There’s so much Clinton Corruption news dropping I haven’t had time to sift through it all.
Take, for example, this 90 page document, evidently compiled by the 4Chan folks from publicly available sources. I’ve only started go through this. (A lot of it looks like unsourced speculation from the Chan Clan, so caveat lector.)
In other Clinton Corruption news:
There’s are persistent rumors that Donald Trump might (emphasis on the might) tap Newt Gingrich as his running mate, an idea that gained more currency with Gingrich scheduled to appear with Trump on the campaign trail. Trump’s manifest shortcomings and weird appeal has been covered at length by now, so lets talk about Gingrich.
Though a running mate’s primary constitutional duty is to step in and act as President in the event of the death or impeachment of the sitting President (plus break the occasional tie in the senate), a VP pick is supposed to accomplish three political tasks: Make it easier to win the general election (either by securing their home state or making inroads into a key electoral demographic), be the “bad cop” of the campaign (which ain’t happening, since Trump’s rhetorical style makes him his own bad cop), and to “balance the ticket,” either geographically (Kennedy/Johnson), ideologically (Dukakis/Bentsen), age and experience (Obama/Biden) or some other way. Gingrich would balance the ticket geographically (though if Trump actually needed Gingrich to win Georgia or any of the rest of the “deep” South, his campaign would be in serious trouble), but more importantly would provide a great deal of balance in terms of experience and insider knowledge.
Though stale as to the identities and proclivities of the current crop of insiders, as a former Speaker of the House, Gingrich is a master of the process and minutia of how Capitol Hill actually works. In his heyday, Gingrich was the most effective Republican speaker in my lifetime by a good measure, and possibly the most effective ever (depending on your opinion of Joseph Gurney Cannon, whose career I am not intimately familiar with). A Vice President Gingrich would greatly help cover up Trump’s many blindspots and areas of ignorance, as well as someone who could interface with the House and Senate.
In his heyday, Gingrich was one of the staunchest conservatives in the land. The problem is that Gingrich’s heyday was 1994 (when he unveiled the contract with America and helped Republicans retake the House for the first time since 1952) to 1999 (when he stepped down as Speaker). Since then he’s reinvented himself as an idea-a-minute futurist, offering a blur of interesting ideas, many of which were frequently innovative (but not always good). There’s no question that Gingrich still has the smarts to be an effective VP, but does he still have the focus?
A Trump/Gingrich ticket would probably be the most variable Presidential ticket ever. You could see a dozen innovative initiatives or an explosion of meaningless rhetoric. Trump might offload many policy tasks onto Gingrich (who then might do an excellent job of furthering the Republican agenda), or he might ignore him entirely. Gingrich is one of the very few plausible Trump running mates who would make the ticket more unpredictable.
About the only thing it wouldn’t be is boring.
One final bit of irony would be that liberals would have to refer to Gingrich as the kinder, gentler half of the ticket, something that might have made their heads explode in 1998…
If you’re not already suffering from Brexit fatigue by now, this John Gray piece in the New Statesmen has more than enough pith and insight to make it worth your time.
A lesson of the past few days is the danger of groupthink. Along with the major international institutions, the assembled might of establishment opinion – in the CBI and TUC, massed legions of economists and a partisan Bank of England – was confident that the existing order here and in Europe would be preserved by promises of unspecified reforms. Until around 2am on the morning of Friday 24 May, the bookies and currency traders followed the playbook that had been given them by the authorities and the pollsters. Then, in a succession of events of a kind that is becoming increasingly common, the script was abruptly torn up. A clear majority of voters had reached to the heart of the situation. Realising that the promises of European reform that had been made were empty, they opted for a sharp shift in direction. The consequences can already be observed: rapid political change in Britain and an accelerating process of unravelling in the European Union. The worldwide impact on markets and geopolitics will be long-lasting and profound.
There are sure to be concerted efforts to resist the referendum’s message. The rise of the hydra-headed monster of populism; the diabolical machinations of tabloid newspapers; conflicts of interest between baby boomers and millennials; divisions between the English provinces and Wales on the one hand and Scotland, London and Northern Ireland on the other; Jeremy Corbyn’s lukewarm support for the Remain cause; the buyer’s remorse that has supposedly set in after Remain’s defeat – these already commonplace tales will be recycled incessantly during the coming weeks and months. None of them captures the magnitude of the upheaval that has occurred. When voters inflicted the biggest shock on the establishment since Churchill was ousted in 1945 they signalled the end of an era.
Predictably, there is speculation that Brexit will not happen. If Britain can vote for Brexit, it is being argued, surely anything is possible. But those who think the vote can be overturned or ignored are telling us more about their own state of mind than developments in the real world. Like bedraggled courtiers fleeing Versailles after the French Revolution, they are unable to process the reversal that has occurred. Locked in a psychology of despair, anger and denial, they cannot help believing there will be a restoration of an order they believed was unshakeable.
