep up the fight. But the fact that Fu Zhenghua, the man brought in to take down the corrupt former security chief Zhou Yongkang, is himself now under investigation for corruption does not bode well for the long-term effectiveness of China’s efforts. The troubled invasion of Ukraine provides a stark real-world example to Xi, the CCP, and PLA about the impact corruption can have on military effectiveness, and will no doubt cause them to redouble their anti-corruption efforts with a newfound urgency. However given its similar authoritarian system and emphasis on career advancement through patronage, systemic corruption may be baked into the system.

    China without corruption is like Norway without snow.

    But not everything is that’s made life difficult for Russia will apply to China.

    While China will benefit from Russia’s increasing reliance on its goods and services, Beijing can be expected to retool its geo-economic strategy to reduce its vulnerability to a similar nightmare scenario. For example, it will likely redouble its efforts to promote its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System—an alternative to the SWIFT international banking system—among its strategic partners and foreign aid recipients in the developing world.

    Likewise, China’s recent “Dual Circulation” economic strategy appears to be aimed at countering a decoupling from China’s trade partners. Further, Beijing has surely observed how easy it was for corporations to withdraw from Moscow. If China is to be exposed to the risk of global sanctions and corporate withdrawal, so too are countries and corporations exposed to dependence on the world’s second-largest economy, and thus the government will likely take efforts to make any sanctions or corporate turn against China as painful a prospect as possible. Either way, policymakers in Washington need to understand that the sanctions being used today against Russia are unlikely be as effective the next time around, as China is not just a different economy, but also will learn from the current conflict and adjust accordingly.

    This is undoubtedly true, and China has a much broader and more modern economic and industrial base with which to wage war. All the more reason for America to bring critical manufacturing and other economic business outsourced to China back home.

    For all these valuable lessons, there is little doubt that China has been watching the ongoing conflict with no small amount of chagrin. Chinese leaders are reportedly surprised and unsettled by the poor military performance of its Russian partners, Ukraine’s resistance, and the level of solidarity from the international community. The image of a much smaller state, against all odds, successfully resisting a larger neighbor surely sits uneasily in the psyches of CCP apparatchiks and PLA officials. It also counters the narrative of overwhelming force and grim inevitability Beijing has sought to instill in the psyches of the Taiwanese people. It is notable that early attempts by Chinese state media to capitalize on the Ukraine invasion in precisely this fashion, illustrating how the United States will surely abandon Taiwan when the chips are down, quietly ceased after the initial days of the war, when it became apparent that the U.S. was not, in fact, abandoning Ukraine. Beyond purely psychological factors, Ukraine also offers a blueprint for successful resistance via asymmetric warfare very similar to Taiwan’s proposed Overall Defense Concept, perhaps giving a jolt to a plan that most analysts agree offers Taiwan its best chance of success against the PLA but has stalled out in the face of bureaucratic resistance.

    While China and the PLA will surely watch Ukraine closely and try to take away the correct lessons, there is one uncomfortable parallel which China may be unable to avoid by the very nature of its authoritarian system. The runup to the Ukraine invasion featured multiple strategic miscalculations by Putin, driven at least in part by him surrounding himself with the yes-men who inevitably cling to authoritarian leaders, eager to please and afraid to speak truth to power. This was obvious in the visibly uncomfortable reaction of Russia’s SVR (foreign intelligence) chief as he was publicly pressured to agree with Putin in the days leading up to the war, as well as in the sackings and arrests of multiple military and intelligence officials after the war turned poorly. Authoritarian leaders have systemic problems in gaining reliable intelligence, oftentimes magnified by their overconfidence in their own singular understanding of a situation. As China continues its slide away from a system of intra-Party consensus toward a one-man cult of personality in which dissenting views are increasingly unwelcome, Xi is bound to encounter the same problem. It is unclear whether Xi will learn this lesson from Putin, or make his own similar miscalculations in the future towards China’s own neighbors.

    Dictatorships (especially communist dictatorships) greatly increase the possibility of a “Thermocline of Truth” building up between bad news and fawning yes-men fearful of making the dictator angry. There’s very little reason to believe that Xi Jinping’s chain of command suffers from the problem any less than Putin’s.

    In war, comforting lies will get your ass kicked.

    Elon Musk and Twitter: Memeorama

    April 5th, 2022

    Everyone and their dog has already commented on Elon Musk becoming Twitter’s largest shareholder. With a 9.2% stake, and being ushered onto the board of directors. Obviously Musk should #FreeTheBee, restore Donald Trump, and kick every social justice warrior off the company’s “safety committee” for starters.

    But instead of cognizant commentary, have a random collection of memes (some of which you’ll need to click through):

    Is Russia Running Out Of Troops?

    April 4th, 2022

    Ukraine is often depicted as David up against Russia’ Goliath, but this analyst argues the situation is closer to the reverse when it comes to in-theater manpower:

    Some takeaways:

  • Russia didn’t anticipate Ukraine undertaking mass mobilization, and now finds itself outnumbered. “There’s a fair chance the number will get even more lopsided.”
  • Estimates for losses on each side are hard. Guestimate: 11,000 Russians dead, 9,000 Ukrainians.

  • Add in captured troops and those wounded enough to be out of combat yields about 39,000 Russians out of action. “That’s a lot. It’s about 21% of the Russian starting force.”
  • Not referenced in the video, but: “Pentagon officials say a 10 percent casualty rate, including dead and wounded, for a single unit renders it unable to carry out combat-related tasks.” Though I’ve seen higher numbers (20-30%) elsewhere.
  • Ukrainian losses are probably around 6%.
  • “Russian losses have a higher percentage of professional soldiers.”
  • Offensive operations produce higher casualties than defense.
  • “Ukraine is vast. It’s bigger than France. [It] had more than 40 million people before the war.”
  • By March 15, Ukraine had hit its planned reserve call-up troop level of 130,000. Add in volunteers, foreign fighters, National Guard, etc., Ukraine may have as many as 400,000 troops (with various levels of training) under arms.
  • Ukraine could potentially have 750,000 troops under arms by July.
  • “Russia is unable to seriously increase the number of its troops in Ukraine. That is because Russia is evidently fearful of sending its conscripts into battle.”
  • After a small number of conscript units got mauled, Putin promised that no more conscripts would be sent.
  • The “Russia has a million man army” figure is misleading. Ground troops only total some 360,000 troops across the entire country, many of which are conscripts.
  • Russia can’t afford to pull every single competent ground troop from every corner of its country and send them to Ukraine. He could maybe get another 10-20,000 professional troops, but those would only be compensating for existing losses.
  • Russia has 35,000 local fighters in Donbas, but they’re not equipped to go on big offensives.
  • Belarus is unlikely to get involved, and may be more trouble than it’s worth, because their army is heavily made up of conscripts. “Fewer than 10,000 troops.” And the political repercussions could be costly.
  • But for Russia to have some chance of continuing to push inside Ukraine under the present conditions – where arms aid is flowing into Ukraine, and where morale issues are widespread within the Russian army – many more soldiers are an absolute must. If Russia does decide to send in conscripts or even the national guard, those would likely be kept back, to keep securing the taken areas. But for that the frontline needs to fully consolidate, without so many Ukrainian pockets of resistance. And still, the domestic political fallout of such a move might be deeply destabilizing.

  • Russia currently seems to be unwilling to increase its numbers in Ukraine above 200,000.
  • “For Ukraine, this war IS what the great patriotic war was for the Soviet Union in 1941.”
  • “With time, further troops and more weapons, Ukraine’s army may try to pressure even those consolidated Russian positions in the east and south.”
  • If there’s a flaw in this analysis, it’s that Putin could change his mind about using conscripts in a heartbeat. But Russia has had huge problems feeding and resupplying it’s existing army. Until that problem is fixed. more conscripts would mean throwing more badly-trained and ill-equipped troops into the meat grinder.

    Is Russia’s Military Running Out Of Equipment And Spare Parts?

    April 3rd, 2022

    Is Russia’s military running out of the equipment, spare parts and supplies necessary to maintain their war in Ukraine? Some reports say so, suggesting it’s because the parts are made in Ukrainian factories.

    Vladimir Putin is said to be running out of missiles, tanks and aircraft, because the parts they rely on are made in Ukraine.

    The engines of Russian military helicopters and key components for warships, cruise missiles and the majority of the nation’s fighter jets are all made in Ukrainian factories, the Telegraph reports.

    The factories, which also produce parts for tanks and ground to air missiles, no longer supply Mr Putin’s army.

    I’ve got to take this report with several grains of salt, because I assume those same factories must have stopped supplying Russia with spare parts after the seizure of Crimea and invasion of Donbas back in March of 2014. Are we to believe that Russia has failed to find alternate manufacturing sources for key military equipment for eight years? Russia’s invasion has displayed multiple levels of manifest incompetence, but it’s hard to believe they would be that incompetent for that long. (Now, could spare parts not exist due to massive corruption? That seems plausible, but it’s not the kind of thing you can count on your opponent suffering from.)

    The army is also understood to be running low on arms following five weeks of sustained bombardment of Ukrainian cities.

    This, on the other hand, seems quite plausible, given the well-documented logistical difficulties, and the furious rate at which Russian forces expended munitions during the initial assault.

    The T-72 battle tank is one of the Russian army’s main armoured vehicles but, parts for it are understood to be manufactured in Izyum, an eastern Ukrainian city that Mr Putin’s forces have failed to capture.

    The T-72 has been around since 1969. I can believe some of the high tech components for the most modern variants are in short supply, but surely they’ve have multiple source for the vast majority of mechanical parts for a long time now. And even if not, they built some 25,000 of the things, so I can’t imagine they don’t have enough mothballed tanks to provide spares, though it’s going to take time to get cannibalized parts out to field repair centers. (I’m assuming Russia has some sort of field repair capabilities, and I know Russian tank recovery vehicles were spotted on trains en-route to the theater before the war began.)

    Open-source intelligence estimates suggest that Russia has lost at least 2,000 tanks and armoured vehicles, although true figures are suspected to be higher.

    This I just flat out don’t believe. And indeed, when you go to what appears to be their primary source, they’re including a whole lot of trucks in that list, which aren’t counted as “armored vehicles.” The lesson here is “don’t believe anything that sounds too good to be true” and “always check the primary sources.”

    Speaking of primary sources, that Oryx blog list does look pretty useful, though the nature of the methodology (adding up all pictures of destroyed equipment) is certainly suspect to manipulation.

    Their summary line for Russian equipment losses as of this post “Russia – 2360, of which: destroyed: 1190, damaged: 41, abandoned: 232, captured: 897.”

    Here are the individual type breakdown lines:

    Tanks (405, of which destroyed: 190, damaged: 6, abandoned: 42, captured: 167)
    Armoured Fighting Vehicles (274, of which destroyed: 129, abandoned: 32, captured: 113)
    Infantry Fighting Vehicles (392, of which destroyed: 216, damaged: 2, abandoned: 31, captured: 142)
    Armoured Personnel Carriers (81, of which destroyed: 21, damaged: 1, abandoned: 17, captured: 42)
    Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles (17, of which destroyed: 9, abandoned: 3, captured: 5)
    Infantry Mobility Vehicles (76, of which destroyed: 43, damaged: 2, abandoned: 5, captured: 24)
    Communications Stations (15, of which destroyed: 4, abandoned: 5, captured: 6)
    Engineering Vehicles And Equipment (78, of which destroyed: 23, abandoned: 13, captured: 37)
    Heavy Mortars (11, of which destroyed: 3, captured: 8)
    Towed Artillery (47, of which destroyed: 9, damaged: 4, abandoned: 5, captured: 29)
    Self-Propelled Artillery (72, of which destroyed: 25, damaged: 3, abandoned: 14, captured: 29)
    Multiple Rocket Launchers (45, of which destroyed: 18, abandoned: 5, captured: 23)
    Anti-Aircraft Guns (3, of which captured: 3)
    Self-Propelled Anti-Aircraft Guns (11, of which destroyed: 5, abandoned: 3, captured: 3)
    Surface-To-Air Missile Systems (42, of which destroyed: 22, damaged: 1, abandoned: 7, captured: 12)
    Radars (4, of which destroyed: 1, captured: 3)
    Jammers And Deception Systems (6, of which destroyed: 2, damaged: 2, captured: 2)
    Aircraft (19, of which destroyed: 18, damaged: 1)
    Helicopters (38, of which destroyed: 33, damaged: 3, abandoned: 1, captured: 1)
    Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (21, of which destroyed: 14, captured: 7)
    Naval Ships (3, of which destroyed: 1, damaged: 2)
    Logistics Trains (2, of which destroyed: 2)
    Trucks, Vehicles and Jeeps (698, of which destroyed: 401, damaged: 16, abandoned: 59, captured: 210)

    (An aside: You’ve got to hand it to those Russian miltech geeks who look at this:

    And confidently declare “Oh, those are two destroyed 120mm 2B11/2S12 heavy mortars!” That’s some #DavesCarIDService level obsession there…)

    Keep in mind that Russia only had some 2,500 tanks assigned to active units at the start of the war (though other estimates are considerably higher). But given well-documented Russian maintenance problems, I can well believe several units have sustained losses in excess of that necessary to impair combat effectiveness.

    Keep in mind that the Soviet Union lost 83,500 tanks between 1941 and 1945 in World War II. Of course, that was a much broader theater, using much more widely-produced, low-tech tanks. Hell, two-way radios didn’t become standard Soviet equipment until 1944.

    For high tech munitions like smart bombs and guided missiles, I can well believe that Russia is running low on stock that can’t easily be replenished under the current sanctions regime. And we see ample evidence that field resupply has been negatively impacted by severe logistical difficulties. But “T-72s lack spare parts because the original factory was in Ukraine” doesn’t pass the smell test.