Snip.
As it is being used today, “populism” is a term of abuse applied by establishment thinkers to people whose lives they have not troubled to understand. A revolt of the masses is under way, but it is one in which those who have shaped policies over the past twenty years are more remote from reality than the ordinary men and women at whom they like to sneer. The interaction of a dysfunctional single currency and destructive austerity policies with the financial crisis has left most of Europe economically stagnant and parts of it blighted with unemployment on a scale unknown since the Thirties. At the same time European institutions have been paralysed by the migrant crisis. Floundering under the weight of problems it cannot solve or that it has even created, the EU has demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that it lacks the capacity for effective action and is incapable of reform. As I suggested in this magazine in last year (“The neo-Georgian prime minister”, 23 October 2015), Europe’s image as a safe option has given way to the realisation that it is a failed experiment. A majority of British voters grasped this fact, which none of our establishments has yet understood.
Skip if you must Gray’s description of leadership fights among the Tories and Labourites, but his summation of the problem facing Labour is admirably succinct:
Leading Labour figures have denied adamantly that the party’s stance on immigration is central to the collapse of its working-class base. It was a complex of issues to do with de-industrialisation, they repeat, that led to mass desertion by Labour voters. There is some force in this, but it is essentially a way of evading an inconvenient truth.
Free movement of labour between countries with vastly different wage levels, working conditions and welfare benefits is a systemic threat to the job opportunities and living standards of Labour’s core supporters. Labour cannot admit this, because that would mean the EU is structured to make social democracy impossible.
Also this:
Corbyn is not alone in passing over this conflict. So do his opponents, and this is one reason why it will be extremely difficult to reverse Labour’s slide. If Yvette Cooper, Andy Burnham or David Miliband had been leader, the referendum would still have ended badly for Labour. No doubt the campaign would have been handled better. But the message would have been the same – promises of European reform that European institutions have shown to be worthless. Labour’s heartlands were already melting away. A rerun in the north and Midlands of Labour’s collapse in Scotland is now a distinct possibility. Fear of this disaster is one reason Labour is unlikely to split. With over 40 per cent of the party’s voters opting for Leave, anyone who joined a new “modernising” party would be on a fast lane to oblivion. Only a radical shift from progressive orthodoxies on immigration and the EU can save Labour from swift and terminal decline. It is doubtful whether any future leader could enforce such a shift, as it would be opposed by most Labour MPs and by activists. Yet it is plainly what millions of Labour voters want.
And this:
The contradictions of the world-view shared by progressive thinkers and established elites are becoming acutely evident. There is constant talk about being in a time of unprecedented change. Globalisation is connecting the world as never before; our lives are being continuously transformed by disruptive technologies; old ways of life and hierarchies in society are fast dissolving . . . these are the ruling clichés of the age. What is striking is that they are deployed to prop up a failing ancien régime. Not only in Britain and continental Europe but also in the Unite States, the human costs of a broken form of capitalism have fuelled popular revulsion – a revolt that has produced a mood of hysteria and something like blind panic among bien-pensants who pride themselves on their judicious rationality. Brexit will be followed by the end of Western civilisation, they foam, while a Trump presidency would be a planetary catastrophe. A paranoid style of liberalism has emerged that sees disaster and demonic evil at every turn.
And this:
“The new tolerance of anti-Semitism by sections of the left in Britain is an elite pathology: a disorder of the gibbering classes not the masses.”
Read the whole thing.
I held off on analysis of the FBI non-indictment of Hillary Clinton because I knew there would be many piquant opinions to be harvested from around the Internet, and indeed there are:
In other Clinton Corruption news:
Yesterday’s Brexit roundup mentioned that Italian banks account for nearly half the bad loans for the entire Eurozone.
Italy is now the heads-on favorite as the most likely instigator of the next global economic crisis. Some analysts are calling it a perfect storm:
Italy’s bank bailout fund might not be enough to beat back the Brexit. More key Italian financial services firms are under pressure and face the potential need to raise capital, leaving Italian government officials and its banking system trying to steer clear of a crisis.
As Italian bank bonds and share prices are seeing their value slammed in the face of rising uncertainty, banks with substantial bad loans are facing greater pressure, with rates around the world slipping into negative territory.
And, of course, they’re blaming Brexit rather than all the myriad problems with the EU that caused the Brexit.
Italy’s bank bailout fund might not be enough to beat back the Brexit. More key Italian financial services firms are under pressure and face the potential need to raise capital, leaving Italian government officials and its banking system trying to steer clear of a crisis.
As Italian bank bonds and share prices are seeing their value slammed in the face of rising uncertainty, banks with substantial bad loans are facing greater pressure, with rates around the world slipping into negative territory. It’s an anxiety some in Italy and throughout the European Union may have been hoping would be eased by the Brexit vote last month — but then the U.K. referendum delivered the opposite outcome from the one they had sought.
“Market volatility following the U.K.’s EU referendum result hit the Italian bank sector particularly hard because it is one of Europe’s weakest,” Fitch Ratings analysts said in a July 4 report. “Asset quality pressure is a main driver for the negative outlooks on several large and medium-sized Italian banks.”
The Brexit vote, which calls for the United Kingdom to abandon a European Union that has careened for years from one crisis to another, could hasten weak Italian banks’ downfall. It was widely expected that European and U.K. banks will suffer the brunt of the vote in late June, and while British banks have been hard hit by the news — which brings with it tremendous regulatory uncertainty — EU banks have suffered as well.
Many banks in Italy, including its largest, UniCredit SpA, have seen share prices pounded; its stock is down more than 60 percent so far this year. A staffer at UniCredit could not provide comment when contacted.
Already, Italian officials and executives appear to be pulling out all the stops to stave off banking sector contagion. The lingering question for banks is whether they can continue to support lending operations at a time when creditors face potential losses and as some of the country’s leading financial services firms could be subject to shotgun M&A marriages by regulators.
Italian financial services firms earlier this year established a multi-billion dollar fund called Atlante to buy non-performing bank loans. But the fund, which is in the 4-billion euro to 6-billion euro range ($4.43 billion to $6.65 billion), one analyst said, is far too small to cover all the non-performing loans held by major Italian banks. However, the fund could still be leveraged in order to support loan purchases.
“The authorities need to get banks to remove a large portion of soured loans from their books so they can loan more,” said Julien Jarmoszko, senior research manager at S&P Global Market Intelligence. “If investors fear more Italian banks, this will raise their cost of capital and reduce lending as a result.”
Look for some sort of holding action for temporary recapitalization (including a “bail in” or some sort of ECB scheme) to let all the insiders dump their bad debts onto the European taxpayer, which was the real point of prolonging the Greek farce.
More news on that front:
Of course, when push comes to shove, we’re likely to see all sorts of banking rules get thrown out the window…
FBI punts on criminal prosecution.
FBI confirms Hillary was careless, sent classified information.
“Hostile actors” may have gained access to Hillary Clinton’s server.
All quick notes from the news conference. Maybe more later.
While the reverberations from the Brexit vote are still being heard, here are a few interesting pieces you might have missed:
As several commentators, from Megan McArdle in The Atlantic to Rupert Darwall in National Review, have noticed, many liberal journalists, representing elites throughout the advanced world, have reacted with indignation to the fact that 52 percent of U.K. voters (many without degrees) have rejected the EU system of supranational government of which the elites approve. Naturally, these journalistic spokesmen argue, the common people could not possibly have good reasons for such an act of multinational vandalism. So they must be inspired by, er, racism, xenophobia, fear of globalization, and related other thought-crimes.
That account doubtless condenses and oversimplifies the elites’ response to the Brexit shock, which is just one small skirmish in a new class war in advanced societies between geographically mobile, liberal, skilled, high-earning professionals and more rooted, communitarian, particularist, and patriotic citizens (or what British journalist David Goodhart calls “nowhere” people and “somewhere” people). “Nowhere” people simply didn’t grasp the outlook of “somewhere people” in the referendum, not seeing that many decent people who voted for Brexit had such respectable anxieties as loss of community or, one step up, the transformation of their country as motives for casting their votes. So the elites thought the worst. They were still making the same mistake in their television and columnar explanations of the result on Friday morning. But what was remarkable was the Darwall-McArdle thesis that in other countries the elites reacted to the Brexit shock as if personally or spiritually affronted in their own lives. Alarmed, they asked: Why weren’t we told that they might vote for Brexit?
It’s a hard question to answer.
One aspect of it, however, is ideologically fascinating. Among the central arguments of those favoring Brexit was that the Brussels system was dangerously undemocratic and that British voters and MPs had lost the power to propose, amend, or repeal failed or oppressive laws. This was a passionate concern among English people who had grown up in a self-governing democracy, who may have fought for it in wars, and who simply couldn’t understand why the loss of their democratic rights didn’t worry their opponents. Yet again and again liberal journalists treated this passionate belief as either abstract or a cover for more primitive emotions and bigotries. Democracy as such was rarely given weight in Remain or liberal debates on the cost/benefit analysis of Brexit. They treat multinational political institutions as such unalloyed goods that it would be impolite to raise questions about such defects as a democratic deficit. Has the knowledge class/meritocracy/cognitive elite/nowhere people/etc., etc. developed not only an intellectual snobbery towards the rest of society, but even an impatient, dismissive contempt for democracy that cannot be openly avowed but that does influence its other political attitudes?
To celebrate, here’s Colin Furze setting off 5,000 fireworks launchers all at once: